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How Religious Identity and Threat Structure Political Attitudes 
 
by 
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SUPERVISOR: David L. Leal 
 
 This dissertation examines how religious group identity and the perception of 
threat toward one’s religious group affect political attitudes. Drawing on social identity 
theory, it argues that religion is a meaningful social category to which individuals can 
develop a psychological attachment. This enables individuals to locate themselves within 
their social and political contexts, and also to perceive threats to their religious group, 
which can elevate the salience of their religious identity and alter religion’s causal impact 
on politics. This amends the literature’s predominant understanding of religion’s 
politically relevant facets by accounting for religion as a social identity. This also enables 
a more dynamic conceptualization of religion as responsive to changing circumstances in 
the political environment. 
Among the dissertation’s contributions, it develops reliable survey measures of 
religious identity. Using these measures, it establishes the relationship between religious 
identity and threat, showing threat and religious identity to have independent and 
statistically significant effects on political attitudes. It also finds threat to have a 
moderating effect on religious identity, which matters more for those with weaker 
religious identities than for those with stronger ones. Finally, it finds that the moderating 
vii 
effect of threat on religious identity among Republicans (as with the general population) 
is felt the strongest by those with weaker religious identities and decreases in magnitude 
as religious identity strengthens. However, the inverse is true for Democrats, with threat’s 
greatest moderating effect being seen among those with stronger religious identities. 
By viewing religion as a social identity, this dissertation explores the social and 
cognitive processes that make religion such a powerful political force, which helps to 
better explain the political consequences of religious division during a time of growing 
religious pluralism and demographic change. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Theory 
 
 
“It Just Feels Less Christian” 
Mount Airy, North Carolina Mayor David Rowe got his man, as he shared with a 
Washington Post reporter about why Donald Trump received such strong support from 
rural towns like his during the 2016 presidential election. “We try to live the good old 
days, but it’s hard,” Rowe said. “Now it’s about secular progressivism, not the values you 
get out of this book,” he explained while tapping the leather-bound Bible atop his office 
desk. Another Mount Airy resident echoed the mayor’s sentiment, “We’re losing control 
of our freedoms…. The government was taking away our rights. Taxes are higher, our 
jobs are gone, and it just feels less Christian” (Bailey 2017). 
It just feels less Christian. This is not an uncommon sentiment, especially among 
conservative Christians (e.g., Hunter 1983; Smith 1998). The words of these Mount Airy 
residents are thick with meaning. They evidence a deep and personal identification with a 
particular expression of Christianity. They offer political analysis and social commentary 
that is thoroughly shaped by an experience of religion. They have a kind of ominous 
overtone of existential threat to their religious worldview and the social context that it 
helped to form. The irony is not lost that Mount Airy is the town on which Andy Griffith 
based his fictional Mayberry. 
In this dissertation, I argue that religion to individuals such as these is more than 
an affiliation, or a set of beliefs, or even habitual behaviors like praying and attending 
church. Rather, religion is also a social identity that forms when someone self-categorizes 
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with a social group to a such a degree that their identity as a group member also shapes 
their identity as a person. Like other social identities, this religious identity is sensitive to 
threats to the group. In these pages, I explore the idea of religion as a social identity and 
how individuals viewing themselves among a particular “people of God” can affect the 
structure of their political attitudes and inform our understandings of religion’s causal 
impact on politics. 
Is America really less Christian? The notion has perceptible albeit not dramatic 
empirical support. According to the General Social Survey (GSS), only 7% of Americans 
were religiously unaffiliated in 1973 compared with 17% in 2008. Mainline Protestants 
experienced the biggest decline over this period of time as a proportion of the nation’s 
population, with their share dropping more than half from about 28% to just 13%. This 
isn’t entirely due to attrition. There has been a modest slump in the raw number of 
Americans who affiliate with historic mainline denominations, but the nation’s larger 
demographic trends have also watered down the position of these largely white 
denominations. Roman Catholics now comprise a larger proportion of the population, 
propelled especially by Latino population growth. Evangelical Protestant affiliation 
remains roughly stable at just less than a quarter of the population in 2008, nearly 
unchanged from 1973 (Smith et al. 1973; 2008). Non-Christian traditions have 
experienced a very slight, almost imperceptible uptick. By far, the largest non-Christian 
movement has been the rise in unaffiliated Americans. This does not mean a rise in 
atheist or agnostic belief. Rather, a significant number of these are people whom Hout 
and Fischer (2002) would term “unchurched believers.” While not affiliating with 
Christianity per se, they still reflect some of its religious sensibilities. 
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Looking strictly at religious affiliation and church attendance, one could make the 
case that America is marginally less Christian. However, in their extensive study of 
American religion and public life, Putnam and Campbell (2010) reveal a more nuanced 
and muddled picture. While affiliation and attendance have waned, many of those who 
now “demur from indicating a formal religious affiliation [still] believe religion is 
important, pray regularly, and even attend a given congregation on occasion” (176). 
These kinds of distinctives are most noticeable when evaluating generational differences. 
Putnam and Campbell found that a significant number of younger Americans are reticent 
to embrace their parents’ religious expressions due to, among other reasons, their political 
overtones. Since the 1970s, traditional views of gender roles and human sexuality have 
ebbed across the board among Americans, including evangelical Christians who have 
historically championed such views in both the pulpit and the public square. This is most 
noticeable among younger cohorts, who prefer religious expressions that are less defined 
by moral traditionalism. As a result, “roughly half of white Americans have departed 
from their parents’ religious stance, either through switching to a different religious 
tradition or through lapsing” (159). 
This reflects more fundamental changes afoot in America’s religious landscape. 
American society is not so much less religious as it is religious in different ways than 
before (Finke and Stark 2005; Putnam and Campbell 2010). Religions are more 
integrated than just a few decades ago. Americans are far less likely to inherit their 
religious preferences and more likely to change religious denominations than ever before. 
A person’s engagement with religious faith may not be defined by a particular religious 
denomination, or even by organized religion at all, as demonstrated by the emerging 
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segment of the population that identifies as “spiritual but not religious.” Younger 
Christians have drifted toward religious expressions that are less exclusivist and more 
self-consciously pluralist in their relationship to other traditions and society as a whole. 
There is a great deal more self-sorting in the religious landscape than ever before, 
and politics is a factor in that process. As Putnam and Campbell explain, interreligious 
marriage and a rise of religious switching and churning may have made American 
religion more integrated, but the self-selection process has also created a more 
ideologically polarized religious landscape: 
people (especially young people) have increasingly sorted themselves out 
religiously according to their moral and political views, leaving both the liberal, 
secular pole and the conservative, evangelical pole strengthened and the moderate 
religious middle seriously weakened. Religious polarization has increasingly 
aligned Americans’ religious affiliations with their political inclinations. (132) 
It is therefore understandable that the reporter’s interview subjects in Mount Airy, North 
Carolina, view their social and political surroundings as “less Christian,” particularly if 
their experience of Christianity binds together religious faith and practice with a certain 
set of social and political attitudes. As the mayor explained, he sees young people leave 
for college and come back with more progressive, secular views. From his perspective, 
the political left represents more than a political ideology with which he disagrees; it is a 
threat to the Christian faith. Sociologist Christian Smith (1998) identified a sense of 
existential threat toward their religious group as a common feature of American 
evangelicalism, ranging from a basic sense of displaced heritage or second-class 
citizenship in an American society that “is now turning its back on its Judeo-Christian 
	
5 
roots” (136) to a more serious fear of “increasingly powerful, organized groups in 
America with clearly anti-Christian agendas” (142). 
While Smith’s research focused on evangelicals, other religious groups also 
experience threat within the political environment. Minority religious groups including 
Roman Catholics, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and atheists experienced various 
forms of discrimination that eventuated in some of the nation’s most cited case law on the 
establishment and free exercise of religion. Muslim-Americans have had particular 
difficulty finding political welcome in the U.S. In Texas, for example, one state 
lawmaker singled out Muslim visitors to pledge allegiance to the United States in order to 
visit her capitol office, also writing, “I did leave an Israeli flag on the reception desk…. 
We will see how long they stay in my office” (Hamilton and Ura 2015). 
This dissertation aims to understand the political consequences of situations like 
these. How does an individual’s identification with a religious group shape one’s political 
attitudes, and how might that be affected by the experience or perception of threat? 
Group identity and threat are closely related concepts. The experience of political threat 
typically occurs via reference groups, since the collective action incentives of democratic 
politics lead individuals to understand interests in terms of groups. As Smith (1998) 
explains, “the human drives for meaning and belonging are satisfied primarily by locating 
human selves within social groups that sustain distinctive, morally orienting collective 
identities” (90). A salient group identity provides a medium through which an individual 
can perceive a policy as threatening one’s interests or wellbeing. When this occurs, a 
group identity can take on a heightened level of political relevance, termed “group 
consciousness” in some literatures. 
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Several studies have demonstrated the political consequences of group identity 
and threat, especially work on race (Matthews and Prothro 1966; Gurin et al. 1980; Miller 
et al. 1981; Conover 1988; Dawson 1994; Chong and Rogers 2005) and national identity 
(Huddy 2003; Huddy et al. 2005). However, religion remains largely neglected by the 
growing body of political research on group identity and threat, even though research also 
shows that Americans are increasingly divided along religious lines (Layman and 
Carmines 1997; Layman 2001). Consequently, religion provides an auspicious 
opportunity to expand our knowledge about the ways in which group identity and threat 
affect politics and policy in the United States. 
If religion is a meaningful group identity, its role in structuring political attitudes 
should account for the social psychological processes involved with an individual’s 
identification with a religious group. Previous studies of religion and politics have 
identified three dimensions of religion’s political relevance. These include religious 
affiliation, religious belief, and religious practice, often referred to as the “three Bs,” 
belonging, believing, and behaving (Kellstedt et al. 1996; Layman 1997; 2001; Green 
2007; Olson and Warber 2008; Smidt et al. 2009). However, none of these account for 
psychological identification with one’s religious group. This informs the first of my 
dissertation’s overarching hypotheses: 
 
H1: Group identity is a politically relevant dimension of the way in which religion 
structures political attitudes. 
 
From this perspective, religion not only provides adherents with a particular set of 
orienting beliefs about life’s deepest questions, but also a social group from which self-
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conception may be derived (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981; Conover 1988; Brewer 
2001; Huddy 2001). The linkage of self-conception to group processes highlights 
religion’s capacity to forge a distinction between “us” and “them.” This distinction 
enables an assessment of whether a policy benefits or adversely affects one’s group. 
When a policy appears to pose or cause disadvantage, it can elicit a sense of threat. 
Research on race, terrorism, and nationalism has found that perceived threat to one’s 
social group leads to more extreme preferences for policies that relate to the threat 
(Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Huddy 
et al. 2005). This informs my second overarching hypothesis: 
 
H2: If religion is a salient group identity for an individual, the perception of 
threat to one’s religious group will lead to more extreme policy preferences. 
 
These hypotheses frame an exploration of the relationship between threat and religious 
group identity in the formation of policy attitudes. 
This dissertation examines these hypotheses through original survey and 
experimental research that develops and assesses quantitative measures of religious group 
identity and examines the impact of religious identity and threat on policy attitudes. This 
promises several research contributions. First, it yields data on religious group identity 
and develops measures that can be used in future research. Second, its focus on religious 
group identity and perceived threat as determinants of political attitudes explores a 
previously understudied dimension of religion’s political relevance. Third, while current 
political research on religion tends to focus on specific religious groups, this project seeks 
to develop a richer theoretical understanding of the social and psychological forces that 
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shape religion’s political effect. Fourth, this informs our understanding of group identity 
and threat in politics more generally by bringing religion together with research on other 
social identities. Much of our current political understanding of group identity and threat 
emerges from studies of race and national identity. Religion offers an ideal opportunity to 
extend this research to a new area of study and develop more general theories. 
This research is particularly important during a time in which the United States 
grows more religiously diverse. The power of religion to motivate attitudes and behaviors 
has become increasingly evident, especially in the years since September 11, 2001. 
Religious cleavages play a conspicuous role in some of America’s most controversial 
policy debates, many of which involve fundamental questions of political rights that 
directly affect individual lives and liberties. Religion has also featured prominently in the 
common narratives about many national elections circa the 1970s forward. Religious 
pluralism and social change exacerbate the relevance of these religious cleavages, 
challenging the political trust and liberal values that maintain democratic stability in the 
United States. 
At present, political science lacks a thorough rendering of the way in which 
religion structures political attitudes and affects public debate. This dissertation examines 
how the relationship between individuals and their religion affects their relationship to 
politics. By viewing religion as a social identity, it explores the cognitive processes that 
make religion such a powerful political force. This benefits society by expanding our 
knowledge of the political consequences of religious division during a time of growing 
religious pluralism and demographic change, and open new possibilities for public 
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conversation on the role of religion in an increasingly diverse and globally connected 
society. 
 
American Exceptionalism 
Context matters, especially in social science. Almost any examination of religion 
and politics in the United States would do well to account for the exceptional nature of its 
religious landscape vis-à-vis most Western counterparts, as is certainly the case here. 
This section presents social scientific and historical explanations for the unique 
relationship that exists between religion and politics in the U.S., which underlies the 
central questions of this study.  
Social observers, public intellectuals, and researchers alike have long noted the 
prominence of religion in American public life. Tocqueville ([1835] 2000) was struck by 
this religiosity in his reflections on American democracy: 
On my arrival in the United States it was the religious aspect of the country that 
first struck my eye. As I prolonged my stay, I perceived the great political 
consequences that flowed from these new facts. (282) 
Since at least the 18th Century, Europe’s leading secular philosophers and thinkers have 
predicted that the Enlightenment’s entrance onto the stage of human thought would 
inevitably lead to religion’s exit (e.g., Woolston, Comte, Engels, Nietzsche, Freud; see 
Stark 1999 for discussion). Thomas Jefferson did not necessarily view religion or theism 
in toto as incongruous with the modern future, but still opined, “there is not a young man 
now living in the United States who will not die a Unitarian” (Healy 1984, 373; see also 
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Stark 1999). For his part, Tocqueville ([1835] 2000, 282) could find no evidence of 
secularization whatsoever in the United States, writing: 
the facts do not accord with this theory. There is a certain European population 
whose disbelief is equaled only by their brutishness and ignorance, whereas in 
America one sees one of the freest and most enlightened peoples in the world 
eagerly fulfill all the external duties of religion. 
Modern sociology nonetheless coalesced around the idea, led by its founding figures. As 
Weber ([1922] 1946, 155) aptly summarized: 
The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization 
and, above all, by the disenchantment of the world. . . . One need no longer have 
recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the 
savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed.  Technical means and 
calculations perform the service. 
Or, more poetically by Durkheim, “the former gods are growing old or dying, and others 
have not been born” (Durkheim 1912, 429). Berger (1967) reflects the common 
sociological sentiment of the middle 20th Century, arguing that religion was undergoing a 
process of losing its plausibility structure as “sectors of society and culture are removed 
from the domination of religious institutions and symbols” (107). The modern world no 
longer required religion to play a legitimating function like a sacred canopy over all 
human society. 
However, by the 1970s and 80s, American society and politics had yet to bear out 
the prognostications of, by that point, several centuries of thinkers. Quite to the contrary, 
the 1976 presidential election saw the election of a self-proclaimed evangelical Christian, 
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Jimmy Carter, to the Presidency—a man who just eight years earlier spent entire weeks 
in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts knocking on doors to invite strangers into a personal 
relationship with Jesus Christ (Balmer 2014). During the 1976 election, it is little wonder 
that Southern Baptist preacher Bailey Smith used his keynote address to the 
denomination’s annual convention to beseech his fellow religionists that, while he could 
not tell them for whom to vote, America “needs a born again man in the White House” 
and “his initials are the same as our Lord’s” (Williams 2010, 125). Such events led 
Newsweek to declare 1976 “the year of the evangelical.” 
Many evangelicals supported Carter’s election but grew disenchanted with an 
administration they perceived to ignore their policy priorities and preferences, especially 
on social issues. This did not dissuade them from their newfound political interest, 
though. Rather, they mobilized with even greater force in advance of the 1980 election to 
displace Carter in favor of Ronald Reagan. With the aid of newly established, politically 
oriented para-church organizations, such as the Moral Majority, evangelicals flexed their 
religious muscle as the new 800-pound gorilla in America’s public square. These groups 
exerted significant influence over policymakers as grassroots lobbyists in the decades that 
followed. Electorally, this same sector of the electorate would again get their man, so to 
speak, with the 2000 election of George W. Bush, who famously proclaimed Jesus Christ 
to be his favorite political philosopher during a nationally televised primary debate, 
“because he changed my heart.” Bush was not shy about his evangelical faith, a fact that 
filmmaker Oliver Stone satirized as a political vow to never be “out Texan’d or out 
Christian’d.” 
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Sociologist James Davison Hunter found numerous examples of religious voices 
and argumentation among the most prominent and controversial public policy debates 
beginning in roughly the 1970s. Especially striking to him was the coalescence of 
evangelical Protestants and conservative Roman Catholics and Jews into a political force 
in elections and on social policy issues. Hunter was most intrigued by this alliance, which 
American political history suggests as strange bedfellows. Not only had these groups 
seldom allied in matters of public life, their relationship in the not too distant past would 
have more likely been characterized by animosity if not bloodshed. Now, they joined 
together in marches and campaigns, and organized together for the election of 
conservative Republican candidates, the appointment of conservative federal judges, and 
the passage of socially conservative legislation (Hunter 1991). 
While among the loudest, these were certainly not the only religious voices to 
have crowded the public square over the latter half of the 20th Century. It is impossible to 
make even a cursory examination of religion in American politics during this time 
without also noting the profound imprint of religion on the Civil Rights Movement and 
its work in the American South. Some of the Movement’s most prominent leaders and 
organizers were pastors of African American Protestant churches. The Black Church 
offered, at the very least, an informal organizational structure and the opportunity to gain 
the requisite civic skills to engineer a social movement. Moreover, the spirituality of the 
Black Church lent powerful themes, imagery, and stamina to the Movement. As Rev. 
Andrew Young explained, “Ours was an evangelical freedom movement that identified 
with not just one’s personal relationship with God, but a new relationship between people 
black and white” (Harvey 2005, 169; also Young 2008). 
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We might expect nothing less from one of the most religious demographic groups 
in American society, with upwards of 80% of Black Church affiliates reporting to pray 
daily according to the Pew Research Center’s most recent Religious Landscape Survey 
(Pew Research Center 2014). Moreover, many Black Church clergypersons and 
congregants view political involvement as a religious imperative. As Fowler et al. (2010) 
argue, “African American Christianity in the United States today is self consciously 
political” (284). Research has also shown religion to be a meaningful political 
determinant for Latinos, e.g., leading to increased political participation (Jones-Correa 
and Leal 2001; Leal 2007; 2010). Although diverse religious affiliations, national origins, 
and immigrant status make for a more complex story. 
My intended point, here, is not an exhaustive demonstration of religion in 
American public life, but to point out that America was and remains an outlier for the 
secularization thesis. Contrary to a great deal of social science in the 1960s, 
Tocqueville’s words have never seemed truer, “the facts do not accord with this theory.” 
The U.S. has not followed the pattern set by most of its Western peers. Berger eventually 
agreed, as did many others, that the secularization pattern simply did not hold in the U.S. 
(Berger, Davie, and Fokas 2008; also Stark 1999). There is something peculiar about 
religion and its relationship with civic and political life in the U.S., a conclusion that 
Tocqueville had reached a century and a half earlier. 
By the 1990s, market theories of religion presented an alternative explanation for 
religion’s continued prominence in American society (e.g., Iannaccone 1994; Stark 1999; 
Finke and Stark 2005). Pluralism and disestablishment in America provided an 
opportunity for religious entrepreneurs to populate a marketplace, so to speak, with a vast 
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and diverse supply of religious options to meet society’s demand for otherworldly 
compensators. Given this supply of religious options, market actors have ample 
opportunity to find avenues of religious expression that meet their personal preferences. 
In contrast, the vitality of religion in Europe (or lack thereof) reflects a history in which 
state churches, absent the same kind of competitive forces and entrepreneurial 
atmosphere, produced ultimately less robust options and less appealing brands. In other 
words, Europe’s religious marketplace does not reflect a lack of demand so much as 
inadequate supply. 
In this market account, the separation of church and state in the U.S. has proven 
the great innovation that spurred the development of such an exceptional religious 
landscape. The ratification of the U.S. Constitution marked the first time in Western 
history that the foundational document of a nation’s political order severed the tie 
between religion and the state. This was not without contention or without angst on the 
part of some religious leaders. By 1833, with the disestablishment of the Congregational 
Church in Massachusetts, no official state privilege for religious remained in the U.S. 
Connecticut’s Lyman Beecher, a prominent Presbyterian minister, feared the worst, 
believing that religion’s role in society was too great to be relegated to purely voluntary 
status. Though, his tune was soon a very different following the Second Great 
Awakening, calling disestablishment: 
the best thing that ever happened to the State of Connecticut. It cut the churches 
loose from dependence on state support. It threw them wholly on their own 
resources and on God…. They say ministers have lost their influence; the fact is, 
they have gained. By voluntary efforts, societies, missions, and revivals, they 
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exert a deeper influence than ever they could by queues, and shoe-buckles, and 
cocked hats, and gold-headed cane.1 (Gaustad and Noll 2003, 300) 
Historian Frank Lambert (2008, 42) further explains: 
The biggest change was in the ministers’ industry; they began to preach and build 
churches with an energy never before seen in the [preceding years of state 
privilege]. The animosity between established and dissenting congregations 
evaporated because all were now on the same footing. The new unity manifested 
itself in a concerted attack against infidels, especially through an evangelical 
revival that enjoyed widespread support among most denominations.2 
Indeed, an open marketplace proved highly propitious for the development of religion in 
America. Not only did it promote evangelical awakening, it led to remarkable religious 
innovation with a host of “Made in America” sects, like the Mormons, Shakers, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, millenarian offshoots, restoration movements, utopian movements, 
and seekers of ecstatic experience. Upstate New York saw so many revival and new 
religious movements during the early and mid 19th Century, it became known as the 
“burned-over district;” simply put, no more fuel, i.e., unconverted souls, remained. Each 
in their own way, these sects engaged their adherents in doing battle with secular ills, 
some through withdrawal and others through engagement. Smith (1998) explicates a 
“subcultural identity theory” of religion, demonstrating how a sense of minority status 
																																																								
1 Beecher contrasts voluntary religion over and against emblems of traditional 
authority. 
2 For the authoritative account of the rise of voluntary religion in the U.S., see Nathan 
Hatch’s (1989) The Democratization of American Christianity. 
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and embattlement with broader society and the secular world can propel a religious group 
to thrive. 
In sum, America is a nation of religious consumers with a higher than normal 
demand for religious options relative to the balance of the Western world. This relates to 
its vast and differentiated religious supply, thanks to a longstanding culture of innovation 
and disestablishment. If these features comprise the structure of America’s exceptional 
religious landscape, its ethos is just as exceptional. From the earliest colonists, religion 
has provided a powerful orienting vision for American public life. 
 
“A City Upon a Hill” 
In 1630, a band of some 700 English Puritans set sail across the Atlantic to 
establish a New England, fueled by their collective desire for a political order in which 
true Christianity might be modeled for the world. Aboard their flagship vessel, the 
Arbella, John Winthrop presented a bold vision for their experiment in the form of a 
sermon, birthed out of competing desires for religious dissent but also conformity. They 
wished to dissent, in conscience, from what they viewed as a Church of England that had 
strayed too far from the purity of the Christian gospel. Yet they desired conformity within 
their ranks to a new religious and political arrangement, built around their own 
interpretation of a Christian vision for a well-functioning society. Winthrop preached: 
For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people 
are upon us. So that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have 
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undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be 
made a story and a by-word through the world. (Griffith 2007, 18) 
The novelty of the enterprise was clearly on Winthrop’s mind, as was its consequence. 
Thus stands the cause between God and us. We are entered into covenant with 
Him for this work. We have taken out a commission. The Lord hath given us 
leave to draw our own articles…. [But] if we shall neglect the observation of 
these articles which are the ends we have propounded, and, dissembling with our 
God, shall fall to embrace this present world and prosecute our carnal intentions, 
seeking great things for ourselves and our posterity, the Lord will surely break out 
in wrath against us, and be revenged of such a people, and make us know the 
price of the breach of such a covenant. (19) 
In their minds, they had the problems of the Church of England fully diagnosed. Bad 
theology, political enmeshment, and moral laxity had converged like a perfect storm to 
compromise the English church’s ability to serve as a sure rudder amidst the world’s 
tempestuous sea. And the sea was indeed tempestuous. For decades, the English throne 
and ecclesiastical leadership were tossed about like badminton shuttlecocks, volleying 
between Catholic and Protestant, high and low church sensibilities, competing political 
loyalties, and varying perspectives on tolerance and conformity. From the Puritan 
perspective, drastic action was necessary to restore truth and stability to the church. 
The common story goes that Winthrop’s Puritans fled England for North America 
to secure the requisite liberty to worship and practice their religion as they saw fit. This is 
about half right. They were absolutely insular in belief and custom, physically separating 
from England and closely monitoring standards of conduct and belief among themselves. 
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But their vision for this enterprise was not so provincial. They were founders and 
dreamers whose concerns were global as much as local. They sought nothing less than 
the renewal of the Christian church, first embodied in their little commonwealth and then 
to England and onto the world. They would bear witness, through personal piety and 
social concord, as a model Christian society. Through this witness, they would transform 
political realities as onlookers “shall say of succeeding plantations, ‘may the Lord make it 
like that of New England’” (Griffith 2007, 19). 
Winthrop’s sermon aboard the Arbella, “A Model of Christian Charity,” was not 
simply a final exhortation before disembarking at Massachusetts Bay. In the immediate 
sense, it offered his people a brief but full-throated political theology for a Christian 
commonwealth. But in the larger context of history, it offers much more; something 
perhaps obscured by the failure of the Puritan project. By the second generation, doctrinal 
compromises were already necessary to shore up lagging membership (and the Puritan 
faith’s political dominance). Winthrop’s Puritans never built their city upon a hill, but in 
some key ways they nonetheless influenced the development of American religion and its 
unique place in the nation’s democratic life. 
The Puritan project represents one of the earliest expressions of the ethos of 
American exceptionalism. Winthrop and his fellow colonists believed themselves to be 
on a divinely ordained mission as instruments in the redemption of the English church 
and society. In subsequent years, America’s leading theologians would eschew much of 
Winthrop’s humility and more directly identify America with God’s intentions in the 
world. In a sermon titled “The Latter-Day Glory Is Probably to Begin in America,” 
Jonathan Edwards opined that America might be the locus of the eschatological new 
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heavens and new earth spoken of in Christian theology. Still others in the founding era 
referred to America as a New Israel or New Zion.  
This theology evolved into a civil religion that invested national ends with a sense 
of divine ordination, from independence to manifest destiny to wars and policy agendas, 
both domestic and international. Thomas Jefferson provides one of the clearest examples 
of this narrative, suggesting “a representation of the children of Israel in the wilderness, 
led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night” for the national seal (Novak 2002). 
Ernest Tuveson (1968) referred to this sentiment as a belief in America as a “redeemer 
nation,” which he explains as, “chosen race, chosen nation; millennial-utopian destiny for 
mankind; a continuing war between good (progress) and evil (reaction) in which the 
United States is to play a starring role as world redeemer” (viii). 
The theme of America as a city upon a hill also demonstrates that the central 
questions of this dissertation run deep within the nation’s soul. The experience of 
religious threat drove America’s earliest religious innovators to entrepreneur a political 
order in which they could pursue their spiritual vision for human relationships with one 
another and with God. However, while they found creative space in America for their 
own experiment they also replicated the same tension between dominion and pluralism 
that caused the experience of religious threat that eventuated in their transatlantic journey 
to begin with. Nonconformists like Anne Hutchinson were banished. Puritans hanged the 
convinced Quaker, Mary Dyer, in Boston Common. This tension between dominion and 
pluralism would lead Roger Williams to found Rhode Island as “a shelter for persons 
distressed for conscience,” and the Mormons to embark on a Westward journey. It would 
lead Roman Catholic Bishop John Hughes to challenge New York’s anti-Catholic 
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education policies and post armed guards at church to protect his immigrant flock from 
Nativist uprisings. It would inspire epic court battles originating in places like Dayton, 
Tennessee; Champaign, Illinois; and Abingdon, Pennsylvania, that would shape and 
reshape the contours of state expressions of religion in the U.S. It would arouse high 
profile policy battles and motivate vote choices and political engagement for everyday 
Americans in such places as Mount Airy, North Carolina. 
Social science and history demonstrate that both the structure and ethos of 
America’s religious landscape lend to an enduring and meaningful political cleavage that 
is defined by the relationships within and between religious groups and their broader 
society. As new chapters in American history are written, our ability to understand the 
impact of religion on the nation’s democratic life will hinge on an adequate 
understanding of these relationships. By focusing on the understudied facets of religious 
group identity and threat, this dissertation seeks to promote a more thorough rendering of 
how religion structures the political attitudes of Americans. 
 
Theoretical Foundations  
Political science has long noted the political relevance of the many groups to 
which people belong (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1960). 
While the nature and meaning of these groups has provided its share of disagreements, 
few would deny the formative role they play in shaping the attitudes and behaviors of 
their members. Americans are members of many different groups: race, gender, class, 
region, religion, sexual orientation, age, occupation, party affiliation, and on and on. 
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Indeed, political science regularly accounts for these distinctions. However, these groups 
do not stand on equal footing in an individual’s mind. When it comes to politics, some 
groups are more salient than others. They also operate differently in terms of how they 
impart values, convey meaning, affect cognition, and ultimately influence the way people 
believe and act. 
Attachment to groups exists in gradations. While Americans are members of 
many groups, they only identify with some. Group membership is often based on 
ascription, especially by social scientists who seek to parse group differences. Group 
membership can provide descriptive insight but not necessarily account for causation. 
McClain et al. (2009) explain that membership does not necessarily entail broader social 
or cultural values that may or may not be universally held by individual members. That is 
rather the domain of group identity. In contrast to group membership, group identity 
implies a psychological attachment to a group rooted in a shared social experience with 
other group members (Gurin et al. 1980; Miller et al. 1981; Chong and Rogers 2005; 
McClain et al. 2009). Perhaps no area of scholarship has explicated this distinction more 
than the area of race. 
Race has dominated the study of groups in the U.S. The majority of this work has 
looked at group identity among African Americans. This area of research has produced a 
variety of conceptualizations and measures of racial identity. Some studies locate group 
identity in the degree of closeness an individual feels towards others of one’s race (e.g., 
Matthews and Prothro 1966). Others consider racial identity as a “multidimensional 
construct” (e.g., Miller et al. 1981; McClain et al. 2009). In this, racial group identity 
emerges not only out of the closeness a person feels toward others of their race, but also 
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the variety of ways in which racial distinctions contribute to one’s life experience, 
including cultural, social, political, and psychological elements. 
Scholars have also found that racial identity can become politicized. Here, group 
members not only sense a psychological attachment to their racial group, but also hold a 
shared set of political interests based on a common assessment of the group’s social 
status and believe that these interests can be advanced through collective action (Gurin et 
al. 1980; Miller et al. 1981; Conover 1988; Dawson 1994; Chong and Rogers 2005). This 
politicized group identity is often referred to as “group consciousness,” to emphasize that 
group members are actively conscious of their status as a group member and their group’s 
social status vis-à-vis society as a whole (e.g., Miller et al. 1981). 
Linked fate is one particular manifestation of group consciousness, where group 
members view their personal interests as inextricably bound up with those of their racial 
group generally (Dawson 1994). This is often assessed through the question: “Do you 
think what happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do 
with what happens in your life?” Linked fate offers the benefit of encapsulating multiple 
dimensions of group identity and consciousness into a single concept and measurement. 
However, it is not synonymous with group consciousness. While emerging from a strong 
group consciousness, linked fate specifically implies the presence of a heuristic where 
group interests serve as a proxy for individual ones. Group consciousness, more 
generally, refers to the political relevance of a salient group identity. Still, the use of these 
concepts, terms, and measurements can vary across study, reflecting again the 
multidimensionality of group identity and consciousness (Huddy 2003). 
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What causes group consciousness? Scholarship on race has attributed high group 
consciousness among African Americans to a number of factors, including a shared 
tradition of racial discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage (e.g., Voss 1996). 
Another factor is the perception of threat (e.g., Grant and Brown 1995). Research has 
shown the perception of threat to increase awareness of group distinctions and the 
salience of group-based interests in political matters for groups other than race. For 
example, in their study of the effects of threat on anti-terrorism policy attitudes, Huddy et 
al. (2005) find that the perception of threat leads to a heightened identification with one’s 
nationality as well as an increased bias against others (also Giles and Evans 1985; Brown 
1995; Huddy 2003). Given the history and characteristics of American religion, threat 
holds potential as a politicizing agent for religious group identity (Smith 1998; Marsden 
2006; Campbell 2006). 
I am aware of scant few political studies on threat and religion. Campbell (2006) 
concludes that evangelical Christians respond to religious threat by voting in higher 
numbers for conservative candidates. Specifically, evangelicals who live in areas with a 
higher proportion of secularists tended to vote in higher numbers for George W. Bush 
during the 2000 presidential election. To operationalize threat, the author looks to a 
particular stream within the race literature where white Americans were found to be more 
likely to vote for racially conservative candidates as the proportion of African Americans 
in their community increases (Matthews and Prothro 1966; Blalock 1967; Wright 1977; 
Giles and Buckner 1993; Giles and Hertz 1994; Glaser 1994; 2003). Campbell (2006) 
does provide tentative support for a threat effect but does not address this dissertation’s 
associated question of whether this is due to a politicization of religious group identity. 
	
24 
Theoretical support for a politicized evangelical group identity exists (Smith 1998) but 
remains to be empirically tested. 
Smith’s (1998) influential work on American evangelicalism describes it as a 
subculture in constant tension with broader society. Its missionary ideals push 
evangelicals beyond the symbolic boundaries of their sub-cultural home to engage a 
secular world that often threatens the major tenets of their moral worldview. Smith 
concludes that “the evangelical movement’s vitality is not a product of its protected 
isolation from but its vigorous engagement with pluralistic modernity” (98). By this 
account, threat is very much a part of the American evangelical experience. But several 
questions remain. In particular, how does threat relate to evangelical religious group 
identity? Is it a politicizing agent? If so, does this hold for other religious groups? Finally, 
how does this affect the political attitudes of group members? 
Like Smith and Campbell, I believe that evangelical Christianity constitutes a 
social group identity, but more research is needed to ascertain whether this identity really 
does exist, whether it becomes politicized by threat, and the consequences of this process. 
This also showcases a weakness in our current understanding of religion and politics in 
the U.S. Namely, much of this research focuses on evangelical Protestants. Consequently, 
many of the current theories of religion and politics develop out of or in contrast to the 
evangelical milieu. As arguably the most researched group within American religion, 
evangelicalism features prominently in political research on religion. However, it is also 
important to identify more generalizable processes concerning religious identity, threat, 
and political attitudes and behavior. 
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In this dissertation, I suggest that group identity is not specific to evangelical 
Protestantism or other religious groups with clearly delineated boundaries, e.g., 
fundamentalists. Group identity is an identification of the self with a social group with 
which one shares certain attributes, feelings, resources, status, and so forth. Moreover, the 
degree of attachment that one feels to a group is not necessarily fixed. In terms of its 
political relevance, group identity may fluctuate in two ways.  
First, a group identity may be salient for some issues more than others. For 
example, a police officer’s group identity as such could be more salient when considering 
crime and law enforcement policy than, say, environmental policy. Variation in a group 
identity’s political relevance may occur across policy domain. 
Second, political circumstances may cause a certain group identity to become 
more salient to an individual. For example, a public school teacher may have a weak 
sense a group identity with other teachers. However, when the state legislature proposes 
reducing public school teacher benefits, or reducing school funding in order to balance 
the state budget, the teacher’s sense of group identity could increase in response to such a 
perceived threat. Conceivably, the increase in salience for this group identity could affect 
the teacher’s political reasoning on matters of taxes and spending priorities. The same 
could be said for political behaviors like voting. Candidate characteristics and stances 
may be weighted differently within one’s mental calculus depending on the salience of a 
particular group identity at the time. 
From this perspective, religious group identity can exist in varying degrees of 
strength for both individuals and groups. Groups like evangelicals may have a 
particularly strong group identity. Other groups may demonstrate weaker group identity, 
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but this does not mean that one does not exist or that it would not emerge within certain 
policy domains or in response to certain stimuli in the political environment. 
This is where the perception of threat relates to group identity. Threat is the sense 
of fear elicited when an individual perceives that their interests or wellbeing are under 
attack. In politics, this involves groups. When a policy is thought to unfairly punish one 
group over others, the disadvantaged group could perceive that policy as a threat. 
Research on other social identities suggests that the perception of threat can politicize a 
group identity, making it more salient and politically relevant as a determinant of political 
attitudes (e.g., Dawson 1994). This project aims to understand whether this process exists 
for religion. 
In this view, threat is theorized as having a moderating effect on religious group 
identity. The literature has well established three politically relevant dimensions of 
religion, often referred to as the “three Bs” (Layman 2001; Green 2007; Green, Kellstedt, 
Smidt, and Guth 2007). These include religious “belonging” (i.e., one’s religious 
affiliation), religious “believing,” and religious “behaving” (i.e., an individual’s religious 
practices). When religious identity and threat are placed alongside these three Bs, the 
conceptualization of religion’s political effect could be specified in a model as: 
 
Y =  b1Z + b2(belonging) + b3(believing) + b4(behaving) +  
b5(group identity) + b6(threat) + b7(group identity*threat) + u 
 
where Z represents other relevant variables and controls, and the interaction term 
accounts for the moderating effect of threat on group identity. (See also Figure 1.1.) 
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Figure 1.1 Conceptualizing the Political Effect of Religion  					
	
	
	
 
 
 
Several studies of group identity within the race literature have shown that the 
relationship between group identity and stimuli in the political environment like threat 
can have a profound effect on political behavior. Dawson’s (1994) “black utility 
heuristic,” which demonstrates the powerful link of an individual’s perceived life chances 
to those of their racial group, shows that a politically relevant group identity can 
fundamentally alter the structure of political behavior for a set of individuals. If a similar 
process exists for religion, our current understanding of how religion structures political 
behavior, built upon the predictive ability of religious belonging, religious belief, and 
religious behavior, is unable to tap the social psychological connection between 
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environment on such an identity. This dissertation aims to provide the requisite measures 
to begin such a scholarly conversation. 
It also provides a more dynamic conceptualization of religion’s political relevance 
that is more able to react to changing circumstances in the political environment. While 
not necessarily static, traditional measures of belonging, beliefs, and behaviors are often 
treated in political research as control variables. Whereas, religious identity taps into the 
psychological attachment one has to a religious group, the salience of which may rise and 
fall across time and policy domain. 
 
Chapter Overviews 
The empirical core of the dissertation takes shape in three central chapters. 
Chapter 2 examines several different approaches to measuring social identity, and 
develops and tests different measurements for religious group identity. Chapter 3 presents 
two studies, one experimental and one that analyzes cross-sectional survey data, to 
establish the relationship between threat and religious group identity, looking especially 
at religion’s effects on policy attitudes toward prayer at public school events. Chapter 4 
looks at similar research questions through survey data on attitudes toward religious 
subject matter in the Texas public school curriculum. Together, these chapters enable an 
exploration of my orienting hypotheses that group identity is a politically relevant 
dimension of the way in which religion structures political attitudes and engagement, and 
that the perception of threat toward one’s religious group will lead to more extreme 
policy preferences. 
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Chapter 2 draws on a survey of 1024 undergraduate students at the University of 
Texas at Austin, with several questions that allow an assessment of religious group 
identity and the way in which it functions as part of an individual’s religiosity. Measures 
of social identity are especially present in political research on race and national identity. 
However, social identity does not play a meaningful role in our current understanding of 
religion and politics. Consequently, no known survey measures of religion as a social 
identity exist. This underscores the importance of this chapter to develop necessary tools 
for this line of research. 
This chapter translates six approaches to measuring group identity in race and 
national identity scholarship to religion. Because group identity is often considered a 
multidimensional construct, many of these measures involve multiple questions in order 
to account for different facets of group identity. In total, these six measures could be 
considered as taking four distinct approaches to measuring group identity. One approach 
assesses group identity in terms of the relationship between one’s own group and other 
groups along four or more separate dimensions (Miller et al. 1981; Chong and Rogers 
2005; Harris-Lacewell and Junn 2007). A related approach collapses this into a single 
question (Dawson 1994). Another approach departs from a focus on dimensionality and 
instead measures the difference in perceived closeness to one’s own group versus other 
groups (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). A final approach, rather than focusing on the 
relationship between one’s own group and others groups, instead measures group identity 
in terms of the relationship between an individual and their own group (Huddy and 
Khatib 2007). 
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These four distinct approaches also represent differences in the way in which 
scholars have conceptualized social identity and its political implications. Since all four 
have proven useful in the development of group identity research in other areas, they 
each warrant inclusion. This chapter assesses each of these different approaches when 
measuring religious group identity. It compares and contrasts these approaches through 
statistical tests. It also demonstrates their relationship to other standard measures of 
religion—religious belonging, belief, and behavior—and looks at their predictive power. 
In sum, Chapter 2 offers different ways in which religious group identity can be 
measured, which provides an important tool for advancing this line of research. 
Chapter 3 establishes the relationship between religious group identity and threat 
through an original experiment and survey data on attitudes toward prayer at public 
school events. The experiment was embedded within a telephone survey of registered 
voters in Tarrant County (Fort Worth), Texas. Respondents were broken into treatment 
and control groups. The treatment group received a statement that could be perceived as a 
threat to their religious group’s relative social status, while the control group did not. Due 
to population constraints, only Christians were included in the experiment, since no other 
religious group could yield a sufficient number of respondents. The threat treatment used 
in this experiment presents demographic trends about Christianity in the United States; 
namely, one-quarter of Americans no longer self-identify as a Christian, and this 
proportion increases to one-third among Americans under the age of 30. Both groups then 
received the same two policy questions about whether public school graduation 
ceremonies should include a student-led prayer. One question specified a prayer by a 
Christian student and the other by a Muslim student. 
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In general, the experiment confirms expectations. The treatment group 
demonstrated more supportive policy attitudes toward prayer at public school 
graduations. However, an interesting wrinkle is that this higher level of support holds for 
both Christian and Muslim-led prayers, which suggests that threat does not necessarily 
manifest in policy preferences for Christian privilege but may evidence a more 
ecumenical respect for religion in public life. A religious identity question also allows 
this to be examined separately for those with strong and weak religious identities, and the 
trend of higher support among the treatment group is demonstrated albeit differently for 
both strong and weak identifiers. While the differences between treatment and control 
groups do not reach a conventional level of statistical significance, as might be expected 
with a small sample size, they are nonetheless suggestive. They are also buttressed with 
statistically significant results from survey data, which find religious identity and threat 
to have statistically significant, independent and positive effects on policy attitudes 
toward public prayer. Moreover, a statistically significant interaction exists between 
religious identity and threat, which reveals the moderating effect of threat on religious 
identity to be greater for those with weaker religious identities than for those with 
stronger ones. 
Chapter 4 explores similar research questions with survey data on policy attitudes 
toward religious content in Texas public schools from a May 2010 statewide survey of 
Texans conducted for the Department of Government at the University of Texas at 
Austin. These policies include the establishment of high school Bible classes and revising 
the state’s social studies curriculum to emphasize the Christian religious beliefs of 
America’s Founders. These are actual policy changes enacted around the time of the 
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survey. Because they involve real world situations of religion in public policy, these data 
provide a favorable opportunity to explore the relationship between religious identity, 
threat, and policy attitudes. The survey includes relevant religious demographic 
questions, and questions on the salience of one’s religion and hostility toward religion, 
which can be used to assess religious identity and threat. 
This chapter presents three key findings that support the dissertation’s overall 
research aims. First, it gives further support to a relationship between threat and religious 
identity. Similar to findings in Chapter 3, these data again show threat and religious 
identity to have independent positive effects on policy opinions, with both leading to 
greater support for religion in public schools. A statistically significant interaction once 
again shows the moderating effect of threat on religious identity to hold greater impact 
for those with weaker religious identities than for those with stronger ones. 
Second, it also shows this moderating effect to have inverse effects for strong 
Democrats compared with strong Republicans and the overall model. Among strong 
Republicans, the effect of threat and religious identity resembles the overall model, with 
threat having a greater positive among those with weaker rather than stronger religious 
identities, but this is not the case among their Democratic counterparts. Rather, threat is 
nearly imperceptible among strong Democrats with a weak religious identity. But, threat 
amplifies the effect of religious identity among strong Democrats who also have a strong 
religious identity, greatly increasing their support for religion in public schools. This is 
also noteworthy because it runs counter to the negative effect of a Democratic party 
identification. 
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Finally, this chapter finds the nonreligious and religiously unaffiliated to perceive 
threat in the form of too much religion in public schools. For these respondents, the 
perception of threat toward the nonreligious has a statistically significant impact on 
policy attitudes, leading to a much lower level of support for these curriculum changers. 
A fifth and final chapter summarizes the results of all three empirical chapters and 
crystalizes their insights, evaluates the relevance of this research to some normative 
questions of public importance, and suggests avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptualizing and Measuring Religion as a  
Social Identity 
 
 
Overview 
This chapter overviews the ways in which religion is most often conceptualized 
and operationalized in political science research and presents another possible approach 
that draws on social identity theory. It looks first at the “three Bs” of religious belonging, 
believing, and behaving, which are commonplace in quantitative research on religion and 
politics. I then suggest that social identity theory offers an additional way in which to 
conceptualize religion, which presents the possibility of another politically relevant 
dimension of religion alongside those already established by the three Bs.  
Social identity theory posits that individuals can derive, to a certain extent, a 
sense of personal identity from a group to which they belong. If the salience of that group 
identity is particularly high, the heightened awareness, or “consciousness,” of that 
identity can impact an individual’s political reasoning. This general relationship has been 
demonstrated in social science scholarship on race and national identity. A close 
identification with a social group can thus provide an explanatory mechanism for 
linkages between that social identity and politics. 
By explicating a theory of religion as a social identity analogous to those found in 
research on race and national identity, this chapter explores the possibility that a salient 
group identity might similarly exist for religion. It also presents some of the more 
common survey measures of group identity for race and national identity and translates 
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them to religion. These measures are tested using a survey of undergraduate students at 
the University of Texas at Austin. They are analyzed for theoretical appropriateness, 
internal consistency, their relationship to other common measures of religion, and 
performance in models of political attitudes. 
 
Conceptualizing Religion 
Over the past few decades, religion has commanded a greater presence in 
scholarship on American politics.1 For empirical and especially quantitative research, this 
involves determinations about how to first conceptualize and then operationalize religion. 
Accordingly, this has forced political science to grapple with questions that arguably 
stand outside its proverbial wheelhouse. The nature and essence of religion is an age-old 
question and one perhaps better suited to theologians and philosophers than political 
scientists. Nonetheless, establishing definitions is essential for any serious study. This 
dissertation is chiefly concerned with how religion functions within political reasoning, 
making the operative understanding of religion of fundamental importance. In light of 
that, it seems reasonable to begin the conversation by taking stock of how social science 
conceptualizes religion. 
Social scientists have developed several constellations of understandings of 
religion to guide its inquiries. Some have chosen to center their understanding of religion 
                                                
1 See, for example, the relatively new scholarly journal Politics and Religion, 
sponsored by the subfield’s organized section of the American Association of Political 
Science, with an inaugural volume in 2008. See also the 2009 Oxford Handbook on 
Religion and American Politics, which fills nearly 600 pages with political science’s 
most significant findings and avenues of inquiry on the subject. 
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on how it functions; that is, what religion does. Sociologist Milton Yinger (1970, 7) is 
illustrative, “Religion, then, can be defined as a system of beliefs and practices by means 
of which a group of people struggles with [the] ultimate problems (the problems of 
origins, the purpose and meaning of life, what is right and wrong, etc.) of human life.” So 
too is Thomas Luckmann (1967), who conceptualizes religion as “the capacity of the 
human organism to transcend its biological nature through the construction of objective, 
morally binding, all-embracing universes of meaning” (Berger 1967, 177).2 Robert 
Bellah’s (1970, 21) approach also demonstrates this emphasis on how religion functions, 
writing that religion is “a set of symbolic forms and acts that relate [people] to the 
ultimate conditions of [their] existence.” These perspectives represent a sampling of a 
social scientific conceptualizations of religion that center primarily on how religion 
functions in the lives of individuals and groups. 
Another constellation focuses less on how religion functions and more on its 
substance, or what religion is rather than what religion does. One of the earliest social 
scientists of religion, Emile Durkheim ([1912] 1995, 62) writes, “[a] religion is a unified 
system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and 
forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into a single moral community called a 
Church, all those who adhere to them.” Here, emphasis is placed on distilling religion to 
its core essence. Modern sociologists Rodney Stark and Roger Finke follow suit, writing 
                                                
2 See also Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of 
Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Random House.  
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that “[r]eligion consists of very general explanations of existence, including the terms of 
exchange with god or gods” (Stark and Finke 2000, 91). 
Some conceptualizations bridge both of these to an extent. Thomas Tweed, for 
example, provides a substantive conceptualization that derives from “lived religion,” 
where its essence is understood in the context of its function within a specific community 
and in contact with others. “Religions are confluences of organic-cultural flows that 
intensify joy and confront suffering by drawing on human and superhuman forces to 
make homes and cross boundaries,” he writes (Tweed 2008, 54). Recognizing the 
increasing imprint of diversity on daily life in modern society and the rise of religious 
churn, Tweed opts to conceptualize religion with spatial metaphors like “dwelling” and 
“crossing” to avoid “essentializing religious traditions as static, isolated, and immutable 
substances” (60). Geertz (1966, 23) also splits the difference between functional and 
substantive lenses with a thoroughly symbolic conceptualization of religion as: 
a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long lasting 
moods and motivations in [people] by formulating conceptions of a general order 
of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the 
moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.3 
For such a multifaceted concept as religion, this variety of conceptualizations is 
understandable. Political scientists have drawn on and employed many of these and more. 
For the most part, political science has sidestepped definitions of religion; a forgivable 
                                                
3 This discussion of conceptualizations of religion is guided in part by graduate 
studies with Professors David Yamane and Thomas Tweed. 
	38 
sin considering that it seldom delves into religion as such, so much as studying (or at 
least observing) religion’s impact on and within the context of particular political 
phenomena. Most studies of American politics that discuss religion are primarily 
concerned with how it contributes to the structure of political attitudes or affects political 
behavior or vote choice. That is, religion is not typically a dependent variable of interest, 
so much as one constituent element within the broad social and political landscape that 
helps to explain our political selves. 
The rise of survey research and abundance of survey data has also shaped political 
research’s approach to religion. As of 2017, the Association of Religious Data Archives 
(ARDA) contains nearly 1,000 datasets with religious variables for use by researchers. 
Some of these datasets, like the American National Election Survey, General Social 
Survey, and Pew Research Center studies are replete with measures of particular interest 
to political researchers, such as political behaviors, candidate and party preferences, 
attitudes on matters of social and political importance, and a host of relevant 
demographic variables. As a result, they are among the most common data sources in 
quantitative political research. While religious variables are present, they often exist in 
fairly standard clusters that are commonly found on large political surveys and may not 
be as robust as desired for religious research. These include measures of religious 
behavior, religious belief, and religious affiliation (or “belonging” for the sake of 
alliteration). These three Bs—behavior, belief, and belonging—comprise three distinct 
dimensions of religion that are now fairly well established as politically relevant 
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(Kellstedt et al. 1996; Layman 1997; 2001; Green 2007; Olson and Warber 2008; Smidt 
et al. 2009). 
The sheer ubiquity of the three Bs, relative to other measures, may also contribute 
to the direction of scholarship and the manner in which religion is conceptualized in 
mainstream political research. On one hand, this is understandable. Over time, a sizeable 
body of research developed, which demonstrates the political relevance of these three 
dimensions of religion. Layman’s (2001) discussion is instructive. Political science has 
long noticed the political relevance of religious affiliation (e.g. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and 
McPhee 1954). Other scholars observed that within these affiliations, some adherents 
cling to a moral traditionalism while others embrace more progressive outlooks 
(Wuthnow 1988; Hunter 1991, 1994). Still other research suggests the predictive value of 
varying levels of devoutness (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993; Layman 1997). As a 
result, an ample body of work suggests that religious belonging, believing, and behaving 
are all necessary for a full and accurate account of how religion contributes to the 
structure of political attitudes and affects political behaviors. 
On the other hand, scholarly consensus like this is a double-edged sword. It 
confirms the shared wisdom of accumulated findings. Yet the widespread availability of 
these measures, and their general acceptance as tapping three different facets of religion’s 
political relevance, may also serve the dampen continued curiosity in how political 
research should conceptualize religion. While appreciating the value of the three Bs, the 
primary goal of this chapter is to challenge the tendency toward stasis by offering another 
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way to conceptualize religion; namely, viewing religion as a social identity with the 
potential for political relevance, and developing survey measures requisite for its study. 
 
The “Three Bs” 
Historically, religious affiliation (or “belonging”) proved one of the surest ways to 
parse religious differences. Herberg’s (1954) seminal work Protestant-Catholic-Jew 
illustrates this well. In his observation of mid-century America, Herberg views religion to 
be society’s single largest distinguishing cultural feature. “By and large, to be an 
American today means to be either a Protestant, a Catholic, or a Jew,” writes Herberg 
(40). Also, “America today may be conceived, as it is indeed conceived by most 
Americans, as one great community divided into three big sub-communities religiously 
defined” (38). Herberg considers these three brand name religious affiliations as distinct 
but also sharing many common features. Most notably, they each cohere and reinforce a 
more general American culture and stoke a sense of patriotism and national pride. Not to 
identify oneself as either a Protestant, Catholic, or Jew, is “somehow not to be an 
American,” opines Herberg (257). 
Herberg adapts the idea of America as a “melting pot” of immigrants, where 
distinctive features of one’s cultural background dissipate into a more homogeneous 
American culture, seeing instead three religiously defined melting pots. While many 
distinctive cultural features dissipated over time, such as national origin, these three 
major religious categories demonstrated much greater cohesion. Protestants might change 
their denominational affiliation with seemingly little resistance but seldom ventured 
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across the Tiber. Interdenominational activities were not uncommon, but participation 
remained generally within the Protestant orbit. Roman Catholics developed a host of 
distinctive social organizations, from schools to civic and recreational clubs, to reinforce 
their religious identity. Jews, Herberg opined, seemed to think of themselves more in 
religious than in ethnic terms. 
It could be argued that Herberg was, at times, long on opinion and short on 
evidence. But, for whatever else one may say about his study, his observation of the 
political relevance of religion was well established. In the early days of the American 
republic, religious innovators tended to line up in the Jeffersonian camp, which makes 
sense given that Jefferson championed religious liberty and sought protection from state 
privilege of religion or the tyranny of the majority.4 Establishment religions privileged by 
the state or the “standing order” as they were later called—Episcopal, Presbyterian, and 
many Congregational churches—tended toward a more formal view of a church’s place 
in society and government. By the 1830s, with higher rates of immigration from 
                                                
4 See Jefferson’s letter the Baptists of Danbury, Connecticut, stating, “the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of 
separation between Church & State.” (Dated January 1, 1802, and available online at the 
Library of Congress, www.loc.gov.) See also Jefferson’s Virginia Statute for Religious 
Freedom, declaring that “no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious 
worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or 
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious 
opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, 
their opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, 
or affect their civil capacities.” (Passed by the Virginia General Assembly on January 16, 
1786, and available online at the Virginia Historical Society, www.vahistorical.org.) 
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Catholic-heavy countries, a Protestant-Catholic political divide emerged, with Catholics 
supporting Democrats in higher numbers and Republicans drawing the lion’s share of 
support from Protestants (especially in the northeast). Religious affiliation was also a 
feature of Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal Coalition,” which included Catholics, Jews, 
and lower class Protestants (Noll 2002; Lambert 2008; Fowler et al. 2010; Wald and 
Calhoun-Brown 2014). 
When Herberg wrote in the early 1950s, the American religious and cultural 
landscape he depicted was on the verge of seismic shifts that would render his work’s 
major contribution more of a historical documentation of its place in time than a cultural 
analysis with enduring relevance. During the mid-20th century, the fissure between 
conservative and liberal Protestantism deepened, denominationalism declined in 
significance, and evangelicalism emerged as a significant subset of Protestantism that 
defied traditional denominational barriers. Protestant and Catholic divisions declined as 
religious churn increased as did intermarriage, and contentious social issues fostered 
deeper ecumenical relations along political lines (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Hunter 
1991). Indeed, religious affiliation became a matter of greater complexity. 
This complexity provides a difficult task for survey researchers, who must find 
reliable ways to create meaningful data on religious affiliation. Were the paradigm of 
Herberg’s day still extant, ascertaining religious affiliation in survey research would be a 
fairly straightforward matter of distinguishing between broad categories of Protestants, 
Catholics, Jews, and perhaps a small handful of others. This approach represents a fairly 
rudimentary way to categorize religious affiliation according to tradition; that is, 
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grouping affiliations that share similar distinguishing characteristics in the way of 
theology and practice. 
While Herberg’s categories are too rudimentary for today’s religious landscape, 
categorizing religious affiliation by tradition is one way in which survey researchers 
approach the matter. Kellstedt and Green (1993), Layman (2001), and others highlight six 
traditions common in political science literature: evangelical Protestantism, mainline 
Protestantism, black Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Judaism, and the nonreligious or 
secular.5 
Within Protestantism, the line between mainline and evangelicals is imprecise. 
Mainline Protestantism comprises historic denominations, the most notable of which are 
the Episcopal Church, Presbyterian Church USA, Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America, Congregational Church (United Church of Christ), and the United Methodist 
Church. During the late 1800s and early 1900s, America’s historic Protestant 
                                                
5 The Pew Forum and many scholars adopt these six categories for religious tradition. 
These Protestant categories—evangelical, mainline, and the African American (or Black 
Church) tradition—present fairly distinct structures and/or emphases on religious belief 
and practice. Some outliers such as Mormons and other minority groups do not easily 
conform to this categorization, though. Some also see Hispanic Protestants as a distinct 
tradition. For example, Fowler et al. (2010) present this breakdown of the American 
electorate by religious tradition: white evangelical Protestant 23%, white mainline 
Protestant 14%, African American Protestant 9%, Hispanic Protestant 7%, Catholic 25%, 
Mormon/other white Christian 3%, Muslim/Hindu/Buddhist 3%, unaffiliated 15%. 
Arguably, Hispanic Protestants do not share the same alignment of race and religion as 
does the Black Church tradition, and Hispanic Protestantism is not similarly regarded in 
the mainstream literature as a distinct religious tradition. While Spanish speaking 
Protestant congregations may be almost exclusively Hispanic, many Hispanics attend a 
racially mixed congregation. In contrast, most African American Protestants attend 
historically black churches. Research has shown more clearly evident differences 
between Latino and Anglo Catholics (e.g., Putnam and Campbell 2010; Leal and 
Patterson 2013). 
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denominations were rocked by controversies, most notably the Fundamentalist-Modernist 
Controversy, in which new developments in science and learning had to be squared with 
traditional religious understandings of the Bible and Christian teaching. Several 
denominations split along these lines, with those against the new science and learning 
leaving to organize new denominations more in line with their beliefs. Today’s mainline 
Protestant denominations remained in continuity with their historic ecclesial structures 
and tend to emphasize the complementarity of religious faith with contemporary society 
rather than viewing them in conflict with one another (Longfield 1991; Marsden 2006). 
In contrast, evangelicalism represents a sometimes distinct and sometimes 
crosscutting stream relative to Protestant denominations. Grant Wacker (1985, 17) 
characterizes evangelicals as sharing a belief that “the sole authority in religion is the 
Bible and the sole means of salvation is a life-transforming experience wrought by the 
Holy Spirit through faith in Jesus Christ.” Unlike their mainstream counterparts, 
evangelicals view modern society and Christian teachings more in conflict than concord. 
The hermeneutic for such an understanding centers on what adherents would term a 
“personal relationship with Jesus Christ” and an experience of being spiritually “born 
again.” In line with their more dualistic view of religion and society, evangelicals tend 
toward a literal (or at least theologically conservative) interpretation of the Bible and 
adherence to moral and theological traditionalism. 
Today’s evangelical Protestants stand in continuity with the early 20th century 
fundamentalists, those who severed ties with historic denominational structures they 
deemed as too accepting of modern influences. The term “fundamentalists” derives from 
	45 
their efforts to elevate the “fundamentals” of the Christian faith over and against 
modernist opposition, e.g., as demonstrated by the theological book series The 
Fundamentals. Five major touchstones, include the veracity and infallibility of the Bible, 
the virgin birth of Jesus Christ, the atoning power of his death, the bodily resurrection of 
Jesus, and the historicity of his miracles as recorded in Scripture (Noll 1994; Marsden 
2006).6 While these fundamentalists grew quiescent from public engagement in the mid-
1900s, after the Scopes trial they began to re-emerge into the public square as early as the 
late 1940s and in force by the mid-to-late 1970s. During this process of re-engagement 
with broader society, the group came to embrace the more outwardly-focused terms of 
self-identification like “new evangelical” or neo-evangelical, harkening back to the 
theological stream associated with the Great Awakenings, or simply “evangelical” (for 
example, Henry [1947] 2003; see also Noll 1994; Marsden 2006). In 1942, the National 
Association of Evangelicals (NAE) was founded, which now has 52 member 
denominations, in order to bring some organizational unity to this theological movement. 
In line with its separatist roots, the NAE was originally viewed as an alternative to the 
mainstream National Council of Churches and has also spearheaded Bible translations 
more amendable to evangelical theological perspectives (Patterson 2010). 
                                                
6 The Fundamentals were published from 1910-1915 as a 12-volume series, 
underwritten by oil magnates Lyman and Milton Stewart. Led by chief editor/authors 
A.C. Dixon, Louis Meyer, and Reuben Torrey, the series championed theological 
conservatism and three million sets were distributed free of charge to pastors, theology 
professors and students, college professors, Sunday School personnel, and YMCAs. 
Essays in the series came from several well-known pastors and conservative theologians, 
including such names as Benjamin Warfield, E.Y. Mullins, W.H. Griffith Thomas, 
Thomas Spurgeon, C.I. Schofield, and Charles Erdman (Marsden 2006). 
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Complicating matters, while evangelical Protestant is a commonly cited 
theological tradition—indeed a sizeable one that comprises a quarter of the U.S. 
population—evangelicalism is a trans-denominational identity that is sometimes 
embraced by entire denominations and sometimes a stream within a denomination. The 
distinction is important and accurate measurement matters, though, with a 25% of 
Americans identifying as evangelical Protestants and another 15% as Protestants in the 
mainline tradition (Pew Forum 2008). Moreover, we see political differences between 
evangelicals and mainliners, reiterating the importance of precise and reliable data. 
The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life runs the U.S. Religious Landscape 
Survey, one of the most exhaustive, regularly-occurring surveys of American religion. 
The most recent survey contacted 35,000 respondents and included a robust array of 
questions. With ample resources and a special interest in precise measurements of 
religion, the survey employs a complex system of branching questions in order to type 
respondents according to religious tradition. Pew considers 63 denominations (including 
a few categorical affiliations) to constitute mainline Protestantism. It categorizes another 
165 denominations as evangelical Protestants.  
In order to arrive at any of these, branching and follow-up questions narrow a 
respondent’s affiliation down from broad categories like Baptist or Presbyterian to 
specific affiliations like the Full Gospel Baptist Association or Associate Reformed 
Presbyterian. However, even after drilling down to this level of specificity, categorizing 
religious affiliation by tradition is yet more complicated. While some of these 
denominational affiliations are considered exclusively mainline or exclusively 
	47 
evangelical, others contain both groups under the same denominational umbrella. In these 
cases, the survey asks: “Do you consider yourself to be an evangelical or ‘born again’ 
Christian?” Those who answer in the affirmative may be typed as evangelical and those 
who do not may be typed as mainline. 
When typing religious affiliation by tradition, African American Protestants are 
typically categorized separately from evangelicals and mainliners, even though many 
consider themselves to be evangelical or born again Christians. This is because African 
American Protestant churches (the Black Church tradition) embody traditions and beliefs 
unique to the African American experience. Moreover, a history of slavery and 
segregation led to these churches developing separately from their white counterparts. As 
a result, the Black Church has theological emphases on hope, freedom, liberation, and 
justice that are not shared in the same way by non-black Protestant counterparts. 
Historically, the Black Church has also provided invaluable opportunities to develop 
civic skills, especially among a population that tended to fall on the low side of the 
socioeconomic status spectrum. During the Civil Rights Movement, the Black Church 
was a critical center of organizing and leadership development. Since African Americans 
are one of the most cohesive voting blocks for the Democratic Party, these churches also 
demonstrate political tendencies that differ significantly from other Protestants, which 
also lends toward categorizing them separately. 
While this system of categorization may work for a large national survey of 
religion and politics with considerable resources and a substantial budget, branching 
questions and follow-ups may prove difficult for smaller surveys with modest budgets. 
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These cases require balance between precision and parsimony, which can pose interesting 
challenges. For example, some non-denominational and “new paradigm” churches do not 
consider themselves Protestant (even though they are in the Protestant historical 
tradition).7 Still other respondents who may attend a Protestant church do not realize this 
fact. They may instead think of themselves as simply “Baptist” or “Lutheran” or 
“Christian.” In order to account for this, surveys may include catch-all categories like 
“Christian” to capture Protestant respondents who don’t realize they’re actually 
Protestant. The University of Texas at Austin/Texas Tribune Poll provides a good 
example. It includes enough religious variables for useful research but not nearly as 
exhaustive a set of questions as the aforementioned Pew survey. The Texas survey 
presents a smaller list of 32 religious affiliations, including some broad catch-all 
categories, through which respondents can be categorized into a smaller number of 
tradition groups.8 
                                                
7 Atwood (2010, 241) observes that “one of the most important trends in American 
Christianity since 1980 has been the rapid increase in the number and size of 
congregations with few or no ties to traditional denominations.” He terms these “new 
paradigm” churches. In some cases, they have a loose denominational affiliation but 
many do not and grow into “mega-churches” with their own distinctive features. Some 
advertise as churches “for people who do not like church,” making it difficult to place in 
a traditional denominational framework. The new paradigm churches are not alone in 
presenting such a difficulty. So-called “emerging” churches similarly eschew 
denominational identities, as do more traditional and self-styles “non-denominational” 
churches. 
8 Unlike the Pew survey, which relies on telephone interviews, the Texas poll utilizes 
an online platform, which eliminates the need for a complex set of branch and follow-up 
questions to drill down to a specific denomination. Nonetheless, respondents would not 
fair well with an exhaustive list of 200+ denominational affiliations, so 32 of the most 
common affiliations (including broad catch-all categories) are included. 
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Categorizing according to religious tradition is the most common but not the only 
way to approach religious affiliation. The Handbook of Denominations in the United 
States (Atwood 2010), now in its 13th edition, demonstrates an alternative approach of 
grouping by denominational family. Whereas a religious tradition grouping would place 
Southern Baptists among evangelicals and American Baptists among mainliners, a family 
categorization would consider these instead under the same Baptist umbrella since they 
share the same lineage. As another example, Pew categorizes the Presbyterian Church 
(USA) as mainline and the Presbyterian Church in America as evangelical, whereas a 
family categorization would simply consider them Presbyterian. Imprecise question 
wording may also collapse these together, e.g., offering only “Baptist” or “Presbyterian” 
as survey response options. This approach works well for historical and theological 
inquiries, which may benefit by tracing continuity and change within a denomination’s 
family line, but it presents problems for scientific studies of contemporary religion and 
politics. As Layman (2001, 54) explains: 
cultural conflict is not between members of different denominational families, but 
between individuals with fundamentally different religious beliefs and 
worldviews. Thus, the important political differences are not between Protestants, 
Catholics, and Jews, but between the members of those groups who have 
conservative, or traditional, religious beliefs and their counterparts who have 
liberal, or modern beliefs and moral outlooks. 
This observation draws on significant insights by Wuthnow, Hunter, and other 
scholars who have highlighted the growing role of religious beliefs in predicting political 
	50 
attitudes and behaviors. Wuthnow (1988) calls this phenomenon a “restructuring” of 
American religion. His main argument posits that significant polarization between 
liberals and conservatives within American denominations has emerged since Herberg’s 
observations several decades earlier. Accompanying this divide, Wuthnow observes a 
general decline in the significance of denominational structures and labels, a rise in 
“special purpose groups” to service liberal and conservative factions, and a self-sorting of 
adherents into these groups. Wuthnow concludes that religious affiliation, while not 
unimportant, is comparatively less important than where a person stands on the 
continuum of religious conservatism to liberalism. 
In a 2007 presentation at Brown University, James Davison Hunter recalled how a 
newspaper article on a religious anti-abortion protest crystalized a similar theory in his 
mind.9 He was struck that Orthodox rabbis, Catholic priests and nuns, and some 
fundamentalist Protestant ministers worked (and were arrested) together in common 
political cause. He was particularly struck by the partnership among religious groups that 
historically associated little with one another save only perhaps in acrimony, recalling the 
pervasiveness of anti-Semitism and anti-Catholicism in American history. As one of my 
favorite lines in the children’s movie The Land Before Time puts it, “three horns never 
                                                
9 Hunter, James Davison. 2007. “The Great Divide: Is America in the Midst of a 
Culture War?” Lecture presented at Brown University. As of the time of this 
dissertation’s submission, a video of the lecture (with counterarguments by Morris 
Fiorina and audience questions) is archived online at: https://www.c-span.org/video/ 
?202596-1/ideological-culture-wars-america. Hunter has published similar sentiments in 
Hunter, James Davison and Alan Wolfe. 2006. Is There a Culture War?: A Dialogue on 
Values and American Public Life. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
	51 
play with longnecks.” But indeed, they apparently now were. For Hunter, this meant 
something significant. He explains: 
It meant that one of the big divisions…the division that came with the birth of 
Christ between Christians and Jews—and the division that occurred 16 centuries 
later with the Protestant Reformation—these divisions were no longer as 
politically significant as another division, a division that seemed to be rooted in 
the secular enlightenment, and especially the French enlightenment. 
We see in Hunter’s example (and he provides many others in his 1991 and 1994 
books) that religious belief stands alongside religious affiliation as another necessary 
dimension when viewing the political consequence of religion. Where an individual 
locates along an ideological (and theological) spectrum is highly relevant. Does a person 
embrace a more liberal worldview or a more traditional one? In survey research, a 
common measurement approach involves how an individual views the origin and 
authority of their tradition’s scriptures. The Pew Forum asks: “Which comes closest to 
your view? The Bible is the World of God, or the Bible is a book written by men and is 
not the word of God?” (For non-Christian faiths, “the Bible” is substituted with the 
Torah, Quran, or simply “holy scriptures.”) A follow-up question brings added clarity: 
“And would you say that the Bible is to be taken literally, word for word, or not 
everything in the Bible should be taken literally, word for word?” 
While this is the most common survey question used for this purpose, Leal and 
Patterson (2013, 7) note that the divine origin and literal interpretation of scripture is not 
an especially appropriate measure of religious traditionalism for Roman Catholics: 
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Religious beliefs like Biblical literalism are important because they reflect the 
role of an interpretive community in articulating a religious worldview that 
translates religious teachings and texts into a particular vision for social and 
political life (Fish 1980; McDaniel and Ellison 2008). However, for Catholics and 
therefore most Latinos, literalism is not a traditional component of religious 
beliefs. In American religion, Biblical literalism emerged as a serious religious 
controversy during the fundamentalist controversies of mainline Protestant 
denominations, and it was especially prominent in the Southern Baptist 
interdenominational conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s (Leonard 1990; Longfield 
1991; Marsden 2006).  
While most Protestant traditions consider the Bible to be an unparalleled 
source of authority on religious matters, Catholics couple the Bible (which is not 
read literally) with an historic interpretation through church traditions and 
teaching (known as the Magisterium). Put simply, literalism is a rather Protestant 
concept. Still, literalism is a common way to demarcate traditionalism among 
Christians in religious research, Catholics included. We contend that it is 
insufficient as a standalone measure and less appropriate to the Catholic context 
than the Protestant. 
Political surveys that contain multiple religious questions may include other 
questions about religious beliefs, which could better apply to different religious groups. 
The Pew Forum’s religious landscape survey includes questions about belief in God, 
spiritual wellbeing, sense of wonder, guidance of and standards on right and wrong, and 
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belief in heaven and hell. The General Social Survey has included questions about belief 
in God, the Devil, heaven, hell, life after death, miracles, Nirvana, reincarnation, and 
deceased ancestors. In addition to views toward scripture, it has also included specifically 
Catholic-relevant questions concerning attitudes toward the Pope, fidelity to church 
teachings, and ecumenism. Such a variety of questions can enable a more robust 
assessment of traditionalism through a scale that includes several measures of belief, such 
as positions on certain religious tenets. This may still prove problematic for some faith 
traditions, and especially those unaffiliated with an organized religion, such as the 
growing number of Americans who claim to be spiritual but not religious.10 Hunter 
(1991) offers an example of a more interfaith way to assess traditionalism, by asking 
whether a respondent agrees or disagrees that there are “absolute standards of right and 
wrong” anchored in transcendent rather than human authority. 
Alongside belief, religion typically places some degree of importance on certain 
actions or practices. These may occur in the corporate sense of joint liturgical practices of 
ritual observance and worship, or in the personal sense of lived devotion such as prayer 
or studying religious texts. The substance of these actions can vary widely among 
religions. Corporate worship provides a good example. Catholics and Orthodox 
participate in highly symbolic and ritualized worship and regularly partake of the 
Eucharist, whereas Protestants tend to hold more didactic services with vastly divergent 
                                                
10 According to the Pew Research Center, “The growth of the unaffiliated population 
and their decreasing religiosity have been the main factors behind the emergence of a less 
religious public overall. But, interestingly, the rise in spirituality has been happening 
among both highly religious people and the religiously unaffiliated” (Masci and Lipka 
2016). 
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Eucharistic practices. At the personal level, all Abrahamic faiths involve prayer, but some 
emphasize prayer at regular intervals throughout the day while others do not. Layman 
(2001) points out that religious behavior is often considered as a conditional variable, 
which suggests the degree to which affiliation or belief affect and individual’s political 
reasoning or behaviors. The reasoning for this is fairly straightforward. Individuals who 
regularly attend worship services or frequently practice devotional aspects of their 
religion are more likely to connect their religious sensibilities to decisions and actions in 
their daily life. McDaniel and Ellison (2008) also note that churches can act as 
interpretive communities that frame the understandings of churchgoers. Their influence 
in this regard would understandably be strongest among those who most often attend 
services, interact with their fellow religionists, and expose themselves to the church’s 
teachings. 
Research has also linked behavior patterns of particular traditions with civic 
engagement. For example, Verba et al. (1995) suggest that a relatively low level of civic 
engagement among Latinos is explained by their predominant Roman Catholicism. A 
more hierarchical Catholic Church structure is argued to provide less opportunity for lay 
leadership and therefore comparatively less opportunity to develop civic skills. However, 
Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) provide alternative evidence that contradicts the Verba et 
al. finding; rather than denomination, the key variable is attendance at religious services, 
which is associated with Latino as well as Anglo political participation. Particularly for 
Latinos, they hypothesize that churches provide valuable and otherwise elusive civic 
resources. 
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Surveys measure religious behaviors in a number of ways. The most common 
measure by far is church attendance. The American National Election Study asks a two-
part question of respondents:  
“Lots of things come up that keep people from attending religious services even if 
they want to. Thinking about your life these days, do you ever attend religious 
services apart from occasional weddings, baptisms, or funerals?” 
If the respondent answers in the affirmative, a follow up question asks “Do you go to 
religious services every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a 
year, or never?” A significant body of research demonstrates that individuals who most 
often attend religious services tend to hold more conservative political positions (e.g., 
Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993) and more often prefer Republican candidates (e.g., 
Green 2007; see also Fowler et al. 2010 and Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014).11 Other 
measures also exist, especially on surveys with a specific focus on religion, including the 
frequency of prayer and reading religious texts. Some also tap into behaviors specific to a 
particular faith tradition, such as Catholic practices regarding praying the rosary and 
participating in confession, or charismatic practices like speaking in tongues. A variety of 
these may also be combined as an index of religiosity, tapping both corporate and 
personal practices (e.g., Kellstedt et al. 1996). Layman (2001) does this to construct a 
“low commitment” variable for respondents who demonstrate minimal religious behavior 
on a consistent basis. 
                                                
11 Although, African Americans tend to vote Democratic regardless of church 
attendance. 
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The literature confirms that all three of these dimensions of religion—belonging, 
believing, and behaving—are relevant determinants of political attitudes and behaviors 
(Layman 1997; 2001; Green 2007; Olson and Warber 2008; Guth, Kellstedt, and Smidt 
2009; Fowler et al. 2010; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014). It also demonstrates that, 
while distinct, the three Bs are closely related concepts (if not at times interrelated), 
which can make them messy and require great care in research. For example, religious 
affiliation may be easy to determine for Roman Catholics, but Protestants can be more 
difficult to peg. Christian and non-Christian traditions alike include groups and subgroups 
within tradition, which can at times make them difficult to categorize. Behaviors can 
differ across tradition, which can make it hard to find uniformly applicable measures of 
such concepts as religiosity and to a lesser extent traditionalism. Assumptions are 
dangerous, especially when dealing with a concept as diverse and complex as religion. 
Certain measures of religiosity may be relevant to differing extents across traditions. One 
must be careful not to falsely assume a measure’s uniform applicability and accidentally 
skew a respondent’s (or tradition’s) religiosity or level of observance.  
Finally, these dimensions are at times difficult to disentangle from one another. 
Take, for example, a respondent reporting that she or he is “evangelical” or “born again.” 
Is being born again a religious experience? Or is it a statement of belief that theologically 
aligns one with evangelicalism? Or is it an affiliation with evangelical Protestantism and 
a traditionalist worldview? It is potentially all three and may mean different things to 
different people. 
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If anything, these complications underscore the importance of all three of these 
dimensions when studying how religion structures political behaviors and attitudes, or 
else the picture may be incomplete. The development of the literature suggests a growing 
appreciation for this understanding. However, the research on social identities offers the 
prospect of another possible dimension of religion’s political relevance that is not fully 
accounted for in the three Bs. 
 
Conceptualizing Religion as a Social Identity 
Having now reviewed the principal ways in which political scientists measure 
religion, a more careful understanding of not only what these measures mean but also 
what they do not mean may be established. Religion is not only an individual but also a 
social enterprise (Durkheim [1912] 1995). The three Bs partially account for its social 
component. In particular, belonging and behaving involve a very obvious social aspect. 
Belonging implies that an individual affiliates with a particular group. Behaving can 
involve social activities, e.g., religious services, that often represent a respondent’s level 
of religious commitment in quantitative research. In this sense, the Bs are able to measure 
one’s membership in a group and the extent to which one interacts with fellow group 
members and demonstrates behaviors associated with the group. Although less obvious, 
believing involves a social aspect too. Since religious groups teach and interpret beliefs, 
the religious community provides a critical mediating structure for the development of 
personal belief systems. 
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The Bs do not, however, measure the sense of psychological attachment one may 
feel toward their religious group as a social group per se. This is important because other 
literatures have demonstrated that the political relevance of a social identity—such as 
race, gender, national identity, and arguably a party identity, to name a few—depends 
upon and varies according to the nature and strength of an individual’s identification with 
the group.  
Social identity theory (SIT) provides a well-developed theoretical perspective to 
explore this possibility. It views society as comprised of many different social groups, 
each with relative status and power (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981). An individual 
can develop a sense of psychological attachment to a group based on attributes, 
characteristics, experiences, ideas, beliefs, or perspectives held in common (Tajfel and 
Turner 1979; Gurin et al. 1980; Tajfel 1981; Miller et al. 1981; Conover 1988; Chong 
and Rogers 2005). Through this attachment, an individual can also derive a sense of 
personal identity, at least in part if not primarily, from this social group. When that 
happens, a social identity is formed. This social identity fosters an ability for group 
members to establish in-group versus out-group distinctions for the purposes of 
contextualizing oneself relative to the broader world, assigning value to persons, actions, 
or beliefs, and favoring or discriminating against some versus others (e.g., Tajfel and 
Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981). 
An important point of clarification is warranted. Namely, group identities exist in 
gradations. At the most basic level, one is a member of a group, assigned by virtue of 
shared characteristics. To be a member of a group requires no sense of belonging on a 
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psychological level, but can be merely a matter of ascription. This occurs often, for 
example, in demography and the social sciences when individuals are typed or 
categorized. If a person would describe one’s own self in the same terms, that 
membership becomes an identity. Group identification implies not only that one shares 
characteristics with a group, but that one is self-aware of this and possesses a sense of 
belonging to the group. According to social identity theory, this sense of belonging 
enables an individual to draw on that group identity to inform one’s own sense of self. As 
Conover (1984) explains, group identification involves not only self-identification but 
also a psychological attachment to the group (also Tajfel 1978; Gibson and Gouws 2000). 
Taken one final step farther, we find the concept of group consciousness. In this, persons 
are not only self-aware and psychologically attached to a group to which they belong, but 
this identity is also highly salient and therefore capable of exerting influence over 
attitudes and behaviors.12 
The terminology used for this concept is not necessarily shared throughout the 
literature, and different scholars may nuance their understandings (and measures) in ways 
that are also not shared across the literature. Many refer to “group consciousness,” others 
to a specific concept of group consciousness termed “linked fate” (e.g., Dawson 1994), or 
on a more basic level to a politicized or politically relevant group identity. Depending on 
                                                
12 For the purposes of clarity, the terms group identity and social identity are at times 
used interchangeably. They are closely related. “Group identity” refers specifically to 
one’s self-identification with and psychological attachment to a group. “Social identity” 
refers specifically to the sense of self one has as influenced by and/or derived from that 
group, and implies the broader assumptions of social identity theory. 
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the specific context, this dissertation employs each of these terms, providing clarification 
as necessary.  
In discussing social identity theory as it pertains to religion, I most often refer to 
religious “identity” and how that identity rises in salience to become politicized or 
politically relevant. I do this for two reasons. First, some religions refer to 
“consciousness” or “religious consciousness” as a spiritual state of being with theological 
connotations, which is not intended here. To avoid coopting that term and creating 
unnecessary confusion, I generally shy away from the phrase religious “consciousness” 
as it relates to social identity theory. Second, referring to identity and its process of 
becoming more salient or becoming politicized provides the conceptual benefit of 
emphasizing a dynamic aspect of religious group identity. Fluidity is an important feature 
of contemporary religion. Religious identity it is not necessarily static.13 It may ebb and 
flow in salience depending on circumstances; causally relevant in structuring attitudes or 
influencing behavior at some times but not at others. 
The race literature on group identity and consciousness offers the best and most 
developed example of the political relevance of a salient social group identity. We find in 
this literature some key findings that prove instructive when considering if and how 
religion may be conceptualized as a social identity. First, the literature clearly 
demonstrates the presence of race consciousness among African Americans (Matthews 
                                                
13 Another point of clarification concerning the use of terms is that “religious 
identity” is intended to imply “religious group identity.” The race literature often refers to 
“racial identity” as short for “racial group identity.” By context, “group” is implied. For 
the sake of simplicity, the same convention is generally adopted here. 
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and Prothro 1966; Gurin et al. 1980; Miller et al. 1981; Conover 1988; Dawson 1994; 
Chong and Rogers 2005). Second, while many studies have identified this politicized 
racial identity, they also approach the concept of a racial identity in a variety of ways. For 
example, some view racial identity as a sense of in-group closeness within one’s race 
(Matthews and Prothro 1966; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999) while others view it as a 
multidimensional construct that involves multiple ways in which race contributes to a 
person’s life experience (e.g., Miller et al. 1981; Harris-Lacewell and Junn 2007).  
Third, a significant subset of the literature looks at the presence of “linked fate,” 
such as the black utility heuristic in Dawson (1994), where individual African Americans 
view their own life chances as inextricably bound together with those of their broader 
racial group. This often involves a sense of common interest or common strategy to 
achieve a desired end. Fourth, despite some diversity in their approach, the studies of 
group consciousness and linked fate among African Americans share several common 
threads. Namely, the presence of a politicized racial identity emerges from a shared sense 
of minority status, discrimination, and socioeconomic disadvantage; it can also emerge 
from the perception of threat against their racial group (e.g., Grant and Brown 1995). 
Finally, these studies demonstrate numerous political effects including increased 
participation and solidarity, as well as effects on other political behaviors, reasoning, and 
attitudes (e.g., Chong and Rogers 2005). 
While this has all been clearly shown among African Americans, the extent to 
which these findings hold for other minority groups is contested. Some have found group 
consciousness to exist among Asian Americans (Lien 2001) and Latinos (Masuoka 2006; 
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Sanchez and Masuoka 2010), but effects can vary by national origin. This is due in large 
part to the presence of panethnic identities and multiple nations of origin, which make for 
a more complex situation among non-black minorities. As Jones-Correa and Leal (1996, 
218) explain: 
Latino panethnicity if a complex phenomenon, differing not only by a range of 
demographic characteristics but also among those using panethnicity as a primary 
or secondary identification…. one needs to think about panethnicity as part of a 
constellation of individuals’ multiple identifications and that individuals may 
manage these identities in very different ways. 
For this reason McClain et al. (2009) urge caution when trying to extrapolate race 
consciousness and linked fate to non-black minorities. For example, linked fate among 
African Americans is rooted in shared cultural experience, which may not translate to 
panethnic identities. Many view racial identity as a multidimensional construct (McClain 
et al. 2009), which complicates a shared sense of minority status, common interest, and 
racial identity among non-black minorities with different national origins and panethnic 
identities. While race consciousness has been shown among these groups, the effect is not 
nearly as strong as among African Americans. 
So, what about religion? When viewed through the lens of social identity theory, 
might religion demonstrate some of the same dynamics? The literature suggests four 
criteria that must be satisfied for group consciousness to exist. First, a group must be a 
meaningful social category to which people can belong. Second, a sense of psychological 
attachment to the group must exist. Third, this attachment must be powerful enough to 
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inform one’s own sense of personal identity, creating a social identity. Finally, this 
identity must become politicized in order to establish causal linkages between an 
identity’s in-group/out-group distinctions and political attitudes and behaviors. 
As to the first of these criteria, the vast majority of Americans claim a religious 
affiliation, despite a recent uptick in those claiming to be religiously unaffiliated. The 
Pew Forum (2009) finds that about 70% of Americans claim a religious tradition that 
(broadly speaking) falls under the Christian umbrella. Another 6% claim a non-Christian 
tradition. Nearly one-quarter of Americans claim no religion, but only a small subset of 
this group claims the label agnostic or atheist. Most (15% of the overall American 
population) simply claim no religion in particular. Half of these express a belief in 
heaven and nearly a third occasionally attend a worship service. Looking at the 
population as a whole, slightly more than half of Americans believe that religion is “very 
important” to their life and another quarter of Americans say religion is at least 
“somewhat important.” Clearly, religion is a meaningful category to many Americans 
that remains a part of their everyday life. 
Can religious adherents develop a sense of psychological attachment to their 
religion? The fact that more than half of Americans believe that religion is “very 
important” to their life suggests that they can. For these respondents, religion is salient 
enough to elicit the strongest affirmative response to the survey question. Behavior 
patterns also suggest this to be the case. About one third of Americans report attending 
religious services on a weekly basis, and another third report attending at least once or 
twice a month. More than half of Americans (55%) report praying at least once a day, and 
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about one third (35%) claim to read scripture at least once a week. These suggest that 
religion is not only a meaningful social category but also one that is salient enough to at 
least suggest the presence of an underlying psychological attachment. 
Moreover, is this psychological attachment sufficiently powerful to inform one’s 
personal sense of identity? Sociological work suggests that it is. For example, Smith’s 
(1998) influential study of American evangelicals explicates a theory of “subcultural 
identity” that aligns well with the social identity perspective. As Smith summarizes: 
Religion survives and can thrive in pluralistic, modern society by embedding 
itself in subcultures that offer satisfying morally orienting collective identities 
which provide adherents meaning and belonging. (118) 
And also: 
In a pluralistic society, those religious groups will be relatively stronger which 
better possess and employ the cultural tools needed to create both clear distinction 
from and significant engagement and tension with other relevant outgroups, short 
of becoming genuinely countercultural. (119) 
In this, Smith “nests [the] problem of human meaning within the larger problem of 
collective identity” (119). 
 This dissertation shares a similar but distinct concern from Smith. His primary 
focus is how religion—specifically evangelical Protestantism—can thrive when 
seemingly at odds with its social context, especially a social context that questions its 
plausibility. He locates this in evangelicalism’s power as a locus of subcultural identity. 
My concern dovetails in part. I share an interest in religion’s ability to establish a 
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collective identity, although not specifically for evangelical Protestants. Rather, does 
religion as a social category broadly possess the requisite features to sustain a social 
identity? If so, can this social identity become politicized and evolve into a causal 
mechanism that links this identity with specific political attitudes and behaviors? This 
empirical focus of this dissertation begins to shed light on these questions, but enough 
previous research exists to at least suggest this as a strong possibility. 
 Conceptualizing religion as a social identity presents some notable benefits. First, 
it stands alongside the three Bs to capture another dimension of religion’s political 
relevance; namely, the explanatory potency of religion as a collective identity. Second, it 
may also shed additional light on the relationship between the individual and group-level 
facets of religion, since the psychological processes involved with developing a social 
identity stand squarely at this intersection of the individual and the group. Third, it offers 
a more dynamic understanding of religion in line with the increased fluidity of 
contemporary religion. This point deserves specific focus. In related research, Leal and 
Patterson (2014, 24) found preliminary evidence that religious change may be 
consequential in politics, writing that: 
“belonging” may still be a relevant measure in the study of religion and politics, 
although it need to be seen as a dynamic—and not a static and ascriptive—
variable. While political science research understands, in theory, that a great deal 
of affiliational churn has taken place, this has rarely been incorporated into 
quantitative research. Instead, the focus has moved to the “behavior” and “belief” 
measures that cut across different denominational traditions. 
	66 
Indeed, many recent studies have highlighted the high level of religious churn and 
change. The Pew Forum (2009) found that half of Americans today have changed 
religious affiliation in their life, and that half of Latino evangelicals are converts, many of 
whom are former Roman Catholics. With this kind of fluidity, a case could be made that 
religious affiliation has qualitatively changed over the past half-century, and if the way in 
which religious affiliation is conceptualized in research does not follow suit, it risks 
running headlong into an Inigo Montoya problem: “You keep using that word. I do not 
think it means what you think it means.”14 
 Leal and Patterson (2014) posit that the emergence of belief and behavior as now-
common measures of religion demonstrate the responsiveness of researchers to “the 
inability of affiliation alone to illustrate how religion shapes politics in America’s more 
fluid, restructured religious landscape” but that comparatively less attention has been paid 
to the way in which affiliation should be viewed (6). If Americans change affiliation so 
frequently, is it still as reliable a measure of “belonging” as it is so often styled? Or might 
this be conceptually augmented by a measure of religion as a social identity? This is not 
unlike the race literature, which demonstrates that the political relevance of race can be a 
dynamic and multidimensional construct with political effects that involve social 
psychological processes that vary in salience and are responsive to the broader political 
environment. This is precisely why this chapter brings religion into conversation with 
these literatures. 
 
                                                
14 The Princess Bride (1987). 
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Developing Measures of Religious Identity 
Scholars have approached the concepts of group identity and group consciousness 
in a variety of nuanced ways. Consequently, multiple approaches to measuring these 
concepts exist. Based on a researcher’s theoretical perspective, some facets are included 
and others are not. This section identifies six measurement approaches from the literature 
on social identity, with much of them focusing on race consciousness and national 
identity. It then translates them to religion for the purpose of exploring potential social 
identity measures for religion. 
The first of these approaches comes from Miller et al. (1981). These scholars 
argue that group consciousness emerges along four dimensions, which they identify as 
group identification, polar power, polar affect, and individual vs. system blame. For each 
of these, they develop a single measure or series of measures. Group identification, the 
researchers refer to as a feeling of belonging to a particular social category, and the 
measure is intended to distinguish between ascriptive membership and self-
categorization. Their measure is: “Which of these groups do you feel particularly close 
to—people who are more like you in their ideas and interests and feelings about things?” 
Respondents were offered a list of social categories and asked whether they strongly 
identified, identified, or did not identify with the group. 
The concept of polar power expresses either “satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a 
group’s current status, power, or material resources in relation to that of the outgroup” 
(496). This measure drew on answers to two survey questions about the influence of the 
dominant group versus another group, and resulted in a score that corresponds to “too 
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little” or “too much” influence. The researchers capture the concept of polar affect similar 
to polar power, but instead of asking about the relative power or status of a group, they 
instead ask about “how positive individuals feel toward various groups.” Subtracting out-
group from in-group affect reveals the relative difference in affect, with higher numbers 
equating to more polarized affect.  
Finally, individual vs. system blame is defined as “the belief that the 
responsibility for a group’s low status in society is attributable either to individual 
failings or to inequalities in the social system” (497). The researchers measure this with 
force choice questions that ask respondents to explain the causes for various problems 
facing groups, including ones with which they may identify. The upshot from this is 
whether or not a respondent feels as though the deck is stacked against a group with 
which they identify, thereby creating systematically disadvantage beyond an individual’s 
control. 
Harris-Lacewell and Junn (2007) include many of the same concepts as Miller et 
al. (1981) but add three additional measures for consideration. Their study also asks 
respondents about the importance of race to their ideas about politics, whether it is more 
important to be black, black and American, or just American, and a series of cultural 
identity questions that aim to assess whether a sense of group-pride is also part of group 
consciousness.15 
                                                
15 Harris-Lacewell and Junn (2007) also included Dawson’s (1994) linked fate 
measure, which did not yield results that conformed to their expectations. Their three 
unique measures, intended to tap a sense of group pride, are their study’s most notable 
contribution to the present measurement conversation. They present these as filling a 
conceptual void in the closeness measures à la Miller at al. (1981). For present purposes, 
	69 
Dawson (1994) presents one of the most famous and parsimonious sets of 
measures with the concept of “linked fate.” He asks respondents: “Do you think what 
happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do with what 
happens in your life?” In the case of an affirmative response, a follow up question is 
asked: “Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much.” These are intended to assess 
whether the respondent views their own interests and life chances as being connected 
with those of their racial group. 
Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) focus specifically on groups consciousness’s effects 
on participation. They acknowledge the many dimensions of group consciousness in 
measures developed in previous studies, but they instead offer a more parsimonious 
approach of two combined measures that assess perceived closeness to one’s own group 
relative to other groups. This decision is informed by research that has found causal 
effects on participation via simple measures of group identity but not more complex 
measures of consciousness like Miller et al. (1981) (Wilcox and Gomez 1990). These 
measures essentially comprise the first of Miller et al.’s (1981) four measures, with the 
perceived closeness to one’s own group being placed in relation to the perceived 
closeness other groups. 
                                                
the index that I later refer to as following Harris-Lacewell and Junn combines these 
together absent the linked fate measure, in order to augment a measure of perceived 
group closeness with a measure of group pride. See also footnote 17. 
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Chong and Rogers (2005) combine measures of both group identity and group 
consciousness.16 For identity measures, they utilize a linked fate measure like Dawson 
(1994) and a set of four measures of group autonomy, e.g., “Black people should shop in 
black-owned stores.” Their group consciousness measures assess group influence, 
perceived discrimination, political efficacy, and an endorsement of collective strategies to 
accomplish group goals. Their measure of group influence is similar to Miller et al.’s 
polar power measure, and the perceived discrimination measure is similar to Miller et 
al.’s individual vs. system blame measure. Chong and Rogers’s political efficacy measure 
reads, “If enough blacks vote, they can make a difference in who gets elected President.” 
Finally, the belief in collective strategies measure reads,  
“To have power and improve their position in the United States: Black people 
should be more active in black organizations; or each black person should work 
hard to improve his or her own personal situation” (370-373). 
Huddy and Khatib (2007) offer a sixth and final set of measures. These were 
developed to measure national identity via gut-level group attachments in order to avoid 
the pitfalls of ideological biases. They also have a strong theoretical rooting in social 
identity theory. The set includes four separate questions that measure the importance of 
the group to the individual, whether the individual views herself as a “typical” group 
member, how well the group serves as a personal descriptor, and the extent to which an 
individual refers to the group as “we” versus “them.” 
                                                
16 This demonstrates the confusion that can arise from the inconsistent terminology 
and measures of these concepts. What this study terms as measures of group identity may 
be considered as consciousness in other studies.  
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Three important considerations deserve attention when translating these various 
specifications to religion. First, each of the studies from which these measures are drawn 
has shown meaningful results, so they all deserve consideration when evaluating social 
identity measures for religion. Second, many of these studies draw on measures that are 
either identical or closely related to others. For the sake of parsimony, some closely 
related measures can be collapsed into a single measure in order to eliminate near 
duplicates. Third, some of these measures were designed to test race consciousness 
among specific groups while others are more general in nature. When translating them to 
religion, their scope of applicability must be inclusive enough so as not to be biased 
toward a particular religion or religious orientation but also to not be overly vague. 
After collapsing similar concepts into a single measure, I have translated these six 
sets of measures to religion and the result is twelve distinct components: (1) Group 
identification or closeness, (2) polar power, (3) polar affect, (4) individual vs. system 
blame, (5) group importance to politics, (6) linked fate, (7) collective strategies, (8) 
political efficacy, (9) group importance, (10) viewing oneself as a “typical” group 
member, (11) viewing the group as a personal descriptor, and (12) preferring “we” 
instead of “them” language about the group.17 
                                                
17 For sake of parsimony, I included only one of the three items unique to Harris-
Lacewell and Junn (2007), since the three measures were all intended to tap a more 
general sense of group pride. The importance of one’s group to politics is the most 
conceptually distinct from other measures among this constellation of questions and was 
included. Their force choice questions about the importance of one’s racial group relative 
to nationality is not too far removed from a sense of closeness to the group, and did not 
produce statistically significant results in their experiment. Their measures of racial 
cultural identity produced mixed results, but those that produced meaningful marginal 
differences also tracked directionally with the group closeness measures. 
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Table 1 displays how these survey questions align with the original sets of social 
identity measures. Here is the question wording for the questions, which as discussed 
below, are tested via a University of Texas at Austin undergraduate survey: 
1. Group identification or closeness: How close do you feel to the following 
groups—people who are more like you in their ideas and interests and feeling 
about things? [Groups: Christians, Muslims, Jews, atheists] 
2. Polar power: Do you think that the following groups have too little, too much, 
are about the right amount of influence in politics and society? [Groups: 
Christians, Muslims, Jews, atheists] 
3. Polar affect: How warmly you feel toward each of the following groups? 
[Groups: Christians, Muslims, Jews, atheists] 
4. Individual vs. system blame: Do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement? “Discrimination against [Christian] values and beliefs is a problem 
in this country.”18 (“Christian” can be replaced with other religious affiliations 
as appropriate in questions 4-12) 
5. Importance of group to politics: How important are [Christian] values of your 
religion to your ideas about politics? 
                                                
18 In previous research, individual vs. system blame measures attempt to gage the 
extent to which one perceives their social category to be systematically disadvantaged, 
and for that disadvantage to extend by proxy to the individual. Discrimination presents a 
closely related concept and a more parsimonious one than Miller et al.’s (1981) four-part 
measure. Discrimination also aligns with a component of Chong and Rogers, enabling the 
elimination of a near-duplicate question.   
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6. Linked fate: Do you think that what happens generally to [Christians] in this 
country will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will it 
affect you a lot, some, or not very much? 
7. Collective strategies: Which of the following is the best way for [Christians] 
to be involved in politics: Participate in [Christian] political groups, or be 
involved in politics on their own? 
8. Political efficacy: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “If 
enough [Christians] vote, they can make a difference in who gets elected 
President.” 
9. Group importance: How important is being [Christian] to you? 
10. Viewing oneself as a “typical” group member: To what extent do you see 
yourself as a typical [Christian]?  
11. Viewing the group as a personal descriptor: How well does the term 
[Christian] describe you? 
12. Preferring “we” instead of “them” language about the group: When talking 
about [Christians], how often do you say “we” instead of “them?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	74 
Table 2.1 Alignment of Social Identity Measures with Survey Questions on Religion 
 Study  Social Identity Measure Corresponding 
Survey Question 
Miller et al. (1981) Group identification 1 
 Polar power 2 
 Polar affect 3 
 Individual-system blame 4 
   
Harris-Lacewell and Junn (2007) Group identification 1 
 Polar power 2 
 Polar affect 3 
 Individual-system blame 4 
 Importance of group to politics 5 
   
Dawson (1994) Linked fate 6 
   
Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) Closeness to one’s own group 1 
 Closeness to other groups 1 
   
Chong and Rogers (2005) Linked fate 6 
 Group influence (polar power) 2 
 Group discrimination 4 
 Collective strategies 7 
 Political efficacy 8 
   
Huddy and Khatib (2007) Group importance 9 
 Typical group member 10 
 Group as a personal descriptor 11 
 “We” instead of “them” 12 
 
 
 
Data and Results 
 In order to explore these as possible social identity measures for religion, the 
twelve survey questions above were included on a survey of 1024 undergraduate students 
at the University of Texas at Austin. The survey was conducted online via SurveyGizmo 
and the Blackboard course management system. Students were offered course credit for 
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their participation. Of those who completed the survey, 881 respondents stated a religious 
preference. This includes 217 Roman Catholics and 331 who responded either Protestant 
or Christian. Another 167 claimed no religion and no other religious group has more than 
38 respondents. Due to the small number of non-Christian categories, most analyses here 
will focus on Christians. 
 This section analyzes these measures in three ways. First, it looks at the internal 
consistency of the index items. Second, it looks at the relationship between the religious 
identity measures and the three Bs. Third, it assesses how these measures perform in the 
context of a model. 
Of the six possible religious identity measures for religion, five are indices of 
different facets of social identity. For these, it is important to assess the internal 
consistency of the constituent parts. The indices were translated directly from social 
identity measures in related literatures which had showed significant results; my 
hypothesis was that these religious identity measures would demonstrate similar facets of 
social identity. Assessing internal consistency through inner-item correlations, alpha 
scores, and correlation matrices will test the validity of this assumption and potentially 
expose possible outliers that could compromise the integrity of the index as a measure.  
One other assumption warrants mention. Namely, each constituent element is 
given equal weight as a facet of social identity. For example, the Miller et al. approach 
has four aspects: group identification, polar power, polar affect, and individual versus 
system blame. Each of these four aspects corresponds to a survey question. Group 
identification simply gages how close a respondent feels to their religious group on a 0-
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100 thermometer scale, with a higher rating equating to a greater sense of closeness. 
Individual vs. system blame assesses the degree to which a respondent believes the deck 
is stacked against Christians so to speak, utilizing a question about perceived 
discrimination against Christians (see also footnote 15).  
Polar power and polar affect are a bit more complex. These measures each 
compare two ratings, a perception of one’s own group relative to a perception of other 
groups. As an example, polar affect subtracts a 0-100 thermometer rating of a 
respondent’s feelings toward Christians from their feelings towards Muslims, Jews, and 
atheists. The result is three scores of relative affect: (1) Christians minus Muslims, (2) 
Christians minus Jews, (3) Christians minus atheists. A positive number indicates the 
degree to which the respondent has warmer feelings toward Christianity than other 
groups. These scores are then compiled into a single score of polar affect. Here is an 
example: Respondent 1 reports a feeling of 100 toward Christians, 75 toward Jews, 50, 
toward Muslims, and 25 toward atheists. The difference in feelings for each group is: 
 
Christians minus Muslims 100 - 75 = 25 
Christians minus Jews 100 - 50 = 50 
Christians minus atheists 100 - 25 = 75 
 
Notice that a higher score means a greater difference in warmth, i.e., greater polarity. 
There is not a great deal of difference in how this respondent feels toward Christians 
relative to Muslims, but there is a much larger difference in how they feel toward 
atheists. The overall polar affect score is the mean of these three scores; in the case of this 
respondent, 50. 
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 Of course, polar affect only comprises one of four aspects in the Miller et al. style 
measure of social identity. In order to combine all four of these together, the score for 
each one—group identity, polar power, polar affect, individual vs. system blame—is 
standardized on a 0-to-1 scale. The overall measure of social identity is the mean of all 
four of these aspects. Again, an example: Respondent 1’s standardized scores are as 
follows: Group identification = 1.0; polar power = 0.75; polar affect = 0.50; individual 
vs. system blame = 0.25.19 I then create an index, where the final score of social identity 
according to the Miller et al. framework is: 
 
    (Group identification + polar power + polar affect 
          individual vs. system blame)  
 Social identity = ________________________________________ 
        
 4 
 
 
Thus, for this respondent, we have: 
 
          (1.0 + 0.75 + 0.50 + 0.25) 
    0.625 = _______________________________________ 
        
4 
 
 
When correlated, the items within the Miller et al. scale all show statistically 
significant, positive relationships. Most are moderate, although group identification 
                                                
19 Note that the direction of a constituent item’s scale may change depending on the 
theory underlying its inclusion. For example, a higher polar affect score suggests a 
stronger social identity, which is why we subtract the out-group from the in-group feeling 
of warmth. However, polar power works in the opposite direction. Here, a sensitivity 
toward out-groups having more power than their own group would suggest a stronger 
social identity, so we subtract in-group power from out-group power in order for a higher 
score to equate to a stronger sense of social identity. 
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shows a somewhat weaker correlation with individual vs. system blame (Table 2.2). The 
Cronbach’s Alpha for the set is .637 (Table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.2 Correlation Matrix for Miller et al. Index Items 
		 		 Group	ID	 Polar	Power	 Polar	Affect	 Indiv-Sys	Blame	
Group	ID	 Pearson	Corr.	 1	 .410***	 .526***	 .229***	
		 N	 873	 860	 867	 542	
Polar	Power	 Pearson	Corr.	 .410***	 1	 .441***	 .472***	
		 N	 860	 863	 857	 535	
Polar	Affect	 Pearson	Corr.	 .526***	 .411***	 1	 .373***	
		 N	 867	 857	 874	 541	
Indiv-Sys	Blame	 Pearson	Corr.	 .229***	 .472***	 .373***	 1	
		 N	 542	 535	 541	 543	
***	Correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.01	level	(2-tailed)	 	  
 
 
Table 2.3 Internal Consistency of Religious Identity Indices 
		 Miller	et	al.	 Harris	Junn	 Leighley	Ved	 Chong	Rogers	 Huddy	Khatib	
Cronbach's	Alpha	 0.637	 0.716	 0.852	 0.546	 0.876	
 
 
For the analog of Harris-Lacewell and Junn (2007), one additional measure is 
added to the Miller et al. index; namely, the perceived importance of the individual’s 
group to politics. All of the correlations are otherwise the same except for this new 
measure, which also has a statistically significant, positive correlation to other items in 
the index at a moderate degree (Table 2.4). The alpha score for this index is .716 (Table 
2.3).  
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Table 2.4 Correlation Matrix for Harris-Lacewell and Junn Index Items 
		 		 Group	ID	 Polar	Power	 Polar	Affect	 Indiv-Sys	Blame	 Group	Import	
Group	ID	 Pearson	Corr.	 1	 .410***	 .526***	 .229***	 .369***	
		 N	 873	 860	 867	 542	 542	
Polar	Power	 Pearson	Corr.	 .410***	 1	 .441***	 .472***	 .412***	
		 N	 860	 863	 857	 535	 535	
Polar	Affect	 Pearson	Corr.	 .526***	 .411***	 1	 .373***	 .336***	
		 N	 867	 857	 874	 541	 540	
Indiv-Sys	Blame	 Pearson	Corr.	 .229***	 .472***	 .373***	 1	 .508***	
		 N	 542	 535	 541	 543	 542	
Group	Import	 Pearson	Corr.	 .369***	 .412***	 .336***	 .508***	 1	
		 N	 542	 535	 542	 542	 543	
***	Correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.01	level	(2-tailed)	 	   
 
 
 The Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) style index works very similarly to the Miller et 
al. polar affect measure described above, although it instead utilizes perceived closeness 
to one’s group relative to others. The correlations of interest when analyzing the 
components of this index are the differences between groups. In this case, Christians 
comprise the in-group, and the out-groups are Muslims, Jews, and atheists. Table 2.5 
displays the correlations, which are all statistically significant and positive, and of a 
similar moderate-to-high magnitude. The Cronbach’s Alpha (Table 2.3) for this index is 
.852.  
 
Table 2.5 Correlation Matrix for Leighley and Vedlitz Index Items 
		 		 Chr-Muslim	 Chr-Jew	 Chr-Atheist	
Chr-Muslim	 Pearson	Corr.	 1	 .668***	 .688***	
		 N	 873	 869	 871	
Chr-Jew	 Pearson	Corr.	 .668***	 1	 .692***	
		 N	 869	 869	 867	
Chr-Atheist	 Pearson	Corr.	 .688***	 .692***	 1	
		 N	 871	 867	 871	
***	Correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.01	level	(2-tailed)	 	
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 The index based on Chong and Rogers (2005) utilizes three new components not 
present in the previously discussed indices. These include a linked fate measure, a 
measure of whether or not an individual prefers group-based political action, i.e., 
collective strategies, and a measure of their group’s perceived collective political 
efficacy. Each is represented by a dummy variable.  
 The correlation matrix (Table 2.6) shows positive and statistically significant 
correlates for all variables in the index. The magnitude varies more than do the other 
scales, with some demonstrating particularly weak correlations. Collective strategy tends 
to correlate fairly weak across the board, as does political efficacy. Linked fate correlates 
weakly except with the measure of group discrimination, which is moderate. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha (Table 2.3) for this index is among the lowest of the index approaches 
at .546. Collective strategies is the only item that would increase Cronbach’s Alpha if 
deleted, but that increase would be marginal, to .592, and the Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation value is also fairly low at just .220. Leong and Austin (2006) suggest that 
removing an item is only beneficial when the Corrected Item-Total Correlation value 
exceeds 0.4. 
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Table 2.6 Correlation Matrix for Chong and Rogers Index Items 
		 		 Linked	Fate	 Group	Influ	 Group	Discrim	 Collective	Strat	 Political	Effic	
Linked	Fate	 Pearson	Corr.	 1	 .254***	 .401***	 .142***	 .210***	
		 N	 538	 530	 537	 532	 534	
Group	Influ	 Pearson	Corr.	 .254***	 1	 .472***	 .094**	 .087**	
		 N	 530	 863	 535	 530	 533	
Group	Discrim	 Pearson	Corr.	 .401***	 .472***	 1	 .268***	 .185***	
		 N	 537	 535	 543	 537	 539	
Collective	Strat	 Pearson	Corr.	 .142***	 .094**	 .268***	 1	 .090**	
		 N	 532	 530	 537	 538	 536	
Political	Effic	 Pearson	Corr.	 .210***	 .087**	 .185***	 .090**	 1	
		 N	 534	 533	 539	 536	 540	
***	Correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.01	level	(2-tailed);	**	is	significant	at	the	0.05	level	(2-tailed)	 	
 
 The four measures based on Huddy and Khatib (2007) are not shared among any 
of the other social identity measurement approaches. The importance of a group to 
oneself, the extent to which a person self-categorizes as a “typical” member of the group, 
and how well the group functions as a personal descriptor all have scaled response 
options. Here, a 10-point scale was used. The amount that one uses “we” versus “them” 
when talking about a group offered six response options, ranging from “all of the time” to 
“never.” As with all of the other indices, these items were standardized on a 0-to-1 scale. 
Table 2.7 displays the correlation matrix of the four index items. They all demonstrate 
significant and positive correlations, with most being moderate in magnitude and a few 
being somewhat stronger; especially the group descriptor and group importance items 
(.789).  
 The Cronbach’s Alpha for the index is relatively high at .876. The “we” versus 
“them” item has the lowest correlation to the other items. Were it to be removed from the 
index, the Cronbach’s Alpha would rise slightly to .894, and the Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation is higher than .4 at .604. However, it is also worth considering whether this 
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item captures an important facet of social identity that might naturally not correlate as 
strongly with the other items in the index. Since it is not an outlier and still correlates 
moderately well, its inclusion does not impair the integrity of the index. 
 
Table 2.7 Correlation Matrix for Huddy and Khatib Index Items 
		 		 Group	Import	 Typical	Memb	 Group	Descript	 We-Them	
Group	Import	 Pearson	Corr.	 1	 .669***	 .789***	 .553***	
		 N	 542	 540	 540	 540	
Typical	Memb	 Pearson	Corr.	 .669***	 1	 .754***	 .519***	
		 N	 540	 541	 540	 541	
Group	Descript	 Pearson	Corr.	 .789***	 .754***	 1	 .577***	
		 N	 540	 540	 541	 540	
We-Them	 Pearson	Corr.	 .553***	 .519***	 .577***	 1	
		 N	 540	 541	 540	 542	
***	Correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.01	level	(2-tailed)	 	  
 
 Having now looked at the internal consistency of these measures, their 
relationship to the three Bs of religious belonging, believing, and behaving yields an 
additional perspective on these data. An important preliminary question when 
considering a new measure of religion ought to be whether it is different than existing 
measures of religion. Is it truly capturing another dimension of religion’s political 
relevance or is it actually a veiled duplication of an existing measure? Table 2.7 shows 
correlations of each of the six religious identity measures with existing measures of 
believing and behaving. 
 
Table 2.8 Correlation of Religious Identity Measures with Believing and Behaving 
		 Miller	et	al.	 Harris	Junn	 Dawson	 Leighley	Ved	 Chong	Rogers	 Huddy	Khatib	
Literalism	 .434***	 .475***	 .223***	 .333***	 .398***	 .484***	
Church	Attend	 .390***	 .464***	 .239***	 .481***	 .347***	 .551***	
***	Correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.01	level	(2-tailed)	 	   
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 As we might expect, each of the six measures shows a significant, positive 
relationship with believing and behaving. In this case, believing is represented by one’s 
view of scripture. Behaving is represented by frequency of church attendance. None of 
the correlations is so high as to suggest that these measures are duplicates or near-
duplicates of existing measures. This aligns with my theory that religious identity 
presents a distinct dimension of religion’s political relevance that heretofore has gone 
undeveloped in the literature. Most are in the weak-to-moderate range. The Dawson-style 
(linked fate) measure is the least correlated to the view of scripture and church 
attendance. The Huddy and Khatib measure is most correlated, squarely in the moderate 
range at with view of scripture (.484) and church attendance (.551). 
 Comparing the means of these measures across the common religion measures 
also helps to gain a better understanding of them. Figure 2.1 displays the relationship 
between these measures of religious identity and religious affiliation. For each of the six 
measures, evangelical Protestants demonstrate the highest level of religious identity. 
Roman Catholics demonstrate the lowest level, with mainline Protestants in the middle.20 
Because each of the six measurement approaches was standardized on a 0-to-1 scale, they 
are comparable to one other in this regard. The degree of difference between the groups 
                                                
20 Religious affiliation options on the survey included Roman Catholic, Protestant, 
Christian, other religious groups and a no religion option. A separate question asked 
whether the respondent was a “born again” or “evangelical” Christian. Variables were 
constructed to classify Roman Catholics according to that affiliation response, 
evangelical Protestants as those who responded as either “Protestant” or “Christian” and 
responded self-identified as evangelical or born again, and mainline Protestants as those 
who responded as either “Protestant” or “Christian” and did not self-identify as an 
evangelical or born again Christian. 
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varies depending on the measurement approach. The Dawson scores are on the whole 
much lower than the other five, but the difference between religious affiliations is also 
the greatest. Catholics and mainliners are fairly close to one another on every 
measurement approach save Dawson. 
 
Figure 2.1 Means of Religious Identity Measures by Religious Affiliation  
 
 
 The survey contained a question about views toward scripture, which is one of the 
most commonly used measures of religious belief. The question wording in this survey 
referred specifically to “the Bible.” Perhaps not surprisingly, each of the six religious 
identity measures show a higher level of religious identity among those who believe that 
the Bible is the Word of God and should be interpreted literally. Those who believe that 
the Bible was written by humans and is not the Word of God demonstrate the lowest 
amount of religious identity, and those who believe the Bible to be the Word of God but 
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not to be interpreted literally are in the middle. Figure 2.2 displays these means. Again, 
the Dawson measure is lower across the board than the other five. 
 
Figure 2.2 Means of Religious Identity Measures by View of the Bible  
 
  
 Finally, the survey included a measure of the frequency with which a person 
attends religious services, one of the most commonly used survey questions to gage a 
respondent’s level of religiosity. The question offered six response options, which were 
grouped together into three broader categories of attendance patterns: at least once per 
week, once or twice per month, and seldom or not at all. The relationship of religious 
identity to church attendance patterns again breaks down as we should expect, with those 
who most frequently attend church demonstrating higher religious identity and those who 
seldom attend demonstrating lower level of religious identity. The Dawson measure is 
once again the lowest of the measures. Figure 2.3 displays the means. 
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Figure 2.3 Means of Religious Identity Measures by Frequency of Attendance 
  
 
 Finally, it is important to assess how these measures perform in models of 
political attitudes. Table 2.8 presents OLS regression results for modeling attitudes 
toward abortion. Abortion is a policy issue on which ample previous research has shown 
religion plays a key role in structuring. Response options on this dependent variable 
range from a low end of no access to a high end of unrestricted access, so that a negative 
coefficient corresponds to more conservative views toward abortion and a positive 
coefficient corresponds to more liberal views. The table displays seven models. Each 
includes fairly standard covariates for models of opinion: party identification, income, 
gender, and race.21 Two conspicuous absences are age and education, since the data are a 
                                                
21 Income is measured as perceived income of one’s family, since this survey used a 
student sample. 
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student sample and consequently have relatively little variation. Each model also includes 
common measures for the three Bs: church attendance (for behaving), view of scripture 
(for belief), and dummy variables for evangelicals and Catholics, with other Protestants 
as the base category (belonging). Finally, the first model contains no measure of religious 
identity, while each of the following six include one of the religious identity measures 
(denoted across the top of the table). 
 
Table 2.8 Modeling Attitudes Toward Abortion (OLS) 
		 No	Religious	ID	 Miller	et	al	 Harris	Junn	 Dawson	
Constant	 4.557***	 4.921***	 4.910***	 4.567***	
		 (.328)	 (.344)	 (.334)	 (.336)	
Party	ID	 -.170***	 -.117***	 -.086**	 -.172***	
		 (.037)	 (.040)	 (.040)	 (.037)	
Income	 .018	 .014	 .003	 .013	
		 (.023)	 (.023)	 (.023)	 (.024)	
Female	 .311***	 .293***	 .282***	 .317***	
		 (.101)	 (.101)	 (.100)	 (.102)	
Black	 .055	 .080	 .077	 .024	
		 (.207)	 (.209)	 (.206)	 (.210)	
Hispanic	 -.265*	 -.344***	 -.347**	 -.277*	
		 (.145)	 (.146)	 (.144)	 (.148)	
Church	Attend	 -.240***	 -.208***	 -.173***	 -.231***	
		 (.038)	 (.039)	 (.040)	 (.039)	
Literalism	 -.212**	 -.102	 -.036	 -.187*	
		 (.104)	 (.109)	 (.108)	 (.105)	
Evangelical	 .064	 .123	 .162	 .073	
		 (.143)	 (.145)	 (.143)	 .145	
Catholic	 -.052	 -.059	 -.074	 -.059	
		 (.136)	 (.135)	 (.134)	 (.137)	
Religious	ID	 --	 -1.491***	 -1.996***	 -.117	
		 --	 (.442)	 (.405)	 (.136)	
R	Squared	 .239	 .257	 .278	 .238	
Adjusted	R2	 .221	 .237	 .260	 .218	
N	 401	 393	 392	 394	
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Table	2.8	continued	 	
		 Leighley	Ved	 Chong	Rogers	 Huddy	Khatib	 	
Constant	 4.827***	 4.751***	 4.566***	 	
		 (.354)	 (.334)	 (.325)	 	
Party	ID	 -.144***	 -.132***	 -.138***	 	
		 (.039)	 (.038)	 (.038)	 	
Income	 .017	 .004	 .017	 	
		 (.023)	 (.024)	 (.023)	 	
Female	 .347***	 .257**	 .340***	 	
		 (.103)	 (.102)	 (.101)	 	
Black	 .085	 .044	 .146	 	
		 (.209)	 (.207)	 (.208)	 	
Hispanic	 -.257*	 -.277*	 -.248*	 	
		 (.146)	 (.146)	 (.145)	 	
Church	Attend	 -.226***	 -.211***	 -.180***	 	
		 (.039)	 (.039)	 (.042)	 	
Literalism	 -.166	 -.097	 -.089	 	
		 (.106)	 (.107)	 (.111)	 	
Evangelical	 .079	 .071	 .063	 	
		 (.143)	 (.144)	 (.143)	 	
Catholic	 -.062	 -.079	 -.086	 	
		 (.136)	 (.136)	 (.135)	 	
Religious	ID	 -.736**	 -1.096***	 -.055***	 	
		 (.357)	 (.325)	 (.298)	 	
R	Squared	 .246	 .255	 .259	 	
Adjusted	R2	 .226	 .235	 .240	 	
N	 398	 388	 397	 	
*	p	<	0.10;	**	p	<	0.05;	***	p	<	0.01 
 
 In the first model, which contains no religious identification measure, significant 
negative effects exist for party identification and Hispanic, and female has a significant 
positive effect on opinion.22 Looking at the religious covariates, behaving and believing 
both are statistically significant. Frequency of church attendance and a literal 
interpretation of scripture both have a significant negative effect. No effect is found for 
religious belonging. 
                                                
22 This uses a 1-to-7 party identification scale from strongly Democratic (1) to 
strongly Republican (7). 
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 In the second model, which adds the Miller et al. style religious identity measure 
into the mix, we see some changes. The effects for party identification, Hispanic, and 
female all remain. The most significant change is that religious identity has a significant 
negative effect, meaning that a stronger religious identity leads to more restrictive 
attitudes toward abortion. The church attendance covariate retains its negative effect. 
However, when religious identity is added to the model, the measure of biblical literalism 
drops below conventional levels of statistical significance. This suggests not only that 
religious identity is a good predictor in this model, but it may also be a better and more 
appropriate predictor than religious belief. This second model also explains slightly more 
variance than does the first, with a slightly higher adjusted R-squared (.237 compared to 
.221).23 
 The third model includes the Harris-Lacewell and Junn style measure for religious 
identity. The results are very similar to the model with the Miller et al. measure. The 
statistically significant effects are all the same. This should be expected because the 
religious identity measures are themselves very similar, sharing all but one component. 
This component appears to have an impact, though. The effect of religious identity is 
stronger in this model, with a coefficient of -1.996 compared to -1.491 in the Miller et al. 
model. Also, the adjusted R-squared is higher (.260), suggesting a better fit. 
 In the fourth model, the Dawson-style measure of religious identity seems less 
effective. It is not a statistically significant predictor of attitudes. While all other 
                                                
23 R-squared and adjusted R-squared values are shown for each mode. Because not all 
models have the same number of covariates, the adjusted R-squared statistic is discussed 
when comparing models. 
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covariates are the same, biblical literalism returns as significant in place of religious 
identity. The model is not as good a fit overall, with a lower adjusted R-squared of .218.  
 The fifth model includes the Leighley and Vedlitz style measure of religious 
identity. Again, significant negative effects exist for party identification, Hispanic, and 
church attendance, and female has a positive effect. Similar to the Miller et al. and 
Harris-Lacewell and Junn models, this model shows religious identity to have a 
statistically significant and negative effect, and biblical literalism drops from 
significance. Religious identity has lower substantive effect in this model, though, with a 
coefficient of -.736. (The coefficients are comparable across models because all are 
standardized on a 0-to-1 scale and the models are otherwise identical.) The adjusted R-
squared for this model is .226, lower than Miller et al. and Harris-Lacewell and Junn, but 
higher than Dawson and the base model with no religious identity measure. 
 The sixth model includes the Chong and Rogers style measure for religious 
identity. The results are on the whole very similar to Miller et al., Harris-Lacewell and 
Junn, and Leighley and Vedlitz. The statistical significance and substantive effects are all 
quite similar. The religious identity coefficient shows a larger effect than does the 
Leighley and Vedlitz model, at -1.096, and the adjusted R-squared is also a little larger at 
.235. 
 The seventh and final model of abortion attitudes utilizes the Huddy and Khatib 
style measure of religious identity. The statistical significance of the religious identity 
measure is similar to those in the other models, with the exception of Dawson. However, 
the substantive effects of the religious identity measure in this model is smaller. With just 
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a coefficient of just -.055, the impact on opinion is almost negligible despite a high level 
of statistical significance. The adjusted R-squared for the model is .240. 
 In sum for these models, we find that all models with a religious identity variable 
(except for Dawson) perform better than does the model without religious identity. When 
religious identity is included, the effect of biblical literalism drops from significance. The 
magnitude of the religious identity coefficients varies, with the Harris-Lacewell and Junn 
model demonstrating the largest effect and the Huddy and Khatib model the smallest. 
 A second set of models looks at opinion toward public prayer at public school 
events like football games and graduations. Table 2.9 displays the results of these models. 
The dependent variable is a question that asks respondents to indicate their level of 
support for a policy of “allowing prayer before high school programs, such as football 
games and graduations.” Response options range from oppose strongly to favor strongly. 
 Overall, the models bear many similarities to the models for abortion opinion, but 
there are also some notable differences. As might be expected, female drops from 
significance across the board in these models. Party identification remains significant in 
every model, just as in the abortion models. The effect is positive, meaning that 
Republicans are more likely to support for public prayers at school events. With one 
exception, there are no race effects in these models (black is has a positive effect in the 
Dawson model). 
 The religious covariates in these models show less uniformity than in the abortion 
models. The model without religious identity shows statistically significant, positive 
effects for church attendance, biblical literalism, and evangelical orientation. When 
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religious identity is added to the other models, some of these effects remain and others do 
not depending on the model. In the Miller et al. model, biblical literalism drops from 
significance when religious identity is added. Church attendance and evangelical remain 
significant albeit with somewhat smaller coefficients. In the Harris Lacewell and Junn 
model, both church attendance and biblical literalism lose significance, as religious 
identity has the largest effect of any of the models (2.343). The Harris Lacewell and Junn 
model also best fits the data, with an adjusted R-squared of .345 compared to the others, 
with the lowest (.286) being the base model with no religious identity measure. 
  
Table 2.9 Modeling Attitudes Toward Public Prayer (OLS) 
		 No	Religious	ID	 Miller	et	al	 Harris	Junn	 Dawson	
Constant	 1.672***	 1.155***	 1.197***	 1.628***	
		 (.300)	 (.312)	 (.303)	 (.307)	
Party	ID	 .215***	 .147***	 .125***	 .214***	
		 (.033)	 (.035)	 (.035)	 (.034)	
Income	 -.005	 .002	 .016	 .002	
		 (.021)	 (.021)	 (.021)	 (.022)	
Female	 -.094	 -.091	 -.083	 -.113	
		 (.092)	 (.090)	 (.089)	 (.092)	
Black	 .299	 .262	 .282	 .321*	
		 (.189)	 (.188)	 (.186)	 (.191)	
Hispanic	 .076	 .185	 .186	 .088	
		 (.133)	 (.132)	 (.130)	 (.135)	
Church	Attend	 .132***	 .084**	 .052	 .120***	
		 (.034)	 (.035)	 (.035)	 (.035)	
Literalism	 .308***	 .154	 .109	 .299***	
		 (.095)	 (.098)	 (.097)	 (.096)	
Evangelical	 .378***	 .294**	 .255**	 .393***	
		 (.130)	 (.129)	 (.128)	 (.131)	
Catholic	 -.176	 -.184	 -.175	 -.164	
		 (.124)	 (.122)	 (.120)	 (.125)	
Religious	ID	 --	 2.099***	 2.343***	 .132	
		 --	 (.399)	 (.367)	 (.124)	
R	Squared	 .301	 .341	 .361	 .307	
Adjusted	R2	 .286	 .325	 .345	 .290	
N	 423	 415	 414	 416	
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Table	2.9	continued	 	
		 Leighley	Ved	 Chong	Rogers	 Huddy	Khatib	 	
Constant	 1.307***	 1.445***	 1.631***	 	
		 (.324)	 (.307)	 (.294)	 	
Party	ID	 .183***	 .184***	 .172***	 	
		 (.035)	 (.035)	 (.034)	 	
Income	 -.001	 .008	 -.002	 	
		 (.022)	 (.022)	 (.021)	 	
Female	 -.151	 -.072	 -.123	 	
		 (.092)	 (.092)	 (.090)	 	
Black	 .267	 .302	 .167	 	
		 (.189)	 (.189)	 (.187)	 	
Hispanic	 .105	 .105	 .071	 	
		 (.132)	 (.133)	 (.130)	 	
Church	Attend	 .109***	 .099***	 .049	 	
		 (.035)	 (.035)	 (.038)	 	
Literalism	 .264***	 .210**	 .155	 	
		 (.096)	 (.098)	 (.100)	 	
Evangelical	 .377***	 .363***	 .372***	 	
		 (.128)	 (.131)	 (.128)	 	
Catholic	 -.145	 -.158	 -.138	 	
		 (.123)	 (.124)	 (.122)	 	
Religious	ID	 .884***	 1.149***	 1.273***	 	
		 (.324)	 (.296)	 (.270)	 	
R	Squared	 .313	 .330	 .338	 	
Adjusted	R2	 .296	 .313	 .321	 	
N	 420	 409	 419	 	
*	p	<	0.10;	**	p	<	0.05;	***	p	<	0.01	 	   
 
 In the Dawson-style model, religious identity is again not statistically significant. 
All of the other religious covariates remain similar to the base model with no religious 
identity measure. Uniquely, as noted above, the African American measure becomes 
statistically significant in the Dawson model. The Leighley and Vedlitz and the Chong 
and Rogers style models are nearly identical to one another. All religious effects remain 
unchanged from the base model even though religious identity is significant in both. 
Chong and Rogers has a slightly larger religious identity effect (1.149) compared to 
Leighley and Vedlitz (.884), but the models are on the whole quite similar. 
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 The Huddy and Khatib model is somewhat of an outlier in this set of models. 
While the statistically significant, positive effect for evangelical remains, both church 
attendance and biblical literalism drop from significance, as religious identification 
emerges as a significant, positive predictor.  
 
Summary 
 This chapter accomplishes a number of tasks. First, it presents the ways in which 
religion has been conceptualized in research, and discusses how scholarship has adjusted 
to changes in American religiosity by creating the three Bs of belonging, believing, and 
behaving. Next, it discusses some challenges and possible limitations for the three Bs. It 
then develops a conceptualization of religion as a social identity, which offers a new 
dimension to how religion is viewed in most political research on religion. As such, it 
opens an additional way to understand how religion can structure political attitudes and 
affect political behaviors.  
 This chapter draws on social identity theory and related literatures to identify 
ways in which social identities have been measured in other fields, looking especially at 
work on race and politics. These measures are then translated to religion, taking care to 
make as parsimonious a list as possible given the many different components. They are 
tested and evaluated using a student survey. Analyses of the results indicate that the 
indices demonstrate internal consistency, and the measures on the whole are positively 
but not too strongly correlated with the three Bs. This suggests that religious identity is 
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measuring a distinct dimension that is related to but distinct from belonging, believing, 
and behaving.  
 Finally, the measures show predictive power when placed alongside the three Bs 
in models of policy attitudes that we expect religion to shape. While the religious 
application of the linked fate (Dawson) measure does not show a statistically significant 
effect, the other measures of religious identity do. Furthermore, including the new 
variables can sometimes drop the other religious measures from statistical significance.  
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Chapter 3: Establishing the Relationship Between Threat  
and Religious Identity 
 
 
Overview 
Previous research on social identities suggests that a perceived threat toward 
one’s group can influence an individual’s attitudes and behavior (Tajfel and Turner 1979; 
Huddy et al. 2002; Huddy 2003; Huddy et al. 2007). These findings are buttressed by a 
broader literature on threat that examines how foreign and domestic policy attitudes react 
to war, geopolitical unrest, and terrorism (Jentelson 1992; Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser 
1999; Huddy et al. 2005). Numerous findings suggest direct links between threat and 
support for more extreme, protectionist, retaliatory and sometimes putative action. Here, 
these insights are drawn into this dissertation’s broader conversation on the political 
effects of religion as a social identity. 
Specifically, this chapter looks at how threat shapes the role of religious identity 
in structuring political attitudes. It does so through two studies. The first utilizes an 
experiment embedded within an opinion survey that tests whether or not Christians with 
differing levels of religious identity react differently to policies on prayers at public high 
school graduations when additional information is introduced that could be viewed as 
threatening to Christians’ relative social status. Respondents are asked about support for 
public prayers offered by both Christian and Muslim students. The threat treatment 
incites stronger support for such prayer, and for both Christians and Muslims. Differences 
in mean responses do not surpasses conventional thresholds of significance, which is 
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understandable for a small sample size, but the results nonetheless suggest a relationship 
between threat and religious identity. This also raises important questions about the 
extent to which religious reaction to threat is protectionist or retaliatory in nature vis-à-
vis religious outgroups. 
The second study uses a student survey to test attitudes toward a similar policy. In 
this study, the issue is not the religion of the person offering the prayer, but rather general 
support for prayer at public school events. In a model of attitudes, I find that religious 
identity and threat both have a statistically significant and positive effect on policy 
support. I also find a significant interaction between threat and religious identity. The 
interaction shows threat to have a greater positive effect among those with a weaker 
religious identity than among those with a stronger one. This aligns with the findings 
discussed in Chapter 4; while threat has a positive effect for both weak and strong 
identifiers, its moderating effect is felt the strongest among the weak identifiers. This 
suggests that threat may increase the salience of their religious identity in structuring 
policy attitudes. While religious identity is already politically relevant for those with a 
strong identity, threat can be viewed as a politicizing force for those with a weak identity 
that may otherwise have little political relevance. 
 
Why Should Threat Matter to Religious Identity? 
 Social identity and threat are closely related concepts. When individuals develop a 
social identity, they self-categorize themselves as part of a larger group with which they 
share certain characteristics. Moreover, this identification with the group informs their 
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personal identity, forming a social identity. Social identities allow individuals to utilize 
in-group versus out-group distinctions to locate and contextualize themselves in relation 
to broader society (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981). This is important because threat 
in a political context is typically experienced via reference groups. 
For example, a public school teacher might experience a sense of threat from a 
policy proposal to reduce health or retirement benefits for teachers, or to privatize a 
public teacher retirement system. This threat is experienced not as a personal threat made 
against a specific teacher, but a threat to public school teachers as a group. Identification 
with the group enables the individual to experience the threat. The race literature also 
provides examples. Dawson (1994) finds that African Americans experience threat via 
identification with their racial group. A policy that is viewed as a threat to African 
Americans generally can be experienced as threat by an individual precisely because of 
the individual’s racial identity. In his study of evangelicals, Smith (1998) argues that “the 
human drives for meaning and belonging are satisfied primarily by locating human selves 
within social groups that sustain distinctive, morally orienting collective identities” (90). 
A social identity provides the necessary medium through which an individual can 
understand a policy or political agenda as threatening to oneself. 
It thus makes sense that several facets of the social identity measures that were 
translated to religion in Chapter 2 include sensitivity to threat among their constituent 
elements. For example, the concept of polar power measures a sense of relative 
disadvantage for one’s own group in relation to the influence of other out-groups. 
Individual vs. system blame similarly gages the extent to which individuals believe their 
station in life to be self-determined versus governed by circumstances that affect their 
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group and are therefore beyond their control. These measures can function like 
barometers of threat, since they directly connect the social identity of group members to 
an experience of exogenous forces of disadvantage directed toward the group. Chong and 
Rogers (2005) include among their measures of social identity the experience of 
discrimination toward one’s group. Such measures, each drawn from related but distinct 
approaches to social identity as a political determinant, demonstrate the close relationship 
between perceived threat and social identity. 
The experience of threat is also a longstanding part of religious experience. World 
history is peppered with examples of threat and persecution toward religious groups of all 
kinds across all times and places. Religious texts in the Abrahamic traditions are replete 
with stories of religious groups being enslaved, religious wars, religious persecution, and 
divine protection from external threats to religious observance and even one’s life. One of 
the most famous sermons of Jesus in the Christian scriptures, the Sermon on the Mount, 
includes: 
Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is the 
kingdom of heaven.  
Blessed are you when people revile you and persecute you and utter all 
kinds of evil against you falsely on my account. Rejoice and be glad, for your 
reward is great in heaven, for in the same way they persecuted the prophets who 
were before you.1 (Matthew 5:9-12) 
                                                
1 New Revised Standard Version; see also Luke 6:22-23. 
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 Political threats toward religious groups played a major role in framing the 
American experiment, as communities of religious dissenters sought out a political 
context in which they could practice their common faith. This also led Roger Williams to 
found Rhode Island as “a lively experiment” in religious freedom for dissenters like him 
who were no longer welcome in the colonial experiments of others. Despite the 
innovation of the First Amendment, religious freedom was still hard to come by for many 
religious minorities. Threats against Mormons eventually drove the group westward in a 
mass migration. Jehovah’s Witnesses, Catholics, and atheists brought numerous 
lawsuits—many of which are now considered landmark cases on the free exercise and 
establishment of religion—in order to secure constitutional rights in the public schools 
and the community. 
Roman Catholics experienced sometimes fierce persecution for much of 
American history. When Al Smith ran as the Democratic nominee for president in 1932, 
stories like this were not uncommon: 
The school board of Daytona Beach, Fla., sent a note home with every student. It 
read simply: “We must prevent the election of Alfred E. Smith to the Presidency. 
If he is elected President, you will not be allowed to have or read a Bible.” Fliers 
informed voters that if Smith took the White House, all Protestant marriages 
would be annulled, their offspring rendered illegitimate on the spot.2 (Slayton 
2011) 
                                                
2 Slayton, Robert A. 2011. “When a Catholic Terrified the Heartland.” The New York 
Times, December 11, 2011. See also Slayton, Robert. 2007. Empire Statesmen: The Rise 
and Redemption of Al Smith. New York: Free Press. 
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In view of Smith’s landslide defeat, John F. Kennedy took proactive measures to ensure 
that the second Catholic nominated by a major party for the presidency would not 
experience a similar fate. In a now-famous speech to a meeting of Protestant ministers in 
Houston, Texas, Kennedy declared, “I am not the Catholic candidate for president. I am 
the Democratic Party’s candidate for president, who happens also to be a Catholic. I do 
not speak for my church on public matters, and the church does not speak for me.”3 
Similarly, Mitt Romney made a speech during the 2008 presidential campaign to 
proactively address his Mormon religion. 
 Chapter 2 looked briefly at (sociologist Christian) Smith’s (1998) argument that a 
constant tension between evangelical Protestantism’s religious subculture and the broader 
world fuels its vitality. That discussion focused on how Smith’s subcultural identity 
theory coheres with a conceptualization of religion as a social identity. Here, it is 
important to also note the role of threat, writing that “conflict vis-à-vis outsiders 
constitutes a crucial element of what we might call the ‘cultural DNA’ of American 
evangelicalism” (121). Writes Smith, “One consistent theme we heard from the 
evangelicals we interviewed was their perception of a double-standard in American 
public discourse that discriminates against Christians” (140). He further explains, “More 
than a few evangelicals are concerned by what they believe are increasingly powerful, 
organized groups in America with clearly anti-Christian agendas” (142). Drawing on 
Marsden (1980), Smith also notes that dynamics of the evangelical subcultural identity 
                                                
3 Full text is available online at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and 
Museum, www.jfklibrary.org. 
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“find similar expression in the experience of ethnic minorities in the context of less-than-
hospitable majorities” (142). 
 Hunter (1991) identifies a strong sense of threat on both sides of the “culture 
wars,” where fundamentally opposing moral worldviews clash over the future of 
American society. Hunter’s depiction of cultural warfare between moral traditionalists 
and progressives shows elite discourse to propel the experience of threat among 
individuals on both sides of the battlefield. This is not unlike analyses of the 2004 
presidential election, which found the presence of state ballot initiatives to ban gay 
marriage to increase mobilization among evangelicals and other moral traditionalists in 
order to protect traditional marriage from the progressive threat (Campbell and Monson 
2008; also Green 2007). 
 Previous research has shown threat in politics to elicit strong reactions, more 
extreme policy preferences, and greater intolerance for out-groups (Sullivan, Pierson, and 
Marcus 1982; Marcus et al. 1995; Gibson 1998; Huddy et al. 2005). The swift passage of 
the USA PATRIOT Act, about six weeks after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks 
provides a good example. Normative arguments over the law notwithstanding, its swift 
passage with votes of 357-66 in the House and 98-1 in the Senate, just days after the 
massive legislation was introduced, demonstrate how the sense of threat can motivate 
strong and sudden policy action.4 Researchers have also found threat to increase support 
for retaliatory action like decisions to go to war (Jentelson 1992; Hermann, Tetlock, and 
                                                
4 This is especially noteworthy considering that many of the representatives and 
senators who voted for the bill have longstanding voting records that contradict some of 
the bill’s sweeping measures. 
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Visser 1999). Huddy et al. (2005) found threat to increase support for the Bush 
Administration’s anti-terrorism policies both domestically and abroad. 
 Threat has also been found to increase support for protectionist policies that 
would seemingly secure the advantage of one’s group relative to others. Examples might 
include white opposition to bilingual education programs, forced busing, or affirmative 
action (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988; Huddy and Sears 1995). Similarly, ample 
research suggests that whites in diverse social settings are more likely to prefer 
candidates that support racially protectionist policies, the so-called “contact hypothesis” 
(Matthews and Prothro 1963; Blalock 1967; Giles and Buckner 1993; Giles and Hertz 
1994; Glaser 1994; 2003; but cf. Siegelman and Welch 1993; Kinder and Mendelberg 
1995). Sometimes, threat elicits retaliatory and protectionist impulses at the same time. 
For example, proponents of capital punishment often cite a perceived deterrent effect. 
 Despite these findings, I am aware of only a few studies that have extended this 
research to religion. Campbell (2006) draws a religious analogy to the racial contact 
hypothesis. In the context of the 1960 presidential election, Converse (1966) and Gilbert 
(1993) find that Protestants who live in areas with higher concentrations of Catholics 
were more likely to vote for Nixon. Noting that politics today no longer demonstrates a 
significant Protestant-Catholic divide as in the past, Campbell instead suggests the 
presence of an evangelical-secular divide, now well established in research (Hunter 1991; 
1994; Smith 1998; Layman 2001). Campbell finds evidence for this evangelical contact 
hypothesis. Evangelicals who live in areas with a higher concentration of seculars, i.e., 
those who claim no religious affiliation, were more likely to vote for the Republican 
ticket in 1996 and 2000. 
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 This review of relevant literature highlights some important points. Ample 
evidence shows that threat is a meaningful determinant in politics. Research also suggests 
that social identity is a meaningful medium through which an individual may experience 
threat. Both previous research and the long historical relationship between religion and 
threat suggest that religion is a social category through which individuals may experience 
threat. The following two studies in this chapter explore this dynamic further using 
individual-level data with measures of religious identity and threat. 
 
Study 1: Response to Threat in an Experimental Setting 
 In the first study, an experiment embedded within an opinion survey investigates 
two questions. Does the perception of threat against one’s religious group impact an 
individual’s policy attitudes? If so, does that effect differ based on the strength of the 
individual’s religious identity? To answer these questions, an experiment was conducted 
via a traditional telephone survey of registered voters in Tarrant County, Texas. The 
experiment includes 230 respondents who self-identify as Christians.5 These respondents 
were randomly assigned to control and treatment groups of 115 per group. 
 Respondents were asked three questions. These include a demographic measure 
of religious identity similar to the Dawson (linked fate) measure that was discussed in 
                                                
5 Respondents were asked “What is your present religion, if any?” Response options 
included Christian, something else, or nothing in particular. Those who responded 
anything other than Christian were dropped from the experiment. 
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Chapter 2.6 Unfortunately, that measure did not perform as well as others in models, but 
it does offer the added benefit of being a well-established approach to measuring group 
consciousness in other literatures. Table 3.1 displays the responses to the linked fate 
question. A total of 16 respondents did not answer this question, slightly reducing the 
number of cases.7 
 
Table 3.1 Linked Fate Responses by Treatment Group 
 
		 Control	 Treatment	 Total	
A	lot	 44%	 41%	 42%	
Some	 34%	 28%	 31%	
Not	much	 22%	 31%	 27%	
N	 108	 106	 214	
 
 Respondents were also asked two policy questions about prayer at public high 
school graduations. This particular policy was a matter of public debate in Texas. In 
2011, a federal district judge issued a controversial ruling that prohibited students from 
reciting a prayer at their high school graduation.8 Soon thereafter, a federal appeals court 
overruled the district judge. The court case was settled the following year, but politicians 
                                                
6 Question wording for this item: “Do you think that what happens generally to 
Christians in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will 
that affect you a lot, some, or not at all?” 
7 For the purposes of analysis, a “strong” religious identity is defined as believing that 
what happens generally to Christians in this country will have “a lot” to do with what 
happens in one’s own life. As discussed in Chapter 2, a social identity forms when an 
individual’s identification with the group is strong enough to inform their own personal 
identity. This suggests a conceptual distinction between those who believe their group to 
have “a lot” and only “some” effect on their life. Participants who respond “some” or 
“not much” to the linked fate question are defined as having a “weak” religious identity. 
8 See Guillermo Contreras, “Appeals panel overturns Medina Valley graduation 
prayer ban,” San Antonio Express-News, June 4, 2011. 
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and interest groups continued to stoke public interest in the matter for some time. 
Religion in public schools is also an important issue in the so-called culture wars (Hunter 
1991) and the source of numerous court battles (Witte and Nichols 2016). Respondents 
were asked:  
Recently, a public school district refused to let a Christian student recite an 
opening prayer over the loudspeaker at her high school graduation. Do you agree, 
disagree, or neither agree nor disagree with the school’s decision? Would that be 
strongly agree/disagree or somewhat agree/disagree? 
Respondents were also asked the same question but the religion of the student was 
changed from Christian to Muslim.9 The order of these two questions was randomized, so 
that about half of the respondents would receive the Christian question first and the other 
would receive the Muslim one first. The control group received these questions with no 
additional framing information. Table 3.2 displays their responses. 
 
Table 3.2 Control Group Responses 
 
“Recently, a public school district refused to let a Christian student recite an opening 
prayer over the loudspeaker at her high school graduation. Do you…?” 
		 Strong	Identity	 Weak	Identity	 Total	
Strong	Agree	(1)	 9%	 10%	 10%	
Some	Agree	(2)	 2%	 14%	 9%	
Neither	(3)	 16%	 21%	 19%	
Some	Disagree	(4)	 16%	 12%	 14%	
Strong	Disagree	(5)	 57%	 43%	 49%	
Mean	(std.	dev.)	 4.09	(1.29)	 3.64	(1.42)	 3.84	(1.37)	
N	 44	 58	 102	
 
                                                
9 Muslim prayer was briefly discussed in the judge’s opinion, and arguments in 
support of the district position reference that students of any religion may offer prayer. 
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(Figure 3.2 continued) 
 
“Recently, a public school district refused to let a Muslim student recite an opening 
prayer over the loudspeaker at her high school graduation. Do you…?” 
		 Strong	Identity	 Weak	Identity	 Total	
Strong	Agree	(1)	 24%	 25%	 24%	
Some	Agree	(2)	 10%	 4%	 7%	
Neither	(3)	 12%	 25%	 19%	
Some	Disagree	(4)	 24%	 13%	 18%	
Strong	Disagree	(5)	 31%	 33%	 32%	
Mean	(std.	dev.)	 3.29	(1.58)	 3.04	(1.59)	 3.16	(1.59)	
N	 42	 48	 90	
 
 
 In the control group, respondents were more supportive of the Christian prayer 
than the Muslim one. Viewed as a five-point Likert, with 1 representing strong agreement 
and 5 representing strong disagreement with the prayer-restrictive policy, respondents 
register a mean response of 3.84 on the Christian question compared to 3.16 on the 
Muslim one (.68 difference). Strong identifiers register a higher mean response to both 
questions compared to weak identifiers, 4.09 to 3.64 for the Christian question, and 3.29 
to 3.04 for the Muslim question. The difference in means between strong and weak 
identifiers is modestly greater on the Christian question (.45 difference) than on the 
Muslim one (.25 difference). 
 The treatment group received an issue frame prior to being read these questions. 
The issue frame was a factual statement that could be perceived as threatening to 
Christians’ relative status in society. The statement reads: 
A national study earlier this year found that fewer Americans are Christians than 
ever before. About one-quarter of Americans now belong to a religion other than 
Christianity or claim no religion at all. The largest decline in Christianity is found 
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among young adults. One-third of adults in America under the age of 30 are no 
longer Christian.10 
The use of an issue frame to introduce threat to the treatment group follows framing 
effects research like Sniderman et al. (1991), which found higher support for AIDS-
related nondiscrimination policies that were framed as matters of civil rights but less 
support when they were framed as matters of public health. Other work on framing 
effects has found that the same policy can elicit different opinions depending on the way 
in which it is framed (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1987; Quattrone and Tversky 
1988). In this experiment, the manipulation of the frame is fairly minimal. The verbiage 
of the policy is not manipulated; rather, one group receives additional framing 
information that could prime a sense of threat toward Christians while the other group 
does not. 
 Table 3.3 displays the treatment group’s results. Respondents in this group were 
also more supportive of the Christian prayer (4.07) than the Muslim one (3.35), with a 
difference of .72 in mean responses. Strong identifiers again registered a higher mean 
response to both questions, 4.44 to 3.83 on the Christian question and 3.57 to 3.18 on the 
Muslim question. As with the control group, the difference in means is slightly stronger 
for the Christian prayer (.61 difference) than the Muslim one (.39 difference).    
   
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 The information in this treatment comes from the Pew Research Center’s 2014 
Religious Landscape Study. 
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Table 3.3 Treatment Group Responses 
 
“Recently, a public school district refused to let a Christian student recite an opening 
prayer over the loudspeaker at her high school graduation. Do you…?” 
		 Strong	Identity	 Weak	Identity	 Total	
Strong	Agree	(1)	 7%	 4%	 5%	
Some	Agree	(2)	 5%	 11%	 8%	
Neither	(3)	 7%	 16%	 12%	
Some	Disagree	(4)	 9%	 24%	 17%	
Strong	Disagree	(5)	 72%	 45%	 57%	
Mean	(std.	dev.)	 4.44	(1.17)	 3.83	(1.30)	 4.07	(1.25)	
N	 43	 55	 98	
 
“Recently, a public school district refused to let a Muslim student recite an opening 
prayer over the loudspeaker at her high school graduation. Do you…?” 
		 Strong	Identity	 Weak	Identity	 Total	
Strong	Agree	(1)	 21%	 25%	 24%	
Some	Agree	(2)	 10%	 8%	 9%	
Neither	(3)	 7%	 15%	 12%	
Some	Disagree	(4)	 14%	 24%	 20%	
Strong	Disagree	(5)	 48%	 27%	 36%	
Mean	(std.	dev.)	 3.57	(1.65)	 3.18	(1.56)	 3.35	(1.58)	
N	 42	 59	 101	
 
 Previous threat research suggests that the treatment group should demonstrate a 
stronger opposition to prohibiting prayer by a Christian but lower opposition to 
prohibiting a Muslim’s prayer relative to the control group, since conditions of threat 
have been shown to incite protectionist policy responses, meaning a policy that privileges 
one’s own group relative to others (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988; Huddy and Sears 
1995). In fact, as the following figures indicate, just the opposite occurs here. Mean 
responses for the treatment group are higher than the control group on both the Christian 
and Muslim prayer question. This does not evidence a connection between threat and 
increased support for protectionist policies that would advantage Christians over those 
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who adhere to other religions. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 compare the responses of control and 
treatment groups. 
 
Figure 3.1 Responses for Christians with a Strong Religious Identity 
“…refused	to	let	a	Christian	student	recite…”	 “…refused	to	let	e	Muslim	student	recite…”	
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Responses for Christians with a Weak Religious Identity 
	
“…refused	to	let	a	Christian	student	recite…”	 “…refused	to	let	a	Muslim	student	recite…”	
 
 
 
 Ample research has also found threat to lead to more extreme policy opinions 
(e.g., Huddy et al. 2005). Mean responses for the treatment group are higher than the 
control group on both questions. The difference in means is not beyond conventional 
levels of statistical significance, which may be due to a small sample size and a fairly 
mild threat treatment, but the differences in means are nonetheless suggestive. Also 
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interesting is that reasons for these differences are not the same for strong and weak 
identifiers. Among strong identifiers, Figure 3.1 shows noticeably more “strong disagree” 
responses for the treatment group than the control group. However, Figure 3.2 shows that 
weak identifiers have no difference between control and treatment groups in “strong 
disagree” responses. Rather, the increase in mean response for weak identifiers came in 
the more measured “somewhat disagree” response category. 
 
Study 2: Modeling Threat and Religious Identity as an Interaction 
 The second study uses cross-sectional survey data to test a relationship between 
threat and religious identity. Individuals can identify with multiple social groups, but the 
strength of those identities can vary widely. Threat and social identity are closely related 
concepts, since social identities enable individuals to perceive a threat in the political 
environment. I hypothesized in Chapter 1 that threat has a moderating effect on religious 
identity, elevating that identity’s salience and thereby increasing its political relevance to 
an individual. Placed alongside other well-established politically relevant dimensions of 
religion—the three Bs—this conceptualization of religious identity and threat could be 
specified in a model as: 
 
Y =  b1Z + b2(belonging) + b3(believing) + b4(behaving) + b5(identity) + 
b6(threat) + b7(identity*threat) + u 
 
where Z represents other relevant variables and controls, and the interaction term 
(identity*threat) accounts for the moderating effect of threat on identity. 
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 This study uses data from the survey of undergraduate students at the University 
of Texas at Austin that was presented in Chapter 2. It was conducted online via 
SurveyGizmo and the Blackboard course management system and includes several 
questions that could be used to measure religious identity. Chapter 2 presented six 
approaches to measure religious identity and tested them in two models of policy 
opinions. Many performed similarly and demonstrated significant effects alongside the 
three Bs and other variables known to structure policy attitudes. In these models, the 
measure based on Harris-Lacewell and Junn (2007) resulted in the highest adjusted R-
squared. Here, this measure is interacted with threat to assess whether threat has a 
moderating effect on religious identity. 
 Similar to the threat experiment in Study 1, the dependent variable is one’s policy 
position on prayer at public school events. Specifically, this survey question asks 
respondents their level of support or opposition to a policy that allows “prayer before 
high school programs, such as football games and graduations.” This model is for self-
identified Christian respondents because only Christians were able to complete some of 
the questions that comprise the measure of religious group identity, and the Christian 
sample is the only one large enough to test models. Christians generally support the 
policy but variation exists, with 4% strongly opposing the policy, 10% registering 
somewhat opposition, 27% holding an opinion in the middle, 33% supporting it 
somewhat, and 26% strongly supporting the policy.11 
  
                                                
11 Viewed as a five-point Likert, with 1 strongly opposing and 5 strongly supporting 
the policy, the mean response for Christians is 3.66, with a standard deviation of 1.10. 
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Table 3.4 The Role of Threat and Religious Identity in Structuring Attitudes 
Toward Prayer at Public School Events (OLS) 
 
Constant	 0.823**	
		 (.342)	
Party	ID	 .123***	
		 (.035)	
Income	 .016	
		 (.021)	
Female	 -.099	
		 (.089)	
Black	 .259	
		 (.186)	
Hispanic	 -.183	
		 (.129)	
Church	Attend	 .051	
		 (.035)	
Literalism	 .122	
		 (.097)	
Evangelical	 .269**	
		 (.127)	
Catholic	 -.176	
		 (.120)	
Religious	ID	 3.163***	
		 (.529)	
Threat	 .929**	
		 (.445)	
Religious	ID	X	Threat	 -1.624**	
		 (.699)	
R	Square	 .369	
Adjusted	R2	 .351	
N	 414	
*	p	<	0.10;	**	p	<	0.05;	***	p	<	0.01	
 
Table 3.4 displays regression results. As hypothesized, both religious identity and 
threat have a significant and positive effect on opinion. The interaction between threat 
and religious identity is also significant, which shows that a relationship between the two 
does exist. The negative coefficient means that, even though threat and religious identity 
both have independent positive effects, threat’s moderating effect on religious identity is 
higher for those with weaker religious identities and decreases as religious identity 
increases.  
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Of the other traditional religious explanatory variables, neither church attendance 
nor Biblical literalism has a significant effect on the policy position. This generally 
accords with the findings in Chapter 2, which show that including religious group identity 
can cause some of the three Bs to lose statistical significance when included together in a 
model, although this depends on the measure of religious group identity used. 
Statistically significant effects also exist for evangelicals and Republicans, and both are 
more likely to support the policy.  
 Figure 3.3 presents a scatter plot to visually depict the interaction between threat 
and religious identity on predicted policy support when all other independent variables 
are held at their means.  
 
Figure 3.3 How Threat and Religious Identity Impact Predicted Policy Support for 
Prayer at Public School Events 
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 The independent effects of religious identity and threat are easy to see. As 
religious identity becomes stronger, predicted policy support increases. Threat is a 
dichotomous variable based on responses to the statement “Discrimination against 
Christian values and beliefs is a problem in this country.” Christians who agree are 
classified as perceiving threat and those who disagree are not. The independent effect of 
threat is evidenced in that green data points, which represent respondents who perceive 
threat, tend to cluster higher, which indicates greater policy support. The interaction 
effect is evidenced in the difference in fit lines for those who perceive threat (green) 
compared to those who do not (blue). Overall, threat changes the slope of the fit line, 
evidencing a stronger positive impact on policy support for those who have a weaker 
religious identity than for those who have a stronger identity.12 
 
Summary 
 This chapter makes several important contributions to the dissertation. Its chief 
contribution is establishing a relationship between threat and religious identity as 
predictors of policy opinion. This aligns with research on other social identities, which 
has shown a relationship between group identity and relevant stimuli in the political 
environment (such as threat) to have a meaningful effect on attitudes and behavior (e.g., 
Dawson 1994). This chapter suggests that a similar process exists for religion: not only 
                                                
12 This finding is further demonstrated in the scatter plots in Chapter 4, which include 
a larger number of respondents at the low end of the religious identity scale who perceive 
threat and more clearly depict the contrasting fit lines as discussed here. The data in 
Chapter 4 is also more representative, coming from a statewide survey of the general 
population rather than a student sample.  
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do threat and religious identity have independent effects, but threat has a moderating 
effect on religious identity. 
 These two studies clearly show independent positive effects for threat and 
religious identity. The data in Study 1 are suggestive that Christians who experience 
threat hold stronger pro-prayer policy positions than Christians who do not experience 
threat. The same general relationship appears to be the case for Christians who hold 
stronger rather than weaker religious identities. The regression in Study 2 shows 
statistically significant and positive effects for threat and religious identity. 
 Both studies also show relationships between threat and religious identity. This is 
most easily seen in the significant interaction effect in Study 2, which shows threat to 
have a stronger impact on policy opinion for those with weaker religious identities than 
for those with stronger ones. This suggests that threat may elevate the salience of one’s 
religious identity when structuring certain attitudes. Study 1 also shows differences in 
how threat affects policy positions, with the increase in mean response for weak 
identifiers due to upward opinion movement within the middle of the scale, while the 
increase for strong identifiers is due more to movement toward the high end of the scale. 
 Finally, these studies do find evidence for threat leading to more extreme policy 
opinions, but not necessarily for protectionist policies that privilege one religious group 
at the expense of others. To the contrary, Study 1 finds threat to increase support for 
public prayers for both Christian and Muslim students. This raises questions about 
whether threat incites the same kind of protectionist reaction for religion as seen with 
other social identities. It could be that support for Muslim prayer by Christians might 
evidence a more general impulse toward religious freedom. Analogies might also be 
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drawn to work on panethnic identities, where Christians might identify with a broader 
category like “persons of faith” concerning matters of religious freedom that impact 
religion generally. This represents an avenue for further research. 
 This chapter also underscores at the dynamic nature of religion as a social 
identity, considering the moderating effect of a political stimulus like threat. Unlike static 
demographic characteristics, the political relevance of religious identity appears to vary 
according to circumstances in the political environment. Such an idea arguably introduces 
more questions than it answers, but the findings here suggest a promising area for future 
research. 
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Chapter 4: The Impact of Religious Identity and Threat on 
Attitudes Toward Religion in Public Schools 
 
 
Introduction 
 On September 13, 2001, just two days after devastating terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center and Pentagon building, television host Pat Robertson, a prominent 
voice among Christian conservatives, offered his perspective on what brought about the 
attacks. His answer took the form of a prayer: 
The Supreme Court has insulted you over and over again, Lord. They’ve taken 
your Bible away from the schools. They’ve forbidden little children to pray. 
They’ve taken the knowledge of God as best they can—and the organizations 
have come into court to take the knowledge of God out of the public square of 
America.1 
While other Christian conservatives rejected Robertson’s controversial assertion that the 
terrorist attacks were divine punishment for secularization, his remarks do typify the 
conviction among many religious conservatives that public schools stand along the front 
lines of a culture war (Hunter 1991).2 From the Scopes Trial to the present day, public 
schools have been a battleground for clashes over evolution and creationism, Bible 
                                                
1 The 700 Club. 2001. Virginia Beach, VA: Christian Broadcasting Network. 
Television broadcast. (September 13, 2001) 
2 Fiorina (2004) differs with Hunter, arguing that the so-called culture war is more an 
elite phenomenon than a popular one, while Hunter views it as more pervasive. There is 
no scholarly consensus on the extent to which soft attitudes, uncertainty, and ambivalence 
may disallow broad and deep rifts in the electorate. Ample research nonetheless shows 
divisions along value-based lines (Wuthnow 1988; Layman and Carmines 1997; Layman 
2001; Wolfe and Hunter 2006). 
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readings, and prayer in the classroom, at graduations, and at football games.3 For nearly a 
century, the trajectory of policy has been toward less religion. This historical experience 
suggests that religious Americans may be especially sensitive to policies pertaining to 
religion in public schools, which makes this an appropriate domain to study how religious 
group identity and threat impact policy attitudes.4 
 In this chapter, I use original survey data from a statewide survey of Texans to 
test the effects of religious group identity and perceived threat against religion on 
attitudes toward curriculum changes designed to increase the presence of religion in 
Texas public schools. If, as this dissertation argues, religion is a meaningful social 
identity, then previous research suggests that social psychological processes like group 
identity and the perception of threat may play a considerable role in how religion 
structures policy attitudes.  
                                                
3 Many of these clashes involved high-profile legal battles. In perhaps the most 
famous of these, State of Tennessee v. John Thomas Scopes (1925), a schoolteacher was 
found guilty of teaching evolution, which was banned by state law for religious reasons. 
Engel v. Vitale (1962) banned mandatory prayer by school officials as a violation of the 
Establishment Clause. In Abington School District v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett 
(1963), the Supreme Court similarly struck down mandatory Bible readings in the 
schools. It also held that public prayers were impermissible at graduations (Lee v. 
Weisman 1992) and sporting events (Santa Fe ISD v. Doe 2000); although, a federal 
appeals court remanded a case to a San Antonio, Texas-based district court to uphold 
student-led graduation prayer, as noted in Chapter 3 (Schultz v. Medina Valley ISD 2012). 
4 Religion in public schools is a meaningful issue to most religious groups, including 
secular Americans. For the Protestant majority, the decline of religion in public schools 
symbolized their loosening grip on religious and cultural domination, since “religion” 
typically meant “Protestant.” The Catholic experience was mixed. While historically 
opposed to prayer in school because of its Protestant nature, Catholics tended to support 
public Christian religiosity per se nearly as much as Protestants (Delfattore 2004). 
Religious minorities like Jehovah’s Witnesses and secular Americans supported—indeed, 
fought for—separationist policy changes that removed religious content from public 
schools. 
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 To preview, I find evidence that religious group identity is a politically relevant 
dimension of religion that produces meaningful differences in policy attitudes when 
included alongside traditional measures of religion in a model. I also find the perception 
of threat to have an independent, positive effect on support for religion in schools. In line 
with findings in Chapter 3, threat also has a moderating effect on religious identity that is 
more pronounced among weak identifiers than strong ones. 
 Interestingly, when looking at these effects among decidedly partisan Texans, the 
direction of this moderating effect reverses for Democrats. Among strong Republicans, 
threat has a stronger positive effect on policy attitudes for those with weak religious 
identities than strong ones, in line with findings for the population as a whole. However, 
the impact of threat among Democrats is felt much more among those with a strong 
religious identity and is nearly nonexistent among those with a weak one.  
 Finally, I find preliminary support for a threat effect among the unaffiliated and 
nonreligious, as well as religious. Some unaffiliated and nonreligious Texans perceive 
threat against their secular beliefs, which has a statistically significant negative effect on 
policies that allow religion in public schools. These are important findings because they 
underscore the importance of religion as a social cleavage, and specifically the causal 
influence of religious identity and threat on political attitudes. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 This dissertation’s overarching thesis is that religion is a social identity for many 
Americans. As such, its role in structuring political attitudes should account for the social 
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psychological processes of an individual’s social identification with a religious group. 
From this perspective, religion provides adherents with more than a particular set of 
orienting beliefs about life’s deepest questions, but also a social group from which self-
conception may be derived (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981; Conover 1988; Brewer 
2001; Huddy 2001). As explained in Chapter 1, the linkage of self-conception to group 
processes highlights religion’s capacity to forge a distinction between “us” and “them.” 
Robertson’s words are telling, “They’ve taken your Bible away from the schools. They’ve 
forbidden little children to pray.” He implicates not only the Supreme Court but also “the 
organizations” that represent those Americans who hold different religious and social 
beliefs.5 The “us” versus “them” distinction created through identification with a 
religious group also enables an assessment of whether other groups, beliefs, or policies 
benefit or adversely affect one’s group. When they appear to cause or pose disadvantage, 
they can elicit a sense of threat. The presence and strength of religious group identity and 
the perception of threat toward one’s group can significantly impact the policy attitudes 
of group members and religion’s role in structuring them. 
 Research shows that religion plays a meaningful role in structuring public opinion 
(Wilson 2007; Smidt et al. 2009; Fowler et al. 2010; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014). 
We also know that Americans are generally accepting of public expressions of religion 
and oppose court rulings such as those against prayer in schools (e.g., Green and Guth 
1989). However, most research has focused on attitudes toward policies that remove or 
                                                
5 Also note the similarity to philosopher Martin Buber’s (1923) conceptualization of 
an “I-it” relationship, where the other becomes objectified. This is also noted in Martin 
Luther King Jr.’s Letter from Birmingham Jail. 
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restrict religion in public schools. In Texas, the pendulum has started to swing the other 
direction. In 2008, the Texas Legislature and State Board of Education began to enact 
policies that favor religion, including curriculum changes that introduce Bible electives 
into public high schools and emphasize the Christian religious beliefs of the American 
Founders.6 The state’s curricula govern the content of textbooks, tests, accountability 
metrics, and course offerings and requirements. These changes are notable for two 
reasons. First, we know less about public opinion on these kinds of policies, which 
promote rather than restrict religion in public schools. Second, these policies are distinct 
because they reverse the recent policy trend. To use a boxing analogy, these policies are 
not “blocks” against blows to religion in public schools, but “counterpunches” that seek 
to actively promote religion. Given our current knowledge of Americans’ attitudes 
toward public expressions of religion, we might expect general support for these politics, 
but dimensionality is difficult to infer. Previous research suggests that religious beliefs 
and affiliation affect both the magnitude and direction of opinion toward religious 
policies (Jelen and Wilcox 1995), and variation also exists because of differences in 
policy specifics and issue frames (Jelen 2000). 
 The great advantage offered by these policies for present research purposes is the 
ability to study the effect of religious group identity and threat on attitudes toward 
policies designed to promote religion. Policies that promote religion are qualitatively 
different from restrictive ones since they invert the historical position of individuals who 
                                                
6 See Stutz (2008) and McKinley (2010) for news media accounts of these policies. 
See also Chancey (2007) for a more detailed account of public school Bible courses like 
the one approved for Texas public schools. 
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favor public expressions of religion from the disadvantaged to the advantaged side of 
policy outcomes. Even though this new position alters the immediate experience of 
policy outcomes, I believe that the historical experience of disadvantage will continue to 
affect attitudes toward these policies. This finds theoretical support in the race literature, 
which notes the formative impact of the historical experience of discrimination on 
African American policy attitudes (e.g., Voss 1996). This leads to the following 
hypotheses. 
 Given the historical trend of removing religion from public schools, I hypothesize 
that this is a policy domain in which individuals can and do perceive threat against 
religion, and that the perception of threat leads to higher support for policies that promote 
religion. This accords with related work on threat and policy attitudes. In their work on 
anti-terrorism policy attitudes, Huddy and colleagues (2005) find that the perception of 
threat leads to more extreme policy attitudes. Those who perceived threat were more 
likely to support aggressive anti-terrorism policies, including restrictive policies against 
Arabs and Arab-Americans. Research has also shown threat to elicit support for 
protectionist policies that privilege one’s own group over others (Kinder and Sears 1981; 
Sears 1988; Huddy and Sears 1995). I extend this line of inquiry to religion by testing 
whether the perception of threat contributes to higher support for promoting religion 
through policy. I further hypothesize a relationship between threat and religious identity 
as seen in Chapter 3, where threat’s impact is even stronger among those with weak 
religious identities. Threat can act like a politicizing force for these individuals, which 
elevates the salience of their religious identity and makes it politically relevant. 
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 I also hazard two additional hypotheses. The first pertains to partisanship. 
Layman (2001) finds evidence of a growing rift between the Republican and Democratic 
parties along religious and cultural lines, with the Republican Party becoming 
increasingly dominated by social conservatives and the Democratic Party by progressives 
(also Wuthnow 1988; Hunter 1991). This gives cause to consider whether the effects of 
religious identity and threat emerge similarly across party lines. Partisanship could alter 
these effects if, for example, the more progressive orientation of the Democratic Party 
dampens the perception of threat to religion. Alternatively, Campbell (2006) found 
support for a religious analogy to the racial contact hypothesis, where evangelicals in 
close proximity to secular Americans exhibited more conservative voting patterns. Might 
this lead Democrats with highly salient religious identities, or who perceive threat to 
religion, to demonstrate a similar phenomenon? I hypothesize the latter given similar 
findings such as Campbell’s. 
 Finally, Texas poses an interesting situation with its relatively religious ethos 
(Pew Forum 2008) and a State Board of Education that is dominated by religious 
conservatives. Given this cultural religiosity and the state’s recent departure from the 
separationist trend in education policy, might this engender a sense of religious threat 
among nonreligious and unaffiliated persons? I hypothesize that it does, and that threat 
affects policy attitudes concerning religion for both the religious and nonreligious, 
leading to more extreme and divergent opinions. 
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Research Design 
 This chapter utilizes original survey data from a statewide survey of Texans 
conducted by YouGov on behalf of the Department of Government at the University of 
Texas at Austin. From May 14-20, 2010, responses were collected from an online survey 
of registered Texas voters.7 The survey produced 800 respondents out of 879 contacts. 
 These data offer many benefits. First, the survey measures current opinion on 
actual policies that directly pertain to this dissertation. The field dates for the survey were 
shortly after the final enactment of these policies by the State Board of Education, giving 
them ample and recent visibility in state and local news. As noted by Djupe and Olson 
(2007), religion in public schools garners attention at the national level but controversy 
typically emerges at the state and local levels, where the specifics of public school 
curricula and other policies are decided. Also, because this is original data, I was able to 
include some relevant questions that are not always present in political surveys. Surveys 
often have inadequate (or even flawed) religious demographic questions. Smidt et al. 
(2009) offer a good example from the American National Election Studies (ANES), 
which from 1990 to 1998 conflated some religious affiliations and theological 
orientations in force-choice questions that did not allow for multiple identifications, (e.g., 
being both “evangelical” and “moderate to liberal”). Many surveys also lack important 
religious demographics. The nature of this research requires a specific set of religious 
                                                
7 The survey employed a sample matching methodology. A sampling frame was 
constructed using the 2007 American Community Survey, supplemented with voter 
registration and turnout data from the November 2006 Current Population Survey and 
party identification data from the 2007 Pew Religious Life Survey. Respondents from 
YouGov’s pool of panelists were then selected according to this frame using techniques 
analogous to traditional random digit dialing (Rivers 2007). 
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demographics, including measures of religious group identity and the perception of 
threat, which I was able to assess. 
 The dependent variables in my model are policy preferences toward two Texas 
public school curricula changes that increase the presence of religion in the classroom. 
One policy approved the creation of Bible electives in public high schools. The other 
made changes to the state’s social studies curriculum standards that emphasize the 
Christian religious beliefs of America’s Founders (see Appendix for question wording). 
The dependent variables are scaled using a five-point, semantically balanced ordinal scale 
from (1) “strongly disapprove” to (5) “strongly approve.”8 On the survey, the questions 
were asked in a randomized battery of five questions pertaining to different aspects of 
public school curricula. Bible classes received support from 65% of respondents, 
including 89% of evangelical Protestants, 62% of non-evangelical Protestants, 63% of 
Catholics, and 39% of those who do not identify as Christian. Changing social studies 
standards to emphasize the Christian beliefs of America’s Founders received a slightly 
lower 60% support from all respondents, including 82% among evangelical Protestants, 
58% among non-evangelical Protestants, 63% among Catholics, and 36% among non-
Christian identifiers. 
 Policy attitudes are modeled by religious group identity, the perception of threat, 
and interaction term to assess a moderating effect of threat on religious group identity, 
traditional measures of religion (the three Bs of religious belonging, believing, and 
behaving), party identification, and a set of common demographic control variables. 
                                                
8 On the survey, the questions were scaled from (1) “strongly approve” to (5) 
“strongly disapprove.” I reversed the scale for purposes of data analysis. 
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While especially interested in the effects of religious group identity and threat, traditional 
measures of religion and party identification are also important because of their known 
effects on policy attitudes and political behavior. 
 Previous research has measured of group identity in several different ways, but 
not for religion. Group identity is not synonymous with group membership, which simply 
connotes shared characteristics with a group, by either affiliation or ascription. Thus, it 
cannot be operationalized by religious affiliation.9 Rather, group identity implies a 
psychological attachment to the group, which entails shared social and cultural values. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, race and national identity literatures yield several approaches to 
measuring group identity (Miller et al. 1981; Dawson 1994; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; 
Chong and Rogers 2005; Harris-Lacewell and Junn 2007; Huddy and Khatib 2007). 
Many of these studies involve measures of the importance with which one holds a 
particular group membership. For example, Harris-Lacewell and Junn (2007) ask, “How 
important is being black to your ideas about politics?” Similarly, Huddy and Khatib 
(2007) ask, “How important is being American to you?” In many ways, these assess the 
salience of the particular group at issue. Some surveys ask a similar question to assess the 
salience of religion to an individual, “How important is religion to your life?”10 Response 
options range along a semantically balanced four-point scale from “very important” to 
                                                
9 Surveys assess religious affiliation is multiple ways. This survey presents an 
extensive list of religious and denominational groups, along with more general religious 
categories, and allows respondents to select the one that best describes their affiliation. 
10 Wording on this question varies. For example, since 1980, the ANES has asked: 
“Do you consider religion to be an important part of your life, or not?” The Pew Forum 
on Religion and Public Life often asks: “How important is religion to your life?” (Pew 
Forum 2008), which is the question style used on this survey. 
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“not at all important.” This salience measure approximates the concept of religious group 
identity and has the added benefit of occurring on other surveys, which can enable 
replication with other data. On this survey, the highest proportion of religious group 
identity is found among evangelical Protestants, with 88% of evangelical Protestants 
responding that religion is very important to their life. Forty-four percent of non-
evangelical Protestants demonstrate the strongest degree of religious identity, as do 54% 
of Catholics. 
 Threat is the sense of fear elicited when an individual perceives that their status, 
wellbeing, or resources are in jeopardy. Huddy et al. (2005) operationalize threat by 
gauging the level of concern one feels that another terrorist attack will occur. I use a 
similar approach, asking whether “hostility toward religion” in public schools is a 
problem. Response options include: (1) “major problem,” (2) “minor problem,” and (3) 
“not a problem.” Huddy and colleagues also assessed threat within a specific policy 
domain, which is appropriate because threat is always perceived in context. Although, I 
was less comfortable with their “how concerned are you” language, which could be 
considered leading and potentially results toward more threat. For analytical purposes, I 
constructed a dichotomous variable where only those who responded “major problem” 
were considered to perceive threat against religion in public schools. Dichotomizing 
threat makes sense because it is a strong emotional response and previous research shows 
that it produces strong political effects at high levels (for example, Herrmann, Tetlock, 
and Visser 1999). In these data, 51% of respondents sensed threat against religion in 
public schools, including 73% of evangelicals, 46% of non-evangelicals, and 52% of 
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Catholics. Another question reverses the problem from hostility toward religion to “too 
much religion” in public schools. Using the same approach, a threat variable was also 
constructed to assess its impact on the nonreligious and unaffiliated, of whom 33% 
expressed that too much religion in schools was a major problem (compared to 13% of 
the population as a whole). 
 Traditional measures of religion consist of religious “belonging” (affiliation), 
“believing” (theological orientation), and “behaving” (religious practice) (Layman 1997; 
2001; Green 2007; Olson and Warber 2008). These are well established in the literature 
but actual measurements can vary. Here, I operationalize belonging as a combination of 
denominational and categorical religious affiliations, which helps to eliminate small n 
problems by grouping similar affiliations together. I type Protestants as either evangelical 
or non-evangelical with the aid of an affiliation follow-up question that assesses 
evangelical identification. Catholics are considered as their own group and non-
Christians are the out-group for purposes of regression analysis.11 I include these in the 
model as dummy variables. In order to evaluate the final hypothesis, I constructed a 
variable for nonreligious and unaffiliated consisting of those who self-identify as atheist, 
agnostic, or spiritual but not religious.12 These are conceptually distinct groups but also 
represent the only respondents who self-categorize out of organized religion. 
                                                
11 Each of these groups could have been broken down even farther, e.g., African 
American Protestants, white and non-white Catholics, evangelical and non-evangelical 
Catholics. However, the ability to do this is limited by both sufficient survey questions 
and small n problems. 
12 Unfortunately, no other response options exist for no affiliation with organized 
religion. About 6% of respondents selected “other,” but these cannot be considered 
unaffiliated since some may simply affiliate with a label not offered as a response option. 
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 For religious belief, I use a common question about whether the Bible is the Word 
of God and to be interpreted literally, word-for-word (e.g., Jelen 1989; McDaniel and 
Ellison 2008). Answers are dichotomized as literalists and non-literalists. Although, this 
may be a sufficient but suboptimal measure for Catholics, the vast majority of surveys 
lack more appropriate alternatives (Leal and Patterson 2013). Finally, behaving is often 
viewed as one’s level of religious devotion (Layman 2001). Some researchers construct 
indices of different types of religious behaviors, such as the frequency of prayer, Bible 
reading, and church attendance (Kellstedt et al. 1996). However, space constraints often 
require a more parsimonious approach. For this reason, I rely on the most common 
measure of religiosity, one’s frequency of church attendance (e.g., Rosenstone and 
Hanson 1993; Verba et al. 1995). 
 These data contain other important control variables. Party identification has 
consistently shown strong effects on policy preferences (Campbell et al. 1960).13 Work 
on religion and politics has also shown race to have an impact on political preferences 
(Leal 2007; 2010; McDaniel 2007; Shaw and McDaniel 2007), as well as gender 
(Kaufmann 2004), and urbanicity (McDaniel 2008). Standard demographic controls for 
education, income, and age are also included. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Confirming the decision to not consider others among religious non-affiliates, about one 
quarter of these also consider themselves to be evangelical Christians. 
13 Party identification is a seven-point scale from (1) “strong Democrat” to (7) “strong 
Republican.” Those who respond (4) “independent” are given a follow up question 
asking whether they “lean” to either party. For analytical purposes, these leaners are 
grouped according to their party inclination. 
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 With the dependent variable and independent variables thus defined, the full 
model looks like: 
 
Y =  α + b1(party identification) + b2(education) + b3(income) + b4(age) + 
b5(female) + b6(black) + b7(Hispanic) + b8(urbanicity) + b9(church 
attendance) + b10(literalism) + b11(evangelical) + b12(non-evangelical) + 
b13(Catholic) + b14(religious identity) + b15(threat) + b15(religious 
ID*threat) + u 
 
I use an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator given that the dependent variable is 
scaled, assumptions about independence are satisfied, and the OLS estimator has proven 
robust for models of policy attitudes. To test the party and unaffiliated hypotheses, I alter 
the model slightly. For the partisanship hypothesis, party identification is omitted. For the 
non-religious and unaffiliated hypotheses, other religious variables are omitted. 
 
The Effects of Religious Identity and Threat 
Table 4.1 presents regression results for the model of attitudes toward the policy 
changes in school curricula. Party identification demonstrates statistically significant 
effects on policy opinion, with Republicans more likely than Democrats to support 
religious content in public schools. Higher education levels also lead to decreased support 
for these policies. This holds for both the creation of high school Bible classes and 
revised curriculum standards to emphasize the Christian beliefs of America’s Founders. 
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Table 4.1 Models of Attitudes toward Curriculum Changes (OLS) 
		 Bible	Class	 Christian	History	
Constant	 1.096***	 .941***	
		 (.264)	 (.282)	
Party	ID	 .162***	 .221***	
		 (.022)	 (.023)	
Education	 -.082***	 -.074**	
		 (.032)	 (.034)	
Income	 .002	 -.006	
		 (.013)	 (.014)	
Age	 -.001	 -.002	
		 (.003)	 (.003)	
Female	 .028	 -.122	
		 (.082)	 (.088)	
Black	 .229	 .051	
		 (.147)	 (.156)	
Hispanic	 .107	 .203	
		 (.123)	 (.131)	
Urbanicity	 .028	 -.101	
		 (.094)	 (.101)	
Church	Attendance	 -.005	 -.030	
		 (.031)	 (.033)	
Literalism	 .253**	 .118	
		 (.109)	 (.117)	
Evang.	Protestant	 .368**	 .323**	
		 (.147)	 (.158)	
Non-evang.	Prot.	 .221	 .214	
		 (.137)	 (.147)	
Catholic	 .109	 .206	
		 (.148)	 (.158)	
Religious	Identity	 .535***	 .541***	
		 (.066)	 (.071)	
Threat	 1.486***	 1.657***	
		 (.382)	 (.410)	
Threat*Religious	ID	 -.260**	 -.262**	
		 (.107)	 (.115)	
Adjusted	R2	 .456	 .465	
N	 722	 717	
*	p	<	0.10;	**	p	<	0.05;	***	p	<	0.01	
	 
Turning to the religious variables, two of the three Bs show statistically 
significant effects. Religious behaving, operationalized here as frequency of church 
attendance, does not have a statistically significant impact on opinion toward these 
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policies. Believing, which is operationalized as belief in the literal interpretation of the 
Bible as the Word of God, has a positive impact on policy opinion for Bible classes but is 
not a statistically significant predictor for revisions to the history curriculum. Looking at 
religious belonging, no statistically significant effects exist for Catholics or non-
evangelical Protestants; however, an evangelical Protestant affiliation does lead to higher 
support for both policies. 
Religious identity and threat both have statistically significant, positive effects on 
opinion. A statistically significant interaction between these terms also exists. The 
negative interaction coefficient shows that threat’s moderating effect on religious identity 
is felt strongest among those with a weaker religious identity and lessens in severity as 
religious identity increases, which is in line with findings in Chapter 3. Figures 4.1 and 
4.2 visually demonstrate threat’s moderating effect on religious identity in the form of 
scatter plots of predicted policy support. The green data points represent the policy 
positions of respondents who express a sense of threat. Those who do not perceive threat 
are represented by blue. The x-axis indicates religious identity, from low (1) to high (4). 
Looking at the Bible class policy, support increases as religious identity grows 
stronger. Across the board, the green (threat) data points tend to cluster higher than the 
blue (non-threat) ones, indicating higher predicted policy support when all other factors 
are held at their means. This is also seen in a higher fit line along the y-axis (predicted 
policy support) for threat than for non-threat. The distance between these fit lines shows 
threat’s moderating effect on religious identity. For those with the weakest religious 
identity (1), predicted policy support for those who perceive threat is 3.23 compared with 
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Figure 4.1 How Threat and Religious Identity Impact Predicted Policy Support for 
Bible Classes in Texas Public High Schools 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 How Threat and Religious Identity Impact Predicted Policy Support for 
Teaching the Christian Beliefs of America’s Founders 
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1.79 for those who do not, for a difference of 1.44 points, or an 80% increase in support. 
For those with the highest religious identity (4), predicted policy support climbs to 4.64 
for those who perceive threat compared to 3.76 for those who do not, for a difference of 
.88, or a 23% increase in support. 
This relationship becomes even more pronounced when looking at policy support 
for emphasizing the Christian beliefs of America’s Founders in curriculum standards. The 
difference between predicted policy support for those who perceive threat and those who 
do not among respondents with the weakest religious identity is 1.84 (3.47 compared to 
1.63), showing threat to increase policy support among weak religious identifiers by 
113%. The difference lessens to .91 (4.55 compared to 3.64) among those with the 
strongest religious identity, showing threat to increase support by a far more modest 25%. 
Again, the impact of threat is clearly seen to be stronger among those with weak rather 
than strong religious identities. 
 
Threat’s Effect Among Strong Partisans 
Research has shown that American parties have grown increasingly polarized 
along religious and cultural lines (Wuthnow 1988; Layman 2001). Might this also lead to 
partisan differences in how religious identity and threat function? I previously suggested 
two possible scenarios. Because of the Democratic Party’s more progressive outlook and 
less religious voting coalition, religious identity and threat could grow causally quiescent 
among Democratic partisans. Alternatively, in a fashion similar to the contact hypothesis 
demonstrated by Campbell (2006) and the race literature (Matthews and Prothro 1963; 
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Blalock 1967; Giles and Buckner 1993; Giles and Hertz 1994; Glaser 1994; 2003), this 
could instead amplify the effects of threat and religious identity among Democrats. The 
following data suggest the latter. 
Table 4.2 presents regression results for models of both policies among self-
identified strong Democrats and strong Republicans. When the models were fitted for all 
Democrats and all Republicans, no statistically significant results emerged for threat and 
religious identity. However, statistically significant and notable results emerge in models 
of attitudes for strong partisans. This may be due to a soft middle of independent-leaners 
and weak partisans obscuring the differences between hard partisans. Looking first at 
strong Republicans, these respondents demonstrate similar behavior to the population as a 
whole. Measures of religious belonging are even more robust among strong Republicans, 
with not only evangelical Protestant but also non-evangelical and Catholic affiliations 
leading to greater support for Bible classes. This is particularly notable among Catholics, 
since a sizeable number of Catholics do not necessarily agree with the church’s 
conservative teachings on certain social issues that are closely in line with the Republican 
Party, like opposition to gay marriage and abortion (Lipka 2015). This positive effect 
may reflect a particular subset of Catholics whose strong adherence to church social 
positions fosters a strong identification with the Republican Party and moral traditionalist 
policies. Such an interpretation coheres with Leal and Patterson’s (2013) finding that 
theological and racial diversity within American Catholicism also manifest in differences 
in political issue positions. 
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Table 4.2 Models of Attitudes toward Curriculum Changes Among Strong 
Democrats and Strong Republicans 
 
		 Strong	D	Bible	 Strong	D	History	 Strong	R	Bible	 Strong	R	History	
Constant	 .376	 .613	 2.337***	 1.881***	
		 (.607)	 (.642)	 (.590)	 (.632)	
Education	 -.153	 -.151	 -.030	 -.012	
		 (.094)	 (.098)	 (.049)	 (.053)	
Income	 .041	 .022	 .000	 .004	
		 (.037)	 (.040)	 (.024)	 (.026)	
Age	 .006	 .012	 .000	 -.003	
		 (.007)	 (.008)	 (.005)	 (.005)	
Female	 .259	 .008	 -.031	 -.124	
		 (.221)	 (.234)	 (.132)	 (.143)	
Black	 .355	 -.054	 -.099	 -.252	
		 (.264)	 (.279)	 (.849)	 (.908)	
Hispanic	 .227	 .007	 -.106	 -.024	
		 (.321)	 (.336)	 (.226)	 (.242)	
Urbanicity	 .120	 .031	 -.021	 -.213	
		 (.226)	 (.239)	 (.160)	 (.173)	
Church	Attendance	 .024	 .011	 -.028	 .021	
		 (.081)	 (.085)	 (.049)	 (.053)	
Literalism	 .172	 .539	 .245	 -.103	
		 (.323)	 (.336)	 (.160)	 (.171)	
Evang.	Protestant	 .703*	 1.108***	 .787***	 .111	
		 (.392)	 (.419)	 (.247)	 (.265)	
Non-evang.	Prot.	 .655*	 .752**	 .441*	 .115	
		 (.356)	 (.380)	 (.251)	 (.268)	
Catholic	 .095	 .196	 .610**	 .226	
		 (.398)	 (.420)	 (.272)	 (.293)	
Religious	Identity	 .415***	 .232	 .418***	 .734***	
		 (.152)	 (.162)	 (.146)	 (.156)	
Threat	 -2.489*	 -1.163	 1.557**	 2.127***	
		 (.427)	 (1.547)	 (.721)	 (.771)	
Threat*Religious	ID	 0.932**	 .549	 -.362*	 -.509**	
		 (.390)	 (.418)	 (.198)	 (.211)	
Adjusted	R2	 .486	 .432	 .235	 .205	
N	 137	 137	 175	 171	
*	p	<	0.10;	**	p	<	0.05;	***	p	<	0.01	
	     
The religious belonging variables produce no significant results for the policy 
regarding the Founder’s religious beliefs. The religious measures of Biblical literalism 
and church attendance demonstrate no significant results for either question among strong 
Republicans. 
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Religious identity and threat for Republicans operate similarly to the previously 
discussed models. The variables for religious identity and threat are both statistically 
significant and positive, and a statistically significant interaction also exists. Again, the 
negative coefficient of this interaction shows threat to have a stronger positive effect on 
policy opinion among those with a weak religious identity than among those with a 
positive one. Figure 4.3 shows the scatter plot of predicted policy support among strong 
Republicans for Bible classes. Among weak religious identifiers, threat perception 
increases policy support from 2.61 to 3.77, an increase of 44%. The impact of threat 
diminishes to nearly the point of nonexistence among those with a strong religious 
identity, shifting opinion from 4.51 to 4.73, for a modest 5% increase in policy support. 
Figure 4.4 depicts a very similar story for teaching the Founder’s Christian beliefs. 
 
Figure 4.3 How Threat and Religious Identity Impact Predicted Policy Support for 
Bible Classes in Texas Public High Schools Among Strong Republicans 
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Figure 4.4 How Threat and Religious Identity Impact Predicted Policy Support for 
Teaching the Christian Beliefs of America’s Founders Among Strong Republicans 
 
 
 
The model for strong Democrats shows both similarities and differences. Looking 
at the model of strong Democrat attitudes toward Bible classes in public high schools, 
religious belonging is similarly important as for Republicans for both evangelical and 
non-evangelical Protestants, leading to a more supportive policy position. Catholicism is 
not associated with a more supportive policy position among strong Democrats, though. 
This would make sense if the Catholic effect among Republicans evidences an alignment 
of some religiously conservative Catholics with the socially conservative politics of the 
Republican Party, a phenomenon also noticed by Hunter (1991). In other words, these 
Catholics share the same church name but are qualitatively different key aspects of belief. 
As with Republicans, neither church attendance nor Biblical literalism is associated with 
greater policy support among strong Democrats. 
 140 
Religious identity and threat look different among strong Democrats. Only the 
model for Bible classes returns significant results; p-values for these variables inched 
beyond the 0.1 level of significance in the model for teaching the Founder’s religious 
beliefs. In the Bible classes model, religious identity and threat are both associated with 
higher policy support (despite the negative regression coefficient for threat, which is due 
to the interaction term).14 However, while threat’s effect was most evident among strong 
Republicans with weak religious identities, the opposite is the case among Democrats. 
Threat amplifies the effect of a strong religious identity on policy support and is nearly 
imperceptible among strong Democrats with weak religious identities. 
This is most easily seen by comparing the scatter plots and fit lines between 
strong Republicans and strong Democrats. In Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 of strong 
Republican policy support, the fit lines for those who perceive threat begin higher along 
the y-axis and have gentler slopes than the lines for those who do not perceive threat. In 
Figure 4.5, the inverse occurs for strong Democrats. Here, the fit line for those who 
experience threat has a much steeper slope, and threat’s effect is felt stronger among 
those with strong religious identities. Almost no strong Democrats with weak religious 
identities perceive threat, which makes the fit line a little deceptive. Aside from a few 
outlying data points among weak religious identifiers, the steepness of the slope is due 
almost entirely to higher policy support among strong identifiers who perceive threat. 
                                                
14 Note that coefficients of the lower order variables are uninterpretable aside from 
the interaction coefficient. While threat has a negative regression coefficient, this must be 
viewed together with the interaction term. The scatter plot more intuitively shows threat 
to be associated with stronger policy support, but this varies systematically according to 
the strength of an individual’s religious identity. 
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Figure 4.5 How Threat and Religious Identity Impact Predicted Policy Support for 
Bible Classes in Texas Public High Schools Among Strong Democrats 
 
 
 
Among strong Democrats with the strongest religious identity, the perception of 
threat increases predicted policy support from 3.14 to 4.58, for an increase of 46%. As a 
result, the predicted policy support of those with strong religious identities and who 
perceive threat to religion looks fairly similar for strong Democrats (4.58) and strong 
Republicans (4.73). The perception of threat leads these strong Democrats to more 
resemble Republicans than the balance of their own party. This is all the more interesting 
when noting the statistical significance of party identification in the overall model, which 
shows Democratic Party identification to lead to lower support for these policies. Thus, 
these data show that threat and religious identity can cause even the strongest Democrats 
to buck their party trend. 
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Threat Among the Non-Religious and Unaffiliated  
Do the non-religious and unaffiliated also perceive threat when it comes to 
matters of religion? The regression results in Table 4.3 suggest that they do. When the 
model is fitted for only the non-religious and unaffiliated (sans the traditional religion 
measures), the perception of threat has a statistically significant negative effect on policy 
attitudes toward both Bible classes and teaching the Founders’ religious beliefs.  
Figure 4.6 shows predicted policy support for those who perceive threat and those 
who do not. When the nonreligious and unaffiliated perceive threat, their predicted 
support for these policies moves from approximately neutral to decidedly negative. 
Support for Bible classes in public high schools moves from 3.14 to 1.31, and support for 
teaching the Christian beliefs of the American Founders moves from 2.93 to 1.38. These 
results may seem unsurprising at first glance but are noteworthy for a few reasons. We 
know little about what structures the attitudes of the nonreligious and unaffiliated. Do 
religious factors such as beliefs, identity, and threat affect their political attitudes, or are 
they simply agnostic to such matters entirely? Given that this is a growing segment 
within the American electorate, understanding the dynamics of their politics is 
increasingly important.  
In addition to threat, party identification has a statistically significant impact on 
policy support, in line with results for the general population. Unfortunately, these data 
do not allow for an assessment of religious identity among the non-religious and 
unaffiliated. The measure used in this study is the importance of religion to one’s life. 
Among religious respondents, this demonstrates variation in religion’s salience. 
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However, for those who are not religious, the measure is a misfit when considering that 
the question of interest is the salience of their identity as a nonreligious person. Finding 
better ways to assess this identity for the non-religious and unaffiliated is an area that 
deserves future research, particularly given their steady rise within the population.15 
 
Table 4.3 Models of Attitudes toward Curriculum Changes Among the Non-
Religious and Unaffiliated 
 
		 Bible	Class	 Christian	History	
Constant	 2.670***	 2.471***	
		 (.588)	 (.606)	
Party	ID	 .211***	 .285***	
		 (.065)	 (.068)	
Education	 -.042	 -.116	
		 (.083)	 (.086)	
Income	 -.020	 -.043	
		 (.032)	 (.033)	
Age	 .000	 .007	
		 (.008)	 (.008)	
Female	 .033	 -.150	
		 (.224)	 (.232)	
Black	 .036	 -.108	
		 (.358)	 (.369)	
Hispanic	 -.039	 .485	
		 (.340)	 (.351)	
Urbanicity	 .063	 -.392	
		 (.253)	 (.264)	
Threat	 -1.498***	 -1.004***	
		 (.251)	 (.261)	
Adjusted	R2	 .338	 .341	
N	 138	 135	
*	p	<	0.10;	**	p	<	0.05;	***	p	<	0.01	
	 
 
 
                                                
15 The Pew Research Center’s 2014 Religious Landscape Study found that almost one 
quarter of the adult population claims no religious affiliation, up from 16% in the 2007 
study. About one-third of Millennials are now religiously unaffiliated according to the 
study. 
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Figure 4.6 Predicted Policy Support Among the Non-Religious and Unaffiliated 
 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter utilizes original data from a statewide survey of Texans to offer 
additional support to the dissertation’s overarching hypotheses that religious identity and 
threat play central roles in structuring political attitudes. Three notable findings emerge 
from these data. 
First, when looking at attitudes toward policies that create Bible classes in Texas 
public high schools and revise the state’s curriculum to teach the Christian religious 
beliefs of America’s Founders, strong religious identity and the perception of threat 
toward religion do lead to higher levels of policy support. A statistically significant 
interaction between religious identity and threat also lend additional support to the 
findings in Chapter 3, that the moderating effect of threat on religious identity matters 
more among those with a weak religious identity than among those with strong ones. This 
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is particularly helpful because the research in Chapter 3 relied on an experiment and a 
student survey, whereas this research draws on a statewide survey. 
 Second, when looking at strong partisans, the relationship between religious 
identity and threat manifests similarly among strong Republicans as the general 
population. However, among strong Democrats, threat’s disproportionate positive impact 
inverts from those with weak religious identities to those with strong identities. While 
Democratic party identification is associated with lower support for these policies, the 
level of support rivals that of Republicans for strong Democrats who also have a strong 
religious identity and perceive threat toward religion. The perception of threat among 
these respondents makes their policy support look more like Republicans than their 
fellow Democrats. The party analysis also revealed a partisan difference in Catholicism. 
Catholics who are strong Republicans are more likely to support these policies, whereas 
Catholicism has no effect among strong Democrats. 
 Finally, this chapter finds that threat also exists among the non-religious and 
religiously unaffiliated, and moves these respondents from neutral opinion to strong 
opposition to these policies. 
 These results all support the dissertation’s overarching hypotheses. The chapter 
also suggests areas ripe for further research, such as parsing the partisan differences 
within Catholicism. While threat toward non-religious perspectives does appear to affect 
opinion toward these policies for the non-religious and unaffiliated, future research is 
necessary to establish a similar relationship between threat and non-religion as a social 
identity. While these data are extremely helpful in allowing a real-world examination of 
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this dissertation’s hypotheses, they only look at one policy domain. It is likely that the 
impact of religious identity and threat differ across domains, which is another area in 
which future research could be particularly helpful. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Implications 
 
 
An Enduring Feature 
This dissertation investigates an enduring feature of American politics. From the 
arrival of the earliest European settlers, American politics have evidenced the tension of 
dominion and pluralism. Winthrop’s band of Puritans embarked on a journey across the 
Atlantic to free themselves from the authority of an established church with which they 
disagreed. The threat of sanctions on their rights—and perhaps even lives—by political 
and ecclesiastical authorities impinged their religious conscience to the point of 
separation. With their departure to America, they envisaged a city upon a hill. Yet, their 
vision required not liberty, but conformity. They did not institute a sanctuary where 
persons could enjoy liberty of conscience but rather a new established church according 
to their own precepts; an ironic replication of the very situation from which they fled, 
swapping only the rules and persons of authority. 
From this nascent moment in history, American politics have displayed the 
intertwining religious themes of identity and threat, amidst the push and pull of dominion 
and pluralism. What to do with the minorities who dare not conform to the city’s vision? 
Dissenters like Anne Hutchinson (banished) and Mary Dyer (hanged) found out all too 
well the Puritan project’s limits on conscience, leading other colonial visionaries like 
Roger Williams and William Penn to create religious safe spaces. With the ratification of 
the Bill of Rights, America began to write a new chapter in political history, severing the 
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official tie between church and state and giving rise to a new and more powerful 
voluntary religion that would bring about “the churching of America.”1 
Rather than ending state-church privilege, it may be best to view disestablishment 
as transforming it from de jure to de facto status, until at least the Separationist Era (the 
late 1940s through the 1970s) of the Supreme Court, when generic Protestant sensibilities 
began to recede from social dominance.2 Tension between dominion and pluralism 
remained a notable feature of American political life, evidenced in legislative acts, social 
norms and movements, and acts of violence both physical and verbal. Roman Catholics, 
Jews, and other religious minorities experienced remarkable discrimination. Nativists like 
the Know Nothings openly attacked and murdered Catholics, including the infamous 
Bloody Monday election day riot in Louisville, Kentucky. The Ku Klux Klan and other 
Protestants unleashed unreserved and widespread fearmongering in response to Catholic 
Al Smith’s nomination for the presidency. Policies, now overturned, curtailed the rights 
of Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and atheists.3 Jews founded the Anti-
Defamation League to combat widespread antisemitism. In the aftermath of the 
																																																						
1 This phrase is borrowed from Stark and Finke (2005), who argue that market forces 
of voluntary religion led to higher levels of religiosity in the U.S. See also Hatch (1989). 
2 Beginning in the late 1940s, the court began to give a more expansive reading to the 
restrictions imposed by the Establishment Clause on state action, e.g., McCollum v. 
Board (1948), Engle v. Vitale (1962), Abingdon v. Schempp (1963), Lemon v. Kurtzman 
(1971). See Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2014, Chapter 4) for further discussion. They 
view these cases as roughly bookending a Separationist Era in court rulings that tended to 
curtail public expressions of religion in public institutions. At the same time, the rise of 
progressive social movements challenged the de facto privilege that Protestant 
Christianity had enjoyed in the approximately century and a half since disestablishment. 
3 For example, Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940); 
West Virginia v. Barnette (1943); Missouri Executive Order 44 (1838), aka. the 
Extermination Order, rescinded on June 25, 1976. 
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September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S. by Islamic extremists, American Muslims 
experienced death threats, mosques set ablaze, and Quran burnings. Even Sikhs were 
gunned down in their temple by a neo-Nazi.4 In more recent years, evangelical 
Protestants and conservative Roman Catholics have fought legislative and judicial battles 
on behalf of public expressions of religion, business owners who refuse services when 
events and behaviors violate their religious conscience, and the exclusion of certain 
medical coverage from employer provided health plans for religious reasons.5 
To be fair, the story of religion in American public life is not all so troubling. As 
with most legacies, the Puritan influence and Protestant Christianity’s long held social 
privilege present mixed legacies, with troubling aspects comingled with good. In fact, the 
entrepreneurial spirit of voluntary Protestantism embodied by the Second Great 
Awakening helped to shed the closed provincialism from Winthrop’s vision for a city 
upon a hill and transform it into a new image that aligned religious faith with the greatest 
ideals of Americanism. This is the religion that Tocqueville, the consummate student of 
democratic flourishing, found such an intriguing and indispensable pillar of the American 
experiment’s early success. Evangelical reformers set in place sweeping social 
movements to abolish slavery, reform prisons, improve public education, and provide for 
the needy. Social Gospellers sought to impose moral restraints on the market economy 
and industrialization, end child labor, improve the conditions of workers, and clean up the 
																																																						
4 On August 5, 2012, a white supremacist opened fire at the Sikh Temple of 
Wisconsin in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, killing six worshipers. 
5 For example, The Equal Access Act of 1984; The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014); Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission (accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court for the 2017 term). 
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squalid tenements of the inner city.6 Theological imagination provided language and 
stamina to the Civil Rights movement, so that Martin Luther King, Jr. could identify his 
work with the Apostle Paul’s answer to the Macedonian call for aid and lay claim on 
behalf of black Americans to the very same God-given rights articulated in the 
Declaration of Independence.7 
In his thoughtful and moderated critique of religion’s place in modern American 
political life, Jeffrey Stout (2004, 300) opines that: 
Among the most important democratic movements in American history were 
Abolitionism and the Civil Rights movement; both of these were based largely in 
the religious communities. Religious colleges and seminaries provided strong 
support for both movements. If religious premises had not been adduced in 
support of them, it is unlikely that either movement would have resulted in 
success. 
Religion in American political life has been a dramatic force for the betterment of 
humanity, and at the same time it has engendered great fear on the part of dissenters, 
especially when threatening the temporal sword. The irony must not be lost that Martin 
Luther King, Jr. was writing to a group of ministers, and the fiercest proponents of 
American slavery sat on church vestries. 
We see again religion’s ever-present tension between dominion and pluralism in 
American politics; something that Reinhold Niebuhr would almost certainly term an 
																																																						
6 Lambert (2008) presents a fairly concise overview. 
7 “Letter from Birmingham Jail;” Acts 16-18. 
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ironic situation, where a nation birthed by conceptions of religious freedom and political 
liberty would produce an environment in which religion functions as both sword and 
ploughshare. From the first European settlers to the present day, religion has featured 
prominently in some of America’s most controversial policy debates, many of which 
involve fundamental questions of political rights that directly affect individuals’ lives and 
liberties. This dissertation argues that religion’s role in these controversies extends 
beyond a matter of affiliation, or confessional predisposition, or religiosity, to a deep-
seated social identity that emerges through self-identification with a particular religious 
category; that the perception of threat can cause this identity to rise in salience; and, 
much like we have seen with other forms of group consciousness, this can have a 
powerful effect on the structure of political attitudes. 
In the time since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the power of religion 
to motivate attitudes and behaviors has become increasingly evident. Understanding how 
religion functions as a political determinant is especially important at a time in which 
America grows more diverse, pluralistic, and globally connected. Growing pluralism and 
heightened political division along religious lines exacerbate religion’s prominence in 
some of our national conversation’s most contentious and controversial topics, and 
challenge the political trust and liberal values that maintain democratic stability in the 
U.S. By highlighting the role of religious identity and its responsiveness to threat, this 
dissertation works toward a more thorough rendering of the way in which religion 
structures political attitudes and affects our democratic life as a nation. Such knowledge 
can open new opportunities to find understanding amidst conflict and commonalities 
amidst deep differences, promoting the kind of hope, faith, love, and forgiveness that 
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Niebuhr believed so central to the salvation of American civilization from blindness to 
“hatred and vainglory.”8 
 
Contributions to the Literature 
 Research shows that Americans are increasingly divided along religious lines, 
which has spurred greater interest in the way in which religion structures political 
attitudes and behaviors. However, little research has considered the political effects of 
religion as a social identity. This is a notable omission considering that research on race 
and national identity have shown group identity and perceived threat to have strong 
effects on the views and behaviors of group members. This dissertation offers 
contributions to the literature that bridge this gap in understanding by bringing religion 
into conversation with research on the political relevance of other social identities, 
developing a framework for continued political science research on religion as a social 
identity, and ultimately working toward a more robust picture of religion’s causal impact 
on American politics. 
 Chapter 1 contributes a theoretical perspective that views religion as a social 
identity. Drawing on social identity theory and its previous application in political 
science research to other social categories, this view suggests that religion is a 
meaningful social category through which individuals can develop a psychological 
attachment based on shared characteristics, experiences, ideas, or beliefs. Through this 
sense of attachment to a social group, an individual can also derive a sense of personal 
																																																						
8 The Irony of American History, pp. 63, 174. 
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identity, forming a social identity. Social identities allow individuals to utilize in-group 
versus out-group distinctions to locate themselves within their social and political 
contexts. Social identities also enable individuals to perceive threats to the group, which 
can elevate a social identity’s salience and alter its causal impact on politics. This amends 
the literature’s predominant understanding of religion’s politically relevant facets, which 
include religious belonging, believing, and behaving, but do not account for the sense of 
psychological attachment one may feel toward their religion as a social identity. This also 
enables a more dynamic conceptualization of religion as responsive to changing 
circumstances in the political environment. 
 Chapter 2 operationalizes the concept of religion as a social identity. It adapts 
survey questions from research on other social identities to develop six different 
measurement approaches for religious identity. Analyzing them alongside measures of 
religious belonging, belief, and behavior, it shows religious identity to be related but not 
too strongly correlated, suggesting that religious identity taps a distinct dimension of 
religion. Moreover, religious identity demonstrates predictive power when placed 
alongside these traditional religion measures in models of opinion, causing some to lose 
statistical significance. This chapter’s added value to the literature therefore includes the 
development of reliable measures of religious identity, which can be used to replicate and 
extend this dissertation’s line of research and for side-by-side comparison with other 
social identities. It also contributes to a larger measurement conversation on social 
identity, which Huddy (2003, 522) notes is “troubled by a lack of consistent 
measurement, divergent measurement approaches… and relatively few studies that have 
attempted to cross validate measures.” 
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 Chapter 3 establishes the relationship between religious identity and threat as 
predictors of political attitudes. It shows threat and religious identity to have independent 
and statistically significant effects on political attitudes. It also shows threat to have a 
moderating effect on religious identity, which matters more for those with weaker 
religious identities than for those with stronger ones. This suggests that threat acts like a 
politicizing force for religious identity among those for whom weaker identities might 
otherwise hold little causal influence in structuring their attitudes. Higher levels of 
religious identity and threat lead to more extreme attitudes, which is in line with 
expectations from the literature. However, threat does not necessarily direct these 
attitudes against other groups through more protectionist or retaliatory preferences. This 
departs from expectations in the literature based on research on race and national identity. 
While the results on this count were only modest and suggestive, it does raise the 
possibility that religion can engender democratically-affirming responses to threat. 
 Chapter 4 uses more representative data to confirm the independent effects of 
religious identity and threat on policy attitudes, as well as threat’s moderating effect on 
religious identity. It also introduces two additional findings. Looking at strong partisans, 
it finds that the moderating effect of threat on religious identity among Republicans (as 
with the general population) is felt the strongest by those with weaker religious identities 
and decreases in magnitude as religious identity strengthens. However, the inverse is true 
for Democrats, with threat’s greatest moderating effect being seen among those with 
stronger religious identities. In fact, the opinions of these Democrats most closely 
resemble their Republican counterparts than their fellow partisans, with strong support 
for religious content in public schools. These new findings cohere with understandings in 
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the literature that polarization along religious lines could produce partisan differences in 
how religious identity and threat function. These differences are also evidenced among 
Catholics, with Catholic affiliation having a statistically significant impact on the 
attitudes of strong Republicans but not Democrats, which speaks to diversity and partisan 
cleavages within Catholicism. Chapter 4 also finds evidence that, when threat is 
perceived by the nonreligious and unaffiliated, it has a statistically significant impact on 
opinion in the opposite direction of those who are religious. 
 As with any research project, acknowledging limitations and opportunities for 
future development are also important. At the onset, this dissertation explicitly sought a 
conceptualization of religion that is generalizable across tradition. Data limitations made 
it difficult to more fully explore this. While the theoretical approach develops with 
general applicability in mind, empirical analysis is limited to Christians in Chapters 2 and 
3. Better data in Chapter 4 enable a look at the entire population and a limited look at the 
nonreligious, but data limitations and small sample sizes forestall a more thorough 
examination. The findings here suggest that religious identity and threat do hold across 
religious tradition and warrant additional research to better explicate a more general 
theory and discover how these processes might operate among different religious 
traditions. 
 The policy domains explored in this dissertation present another data limitation. 
Chapter 2 looks specifically at two public policies: attitudes toward abortion and prayer 
at public school events. Chapter 3 also looks at attitudes toward prayer at public school 
events. Chapter 4 remains in the public education orbit, examining attitudes toward 
changes in the state education curriculum designed to increase the presence of religion in 
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the public school classroom. These are policies in which religion has been found to hold 
particular relevance in structuring attitudes. Future research should develop an 
understanding of religious identity and threat’s political relevance across multiple policy 
domains. Might religious identity prove relevant in some policy domains and not others? 
Might the emergence of threat in a particular domain activate its political relevance? How 
might these processes respond to changing circumstances in the political environment 
across domains? These are interesting questions that could be developed by further 
research. Moreover, how do these processes extend from political attitudes to behaviors? 
We know, for example, that religion plays an important role in promoting political 
participation and civic engagement. How might these processes extend to vote choices in 
the context of elections? This presents a logical extension of the research begun in this 
dissertation. 
 These aforementioned areas for further research also present an opportunity to 
more thoroughly explore the partisan differences that emerged in Chapter 4. Two were 
especially noteworthy: the inverse moderating effects of threat on religious identity for 
strong Democrats vis-à-vis strong Republicans, and the emergence of Catholicism as a 
relevant predictor among strong Republicans but not strong Democrats. Further research 
should explore the underlying reasons for differences such as these, their underlying 
causes, and political consequences. This could bring additional insight to our 
understanding of religious and partisan cleavages in the electorate. 
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Two Normative Responses to This Research  
 In conclusion, it may also be worth connecting this research to some broader 
normative considerations about religion in American political life. Theologians and 
theorists have long argued about the rightful place of religion in politics. Entire books 
(and careers) have been spent on this issue, so these closing pages present a far from fully 
developed treatment of this topic. Still, this dissertation’s empirical findings offer some 
relevant implications for this important and ongoing conversation, and warrant at least a 
cursory attempt to outline some normative responses for consideration. 
 First, let us assume for a moment this dissertation’s keystone finding that religion 
is a social identity. This speaks to the very way in which religion is conceptualized. For 
many Americans, religion is more than a category assigned by a demographer or even 
membership in a group. Rather, it entails a deep-seated and personal connection between 
an individual and a religious group, from which an individual derives, to a certain extent, 
one’s very sense of self identity. Marry to that a second key finding, that this social 
identity has significant impact on the way in which religion structures attitudes and 
affects political reasoning. In this way, religion is very much part of democratic decision 
making in the U.S. Moreover, under circumstances of threat, this research suggests that 
religion becomes even more a part of the decision making process, elevating the salience 
and causal impact of religious identity, even for those for whom religion is otherwise a 
more weakly held identity. 
 Some object to this situation as highly problematic and opposed to the ideals of 
political liberalism, John Rawls among the most prominent of such critics. For Rawls, 
	158 
when religion plays a major role in decision making, democratic society risks outcomes 
based on values that lack consensus, which may be biased against some citizens and 
could undermine democratic stability. He proposes instead a “political” conception of 
justice that is “freestanding” and rooted in shared democratic values of fairness.  
The point of the ideal of public reason is that citizens are to conduct their 
fundamental discussions within the framework of what each regards as a political 
conception of justice based on values that the other can reasonably be expected to 
endorse and each is, in good faith, prepared to defend that conception so 
understood (Rawls 2005, 226). 
This proposal places bounds on the extent to which religion can and should be part of the 
democratic conversation—bounds that may prove too difficult given this dissertation’s 
key findings. Consider for a moment the conceptualization of religion as a social identity, 
with the operative word being identity. This implies that religion may be so intimately 
tied to a person’s sense of self, self-categorization within society, and decision making as 
a citizen, that placing such bounds on its democratic participation may be an unworkable 
proposition. 
Workability aside, another concern is the desirability of such a proposal. If 
anything, more recent developments in public attitudes suggest a growing appreciation 
and respect for a person’s identity, with laws and social norms creating space for diverse 
identities to receive welcome in American society. This dissertation suggests the presence 
(and power) of religious identities, which may exist not only across religious tradition but 
also for the nonreligious and unaffiliated. Should social and political welcome be any 
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different for these identities, or would that deny their dignity by requiring a person to 
alter or deny their sense of self in order to fully participate in public life? 
An alternative proposal would be to consider this dissertation’s key findings to 
reinforce the depth of pluralism’s imprint on American democracy, and develop a public 
culture of tolerance toward religion that respects the diverse contributions of many voices 
as coequal dialogical partners in pursuit of common good. Stephen Carter (1993, 230-
231) puts it well: 
What is needed is not a requirement that the religiously devout choose a form of 
dialogue that liberalism accepts, but that liberalism develop a politics that accepts 
whatever form of dialogue a member of the public offers. Epistemic diversity, like 
diversity of other kinds, should be cherished, not ignored, and certainly not 
abolished. What is needed, then, is a willingness to listen, not because the speaker 
has the right voice but because the speaker has the right to speak. Moreover, the 
willingness to listen must hold out the possibility that the speaker is saying 
something worth listening to; to do less is to trivialize the forces that shape the 
moral convictions of tens of millions of Americans. 
This dissertation’s findings suggest that Carter may be too modest in referring simply to 
the religiously “devout,” but that religious identity—especially under conditions of 
threat—can have a broader impact on the structure of public opinion. 
 In essence, one normative response to this dissertation would be to adopt a “glass 
half full” reaction to the capacity of American democracy to accommodate a vibrant 
religious pluralism even in the shadow of 9/11. To be clear, religious pluralism presents a 
challenge for a democratic society. Religion can inspire intolerance, hate, and even 
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murder; but it has also proven a force for social good and democratic flourishing. 
Religion has been shown to nurture civil society and promote political participation 
(Putnam 2000; Verba et al. 1995), and democratic stability and economic development 
(Woodberry 2012), and Neuhaus (1984) considers it an independent moral check on state 
action and the only sure check on totalitarianism. As noted earlier, Stout views religion as 
inseparable from some critical advances in human rights. Would we be better off without 
it? He poetically argues no: 
We should not imagine the life-giving sources on which we depend as something 
essentially alien to American democratic modernity. That stream is in us and of us 
when we engage in our democratic practices. Democracy, then, is misconceived 
when considered to be a desert landscape hostile to whatever life-giving waters of 
culture and tradition might still flow through it. Democracy is better construed as 
the name appropriate to the currents themselves in this particular time and place 
(Stout 2004, 308). 
 Of course, religion’s social benefits are not Rawls’s chief concern so much as its 
capacity in the other direction. However, if this dissertation’s findings raise red flags 
about his proposal’s workability, it might also suggest some relief for his fears. In 
Chapter 3, there appears no evidence that perceived threat to a majority religious group 
leads to higher support for policies that privilege that group (Christianity in this case) at 
the expense of the minority (Muslims). The policy response was instead democratically-
affirming, with greater support for both Christian and Muslim prayers in response to a 
perceived threat to Christianity’s social status. Although modest, this is one of the 
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dissertation’s most intriguing findings, and one that I hope receives future attention. It 
also segues to a second normative response to this dissertation’s findings. 
 Any call for a religion-affirming public square should dovetail with a call to 
nurture democratically-affirming public theologies within faith communities. As my 
former ethics professor and rabble rouser, the late James Dunn, argued, “All true freedom 
is in a real sense religious freedom. It is that which replicates the Divine in all of us that 
makes us response-able, responsible and free” (Dunn and Cothen 2000, 7). The Rawlsian 
fear is not without cause. Religious actors have too often ignored their democratic 
responsibility; which, as Dunn would argue, is also a religious responsibility. As a result, 
religion can manifest in triumphant rather than democratic ways. As an example, Richard 
Mouw (2010, 161) recounts the words of the Dutch theologian and politician Abraham 
Kuyper before a university audience in Amsterdam, “There is not one square inch of the 
entire creation about which Jesus Christ does not cry out, ‘This is mine! This belongs to 
me!’” Such an approach to public policies could perhaps work in Winthrop’s Puritan 
colony, but even a generous reading of Kuyper’s approach would not work in pluralist 
modern America. Not without alienating a massive number of Americans. Not without 
the dangerous potential of trampling on the rights of others. Not without disregard for any 
semblance of democratic responsibility. 
 For this reason, Mouw suggests introducing the triumphant Kuyper to the public 
engagement modeled by Mother Teresa. Word-for-word, Mouw suggests that Mother 
Teresa would have no objection to any part of Kuyper’s famous “every square inch” 
manifesto, but that: 
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She knew that many of those square inches are presently occupied by people with 
stinking, rotting flesh, by grieving parents, by frightened children—the abused, 
the abandoned, the persecuted and the desperately poor. And she was convinced 
that our “claiming” those places in the name of Christ means that we must go out 
to join them “in the distressing disguise” as he makes the agony of the suffering 
ones his very own. (168) 
Why should faith communities assume the responsibility to nurture democratically-
affirming public theologies? Because they have the capacity to inspire and shape the 
sensibilities of the faithful. Religion as a social identity suggests that the contours of the 
religious group—its values, beliefs, concerns, characteristics, and how they are practiced 
and modeled—can inform an individual’s own sense of identity. In the context of a 
pluralist society, democratically-affirming public theologies can champion religion’s 
capacity for social betterment and curb its capacity for harm. They can uphold in one 
hand a religious tradition’s particular vision for human flourishing, while holding in the 
other a kind of Niebuhrian humility: 
in which the urgencies of the struggle are subordinated to a sense of awe before 
the vastness of the historical drama in which we are jointly involved; to a sense of 
modesty about the virtue, wisdom and power available to us for the resolution of 
its perplexities; to a sense of contrition about the common human frailties and 
foibles which lie at the foundation of both the enemy’s demonry and our vanities; 
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and to a sense of gratitude for the divine mercies which are promised to those who 
humble themselves (Niebuhr 1952, 174).9 
A democratically-affirming public theology allows the individual to stand in between 
these two arms of moral vision and responsible humility, and embody the prophet 
Micah’s admonition to “do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your 
God” as democratic citizens and as neighbors.10 
 This is not the kind of democratic engagement about which James Hunter wrote 
in his 1991 book, Culture Wars. (Perhaps just as telling is the title of his subsequent 
book, Before the Shooting Begins, which sought to rescue democracy from the former.) A 
short time after the release of Culture Wars, former presidential candidate Pat Buchanan 
was invited to address the Republican National Convention, in which he drew on 
Hunter’s terminology to cast the 1992 Presidential Election as: 
a religious war…. a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we shall be as 
was the Cold War itself, for this war is for the soul of America. And in that 
struggle for the soul of America, Clinton and Clinton are on the other side, and 
George Bush is on our side (Buchanan 1992). 
Hunter recalled, “when I heard the speech I was absolutely appalled… it is one thing to 
analyze the cultural and political landscape as a culture war; it is another thing, quite 
another thing, to use this as a call to arms” (Hunter 2007). 
																																																						
9 Niebuhr spoke specifically here about the struggle between Soviet-style communism 
and American-style liberalism, but as with so much of Niebuhr, his words find wide-
ranging application. 
10 Micah 6:8, New Revised Standard Version. 
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 With the retrospect of time, he has considered further the public engagement of 
persons like Buchanan in the decades since publishing Culture Wars. Also telling, his 
response has transformed from sociological analysis to a sociologically-informed 
theological argument about how to make the world a better place by reconciling modern 
pluralism with religious faithfulness; about how to be simultaneously faithful as a 
democratic citizen and faithful to one’s religion. Hunter draws parallels between pluralist 
modern America and the Babylonian exile of the Hebrews, where the exilic community 
was instructed by the Prophet Jeremiah to “seek the welfare of the city where I have sent 
you into exile, and pray to the Lord on its behalf, for in its welfare you will find your 
welfare.”11 Rather than domination, or conquest, or retaliation, Hunter terms the 
prophet’s call a theology of “faithful presence,” where “commitment to the new city 
commons is a commitment of the community of faith to the highest ideals and practices 
of human flourishing in a pluralistic world” (279). 
From this dissertation emerges a picture of “the politics of the people of God” that 
are structured in no small way by religion as a powerful social identity from which 
individuals can derive a fundamental sense of self, an identity that is sensitive to its 
political circumstances and responsive to perceived threats. In a time of growing 
pluralism and ever-deepening religious and partisan cleavages, this could portend dark 
days for democratic stability. But, history has also shown the capacity of religion to 
nurture democracy and advance the cause of justice. This dissertation also suggests that 
religion is able to offer a democratically-affirming response to the threats associated with 
																																																						
11 Jeremiah 29:7, New Revised Standard Version. 
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social and demographic change. Promoting a religion-affirming public square and 
nurturing democratically-affirming public theologies within communities of faith do not 
promise some kind of utopian future. But they do extend from this dissertation’s findings 
as reasonable responses to the serious challenges and deep differences that we face in 
pluralist modern America. 
As we face these challenges, we should also remember that it is not the first time 
America has confronted deep differences and emerged whole on the other side. President 
Lincoln’s words are just as prescient today as they were when the darkening clouds of 
civil war gathered on the horizon: 
We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may 
have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of 
memory will swell when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better 
angels of our nature.12 
																																																						
12 Abraham Lincoln’s first inaugural address, March 4, 1861. 
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